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Abstract ix 
During the period of 1993-2002, the US and China had 14 summits between 
themselves. Compare to only two times in the past decade, this increase was 
remarkable. Eight of the fourteen cases were leaders' meeting in APEC. There was no 
common enemy serving as the ground for further cooperation, worse, there were 
sufficient divergences in their, there were also sufficient divergences in their 
ideological, political and economic systems, as well as their basic values, for them to 
go into conflict. Contrary to the long-standing key of Chinese foreign policy 
consideration, Jiang Zemin longed to have summit with his US counterpart regardless 
to the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, NATO bombing on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy 
in 1999 and even the EP-3 collision in 2001. 
In light of these dramatic changes，this research aims to examine the trigger 
factors behind the increasing number of bilateral summits despite the mountainous 
battles between China and the US, and to what extent APEC contributed to this 
regular pattern. Based on an investigation on the three cases in 1996, 1999 and 2001 
respectively, the research attempts to explore the underlying reasons for China to 
attend the summit with a two-level game instead of a realism approach. This project 
will argue that both domestic and international concerns are valid and count in the 
decision-making of foreign policy. The theoretical implication of this interacting 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Summit in Sino-American relations 
Table 1.1 The Summitry history in the Sino-American Relationship 
Year 1972-1982 1983-1992 1993-2002 
No. of 2 times 2 times 14 times 
Summit 1972 Nixon^China 1984 Reagan^China 1993 Clinton&Jiang^APEC Seattle 
1975 Ford->China (1985 Li Xiannian -^ US) 1994 Clinton&Jiang-^APEC Borgor 
(1979 Deng US) 1989 Bush —China 1995 Clinton&Jiang->UN anniversary 
“ 1996 Clinton&Jiang^APEC Manila 
1997 Jiang— US 
1997 Clinton&Jiang-^APEC Vancouver 
1998 Cl inton乂hina 
1999 Clinton&Jiang^APEC Auckland 
2000 Clinton&Jiang别N millennium 
2000 Clinton&Jiang^ APEC BandarSeri 
2001 Bush & Jiang+ APEC Shanghai 
2002 Bush->China 
2002 Jiang-> US 
2002 Bush & Jiang》APEC Los Cabos 
1.1 A Magic Figure 
Jiang Zemaii gave the world an astonishing show when lie was in power, During 
Jiang's 13 years of tenure as the leader of the state, the number of summitry between 
US presidents and Chinese preeminent leaders multiplied by seven. With their 
common ground gone with the USSR and mounting disputes over various issues such 
as Taiwan and human rights, it is interesting to dissect how Jiang could build this list 
of summits. 
30^ '' Anniversary of Rapprochement between the US & China 
Jiang, or the third generation leadership of the People's Republic of China, 
witnessed the anniversary of rapprochement in Sino-American relations. 
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Kaleidoscope is probably the best word to describe the 'ups and downs' involved. As 
shown in the above table, in the past ten years (1993-2002), the number of 
summitries increased dramatically. Following Richard Nixon's rapprochement with 
China in 1972, there were only two or three summitries in each decade. The 14 
summitries during the decade since 1993 is thus atypical in Sino-US relation. 
From two to fourteen, from Mao Zedong to Jiang Zemin, from enemies to 
constructive partners of the US, from closed door to joining the international regime 
in a full spectrum, the world seems so different for China. None of the US Presidents 
in the history met their China counterparts more than once in their tenures before 
1992. When Bill Clinton was elected as US Presidents, however, he met Jiang Zemin 
once a year after the latter become the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). Summit, although as a symbol of respect and honor, was seldom held in Mao 
Zedong's or even Deng Xiaoping's era. But it is getting important, a phenomena 
which has become an interesting puzzle for research in Sino-American relations. 
Hence, this thesis would like to explain the reason for this remarkable increase 
ill summitries between the US and China presidents. Moreover, through the cases-
studies in Chapter 4-6, it would be clear to what extent the summitries contribute to 
building and repairing Beijing and Washington relationship, that other communication 
channels might not achieve. Further, given that eight out of the fourteen meetings 
between the heads of states were set at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) leaders meeting platform, it is worth accounting for the role of APEC in 
institutionalizing Sino-American summits. 
2 
Summitry between the two heads took place since the two countries were 
connected. Their relations fluctuated throughout the subsequent thirty years with 
cross-nation crises linger. Nevertheless, their contacts never stop, there were bad 
times in their relationship. For instance, the Vietnam War in 1970s, when the US 
made made a signature on the 'Taiwan Relations Act，in 1979, the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre 1989 when the US opened criticism China as 'butcher' and the recent 
military confrontation in Taiwan Strait in 1996. But then the two countries managed 
the relations well in 1997 and 1998 when reciprocal visits were conducted between 
Clinton and Jiang. In 2001，the US supported China's admission to World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Jiang even had barbecued in Bush's ranch in these two years. 
What message can we read from these changes? Are the Sino-American 
relations consolidated? Did those altercations disappear? How could there be frequent 
summits given an unstable relationship between the US and China? Are there 
absences of conflicts at the same time? 
1.2 The Puzzle 
In reality, crises abound all over the years ranging from the US granting visa 
to Lee Teng-hui in 1995, The third Taiwan Strait crisis inl996, NATO bombing the 
Belgrade Chinese Embassy in 1999 and to the EP-3 plane incident in 2001. These 
crises are to various extend harming the three foremost items on Beijing's long 
standing foreign policy agenda~security, development and unification^ The two 
Taiwan incidents in 1995 and 1996 concerned the unification problem, while the 
Embassy and EP-3 incidents involved national security, since they could be regarded 
‘H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong (2001)，"The Foreign Policy outlook of China's 'Three 
generation' elite" in David Lampton (2001), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the 
Era of reform, 1978-2000. Ch. 5，pp. 123-150. 
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as invasions of overseas powers. China was indeed very sensitive to this kind of 
intervention by the US, and normally the administrations' response would be tough 
reprimanding each other so much, so that they came to the brink of cutting off their 
contacts. Simply, Jiang and Clinton, however, handled there serious crises in such a 
w a y tha t t h e y r e t a ined the i r m e e t i n g s , e v e r y t i m e e v e n a f t e r t he c l a s h e s , t h e l eade r s , 
especially Jiang Zemin still attend the summits. And at the meetings, they had 
dialogues, though not a very gracious one but at least they kept the conversation. 
These dialogues and meetings never ceased since 1993 when they were by the APEC 
meeting in Seattle. Why did they still attend the summit albeit crisis occurred? 
Are the presidents free from internal pressure? Or are they risk-seeking by putting 
themselves into a dangerous position? 
In American politics, the iron triangle一White House, Congressmen and interest 
groups shapes the direction of government policy. All politicians have to be mindful 
of, and cautious about public opinion or they will not be re-elected. The White House 
certainly cannot appear apologetic towards China in terms of a crisis. Consequently, 
holding a summit could not be easy. Similarly, although the president of state faced 
no pressure from public election, the internal power struggle is vigorous. Acting too 
mild appeasing Washington will be condemned by other members of the Politburos. 
The leader would easily lose his power. In addition, rising nationalism^in China 
forbids the leader to compromise under crisis. Hence, it could be said that in 
summitries upon these crises was a brilliant accomplishment by Jiang. 
2 Yong Nian Zheng (1999), Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and 
International relations, Ch. 6 pp. 111-138. Also in Si Cheng, 'Chinese Say No to the United States' in 
Beijing Review, Oct 1996, pp. 13. 
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History told us that the two countries have sharply divergent worldviews. They 
are contrasting political systems, competing geo-strategic interests and opposing 
values in various concepts like human rights versus sovereignty. It is difficult to 
predict whether relations between them will remain confrontational or will become 
cooperative, from the chronology (appendix 1), these revolutionizes never stopped 
and static. Despite these conflicting views, Chinese and American leaders met at least 
once a year in last decade even though their relationships were as cold as in the polar. 
Does this amazing change signify a new era in Sino-American relation? Has their 
relationship developed from fragile to robust? Are the debates between containment 
or engagement, constructive strategic partner or strategic competitive rival, threat or 
friend over? It seems a bit early to come into a conclusion; however it is certain that 
they are impossible to isolate from each other, though they are connected. As saying 
goes, “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Only our 
interests are eternal and perpetual^” Although in international politics, there are no 
forever friends. Indeed China and the US are in some way cannot afford to lose each 
other. Therefore, the above dichotomies neglect an important interaction in US-China 
relation. Discarding a dichotomous classification, one should observe that both 
countries have been learning to handle their relations. 
The Central Question 
Rather than saying that the US and China have learnt to manage their relations 
gradually, or some would further conclude that their interests were embedded. It 
cannot be denied that the US and China are interdependent in various aspects, 
including economic, security and international support etc (will be further discussed 
3 A statement by Lord Palmerston, one of the most famous British Prime Minister. 
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in Chapter 3—Theoretical Framework) Throughout these years they have been 
searching for the best way to get along with each other which serve their own interests 
best even though conflicts stay on. As a result, there is cooperation between a rising 
dragon and the hegemonic eagle. This paper attempts to take a snap-shot at their 
relationship by picking out one important area for analysis summitry, especially the 
summitry platform provided by APEC, between two countries' leaders, a niche which 
past literatures had devoted surprisingly little attention. Summitry could be a 
significant event that would influence domestic and international interaction in Sino-
American relationship. Hence this thesis would like to examine why the number of 
Sino-American summitries increase remarkably and how did APEC help to 
institutionalize their ties as a bridge. 
1.3 The Layout 
To develop a comprehensive answer to the above questions, this research will 
combine theoretical elements, like the debate of rational choice and power model, the 
contemporary international relations discussion on dominated theory realism, with 
double-edged game in Chapter 2 as well as the value of summitry in literature review, 
in order to show the dynamics of interaction among domestic politics and 
international context. An integrated conceptual framework will be constructed in 
Chapter 3 Methodology, to explain the summitry development throughout the decade 
from 1993 to 2002，using the data from various sources. Models on how summitry 
worked in APEC will be prepared for further examination in the next parts. Since the 
pattern of conflicts and summits repeated in the last ten years, this thesis will pick 
three representing cases, 1996，1999 and 2001 for analysis in Chapter 4，5 and 6 
respectively. 
6 
The case in chapter 4 was mainly caused the weak leader, Jiang Zemin, who had 
to handle the Taiwan crisis amid internal storm in 1996. In Chapter 5, despite Jiang's 
power was much consolidated, he faced a Waterloo in trade deal together with an 
invasion of boundary by the US-led air raid in Belgrade in 1999. While the 
atmosphere of Sino-American relations was improving in the case of Chapter 6, the 
plane collision incident and the power struggle over leader succession within the CCP 
cast shadow over their relations in 2001. Nevertheless, Jiang still attended the summit 
with the facilitation by APEC. 
To sum up, this research tries to integrate the internal politics and external 
circumstance in triangular interaction with the summitry. The cases are designed to 
show the causal relationship between the dynamics of two-levels, internal and 
external factors, and the significant increase in the number of summits by the platform 
provided by APEC. 
Argument 
In this thesis, I will argue that Jiang use the lever of two-level game to enhance 
his standing in Politburo, regardless he was weak at the early 90s，through actively 
participate in summits, he consolidated the power from within. APEC as pre-
scheduled platform gave Jiang a perfect excuse to communicate with US even though 




Linking the internal politics to decision-making process of foreign policy: 
Rational model vs Power model in high politics 
2.1 What is a Summit? 
In international relations, the term 'summit' implies participation by either the 
head of state or the head of government'^ in a diplomatic avenue, meaning the face-to-
face meeting between two or more heads of states. Referring to historical documents, 
the term 'summit' originated from Winston Churchill's constant calls during the 
1950s for meetings at the highest levels of government to resolve international 
differences^. Among the many means of communication between countries, summitry 
is a relatively rare case than the diplomats' contacts in diplomacy. Usually, 
representatives in a summit are leaders of the executive power, e.g. the president of 
the US6. As a president of the US has two separate posts, the head of state, who is a 
personal embodiment of the state's formal power and authority which is symbolically 
significant, and the head of government, who carries out policy-making and political 
responsibilities^, thus the executive authority is concentrated in the hands of the 
president. China's case was more complicated at any moment in time. Approximately 
25-30 people constitute China's top leadership, (In the current term, from November 
8-14 2002 till now, Hu Jintao replaced Jiang as the new Party Secretary at the 16 '^' 
4 Harry Harding, 'The Clinton-Jiang Summits: An American Perspective' in Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S. 
Cheung, (eds) (1999) The Outlook for US-China relations following the 1997-1998 Summits: 
Chinese and American Perspectives on Security, Trade and Cultural Exchange. 
5 David H. Dunn (1996)，Diplomacy at the Highest Level, Part I: The evolution of Summitry, pp. 3-40. 
6 B. Guy Peter, R.A.W. Rhodes & Vincent Wright (2000), 'Staffing the summit: The Administration of 
the Core Executive: Convergent Trends and National Specificities', Administrating the Summit, pp. 3-
22. 
7 Andrew Hey wood (2002), Politics (2"'' Edition), Ch.l6, pp. 334. 
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Party Congress. During the Congress, new member of the 24-member Politburo and 
its 9-member Standing Committee were chosen forming the top policy and decision 
making bodies in China^) This group is roughly equivalent to the Executive 
Committee of an American corporate hierarchy. They are not defined only by their 
formal position. IT is possible that some of them are in sufficient political disgrace 
that they would not be considered as the top power elite even though they retained 
their formal titles. Conversely, some stems of the top leadership possess intangible 
attributes^. The one who has the final say on political matters should be the 
preeminent leader. So far, China has three Mao Zedong until 1976, after a brief 
interregnum, Deng Xiaoping from 1978 � to 1993 and succeed by Jiang Zemin to the 
present. In Deng's era，the then head of state Li Xiannian only had an official capacity 
instead of real power. Therefore, Li's visit to the US in 1985 was hardly a summit. In 
contrast, when Deng visited to the US in 1979，he enjoyed the supreme power despite 
he had no official title like Party Secretary or President. In this light, Deng was the 
Chinese head of state in practice by the time he visited the US, while Li was just a 
leader in name when it was his turn in 1985. 
In the Cold War period, the world was divided into two major camps, the 
Western capitalist camp versus the Eastern communist one, led by the US and the 
USSR respectively. Dialogues between their presidents were essential for handling 
divergences and preventing rifts from aggravating. Thus, summits between the two 
dominant powers in order to reduce the risk of the world were frequent, whereas 
throughout the history of Sino-American relations, the number of summit between 
them during the Cold War period was limited. From that time on, the world was 
"Kerry Dunibaugh, 'China-US relations: Current Issues for the 108山 Congress' in CRS Report for 
Congress (^Order Code RL31815) Updated July 25, 2003 
9 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg (1988), Ch. 2 ‘At the Top', Policy Making in China: 
Leaders, Structures, and Processes, pp. 35-41. 
丨。Ibid, p.36. 
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characterized by a bipolar setting in which, two superpowers dominated most of the 
world affairs. Crisis diplomacy was common as 'only the emergency of war could 
have impelled these elder men and their associates to accept such frequent toil and 
risk. ” , Since attending summit was not without risk, Presidents who do so as the 
representatives of their states were under great pressure. Moreover, they were 
expected to get certain achievements in the summit, returning home empty handed 
would be shameful. The Cold War had augmented the extraordinary nature of summit, 
a form of diplomacy which helps narrow down two conflicting parties divergences, 
reduce the risk of real confrontation，summit was thus vital for containing crisis. 
The US and China have never faced emergency of war, nor even in 1996 
Taiwan Strait confrontation, which was just a military drill rather than a real threat of 
war, through 1993 to 2002, then why were there so many summitries between them? 
It was an extraordinary development in the past decade. The development of 
summit diplomacy in the and century has a significant impact on state-to-
state relationship, it was constructive with respect to the way in which dialogue 
between participating countries was conducted. However this subject area remains 
under-explored. After the Cold War, the emergency of summits could not be 
contingent on the threat of war. In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR in 1991, 
the bipolar world changed, the US and China no longer shared a common enemy, and 
thus lack a common ground for cooperation. Their relations are hence loaded with of 
clashes. Discrepancies, ranging from ideological, political, to those regarding 
economic and social systems made them incompatible in a wide range of issues 
“Abba Eban (1983) The New Diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modem Age. P. 361. 
10 
including human rights, trade, arms control and disarmament, and Taiwan issues. 
Therefore, method should be found for handling the divergences. Scholars like Robert 
Ross mentioned that if they want to keep a sturdy relationship under so many 
potential clashes, it required both sides to have extensive negotiation and to make 
mutual adjustment. Dialogues are thus admittedly critical for them to handle 
differences across the broad. 
In the past ten years, Sino-US summitry between has remarkably increased 
(Table 1.1)，American and Chinese leaders' meetings have never stopped since 1993, 
and they met at least once a year. Between 2000 and 2002 alone, they had six summits 
within three years, twice a year on average, in comparison to twice a decade in the 70s. 
This noteworthy phenomenon is the focus of this thesis. Yet, before getting into the 
explanation part, it would be useful to have an understanding on the making of 
foreign policy in both sides first. As part of the important avenue for Sino-American 
relations, there should be special messages one could derive from summitries between 
the top leaders, indeed it really depends on 'to what extent leaders have bearing on the 
foreign policy'. Otherwise, it is unclear that why summitry was an important topic 
that worth discussing? Above all, exactly what are the political implications derived 
from leaders' meetings? The decision making process of both sides would shed light 
on all this question. 
2.2 Who is/are the person(s) in charge of foreign policy making process? 
12 Robert S. Ross (1995) Negotiating cooperation: the United State and China, 1969-1989，pp. 1-15 
Introduction. 
11 
The decision-making process was a very human one. It is a complex and 
confusing process^^especially in the context of China~a state which emphasizes on 
relationship (guawci). It requires a glimpse of the involving parties in high-politics so 
as to understand the operation of foreign policy decision making. 
In most nations, the ultimate power to make decision, especially on major 
foreign policy issues in particular, is fairly concentrated. Usually the final say is 
rested in one person. Even in the US, a society well known by its openness, a 
superpower might handle the dispersion of power and the complexity of international 
relations, its key foreign policy decision was exclusively made by the president and a 
small group of his closest policy advisors, ^ "^ it can be imagine that expect that the case 
in China would not differ much from that. The ultimate decision making power is still 
concentrated among the political elites, or we might say in one single individual. Yan 
Jiaqui, a rebellious political scientist, further commented that 'in China, only one man 
does the thinking.'^^His comment is based on the long line of monarchs stretching 
from Qin the first emperor to Deng Xiaoping. The absolute power of Chinese 
preeminent leaders has declined after Deng, making him the last helmsman of China. 
In Deng's era, he played a pivotal role in all significant issues^^. Deng passed his 
power to Jiang whose ability has no match with that of Deng's, Jiang gradually 
solidified his hold on the levers of power within the party after 1989 though, and more 
so after 1997 or after the 15山 Party Congress. It should be noted that on many foreign 
policy questions, record suggests that Jiang did consult with other members of the 
13 Robert L Suettinger (2003) Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989-2000. Ch. 
1，Introduction. 
14 A Doak Bamett (1985) The making of foreign policy in China: Structure & Process, P. 7. 
15 Willy WO Lap Lam (1995) China after Deng Xiaoping: The power struggle in Beijing since 
Tiananmen, Introduction: Dend Xiaoping's controversial Legacy. 
16 Ibid, P.3. 
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Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), as well as the Politburo and the Foreign 
Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG)'^. Besides, the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) was another hidden power influencing diplomacy. Although no evidence 
shows that PLA plays a decisive role in major foreign policy decision, it have 
involved in many of the problematic issues, especially in bilateral relations, including 
the suppression of democracy activists at Tiananmen in 1989, the missile test of 1996, 
the sales of technology for weapons of mass destruction to states of concern, the illicit 
acquisition of the US technology, development of strategic doctrine hostile to the US 
and even the EP-3 incident in 2001^^. In short, both of the US and China's foreign 
policy decisions were under the hand of a few, the heads of the executive branch and 
other related staff, few of their resolutions could be made unmindful of internal 
considerations or are free from restrictions. 
Given the predominant role of the chief executives in US-PRC relations, with 
the chief executives in the two countries making the ultimate decisions, which did not 
involve lower level official waging policy battles in the bureaucracy, the outcome in 
the summits tended to reflect the chief executive's decision. Idiosyncratic leadership 
style especially affects the consistency of policy-making stability in democratic 
countries where there is regular leadership turnover. In contrast, in communist 
countries where regular democratic election is absent at the highest organs of power 
policy is relatively more stable except in times of political succession'^. 
17 Robert L Suettinger (2003) ‘Back to the Cold, 1999-2000' Ch. 10，p. 430 
'8 Robert L Suettinger (2003) 'Back to the Cold, 1999-2000' Ch. 10，p. 431 
19 Robert S. Ross (1995) Negotiating cooperation: the United States and China, 1969-1989. 
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As mentioned the Constitution stipulates that, the president is the federal official 
primarily responsible for the US' relations with foreign nations^® and confers overall 
the executive authority in the hands of the president, it also restricts him/her by 
installing checks and balances from the legislative branch. It is the powers and 
limitations of the US presidential system that influence various presidents' policy 
over international relations, from Senior Bush, Clinton and Junior Bush, depending on 
different in domestic context they are in. Since American foreign policy decision has 
to be endorsed by the Congress, the available choice sets are different from what he 
wants. For instance, the capacity of R. Nixon to make FPD decreased after Vietnam 
War in the 70，s and the 'Watergate' incident because of he was troubled by the 
legitimacy problem. All treaties and war declaration must then be made by the 
Congress whereas amid the Korean War, no formal declaration by the Congress was 
required, the then President could sufficiently determine foreign affairs by signing 
'executive agreements'. 
Occasionally, the president may personally participate in international 
conferences where chiefs of state meet for direct consultation. President Woodrow 
Wilson headed the American delegation to the Paris Conference at the end of World 
War I，President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Allied leaders during World War II. 
Every president since then has sat down with other world leaders to discuss economic 
and political issues and to reach bilateral and multilateral agreements. Their 
engagement in the summits will be discussed later 
2° From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President of the United States#Presidetitial powers 
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Politics in Beijing is of a different character than the US. Its political system is 
highly centralized and personalistic, with the preponderance of decision making 
authority vested in the CCP's PBSC^'. China is an authoritarian or totalitarian state, 
which social controls were thoroughly penetrated, decision-makings were highly 
hierarchical and narrow focused in the hands of a few, in extreme cases; policies were 
from the senior politburo only, that is the top leaders. Chinese former Premier Zhou 
Enlai had a famous phase commenting on foreign policy decision making 'There's no 
minor issues in diplomacy.'(夕 交無/J�事）He believed that every single spark could 
politically ruin the relationship. Therefore he never moved his eye off foreign 
relations. His statement drives home the points why foreign policy decision-making 
authority his to be highly centralized. If there is no minor issues in foreign policy, no 
decision should be made in the hands of the minor officials. However, an 
authoritarian government does not alike to a government which can neglect other 
parties or public's sentiment. It was very important to remember that in China, the top 
leadership does not make decision free form restrains. Rather, it was much confined 
by the increasing nationalism and the power struggle from within. 
As Kenneth Liberthal mentioned 'Internal factors' always 'constrain their (the 
leaders) own diplomatic choice'since how the leaders handled the foreign policy 
will affect their internal standings. Jiang Zemin has typically strengthened his position 
in PRC leadership by associating himself with a more moderate line towards the US. 
Tyler described in his book J Great Walf^ the situation in early 1998 that after the 
reciprocal summitry of Jiang's visit to Washington in 1997 and receiving Clinton in 
21 Robert L Suettinger (2003)，Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989-2000, 
'Back to the Cold, 1999-2000' Ch. 10, p.429. 
22 Kenneth Lieberthal (1997) 'Domestic Forces and Sino-US relations', in Ezra F Vogel (ed.) US-China 
relations in twenty first century, Ch. 8，pp. 254-276 
23 Patrick Tyler (1999), A Great Wall, pp. 381-417. Clinton: The Butchers of Beijing. 
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Beijing in 1998，Jiang strengthened his position against his competitors and ensured 
the appointment of a new and more pragmatic Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, his friend 
of the "Shanghai Gang" who replaced Jiang's main competitor, hard-liner Li Peng. 
2.3 Foreign Policy decision making model (s) 
-Rationality model VS Power model 
This kind of elaboration on policy formation process, which is known as 
'individual power approach' and is competing with the traditional rational choice 
approach emphasizes on the calculation of rationality; decision maker chooses the 
best option from the available choice set. The outcome will be a purposeful action 
based on cost-benefit calculation which aims at maximizing expected utility?^ it can 
be called as a 'policy analysis' for this rational model focuses on the response of 
leaders to the changing economic and foreign policy environment by evaluating its 
choice sets and ranking preferences according to national interest. The decision 
should be the result of an evaluation of choice by a coherent group with shared 
perceptions of the values to be maximizing in response to a perceived problem?^ 
Under this approach, decision maker will focus on the evolution of policy in particular 
areas.26 The policy outcomes are expected to serve national interest best. This 
rationality model is also advocated by Harry Harding in Organizing China�? However, 
the existences of this 'coherent group' of top leaders are questionable in reality. 
Actual motivations of the decision makers might differed from the stated rationales. 
Hence, other scholars have suggested the alterative explanations Wu Guoguang in 
24 Prof. Kuan Hsin Chi's lecture on Rational Choice Theory (GPA 5290 Contemporary political science) 
25 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg (1988) Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and 
Process, Ch. 1 Structure and Process: An Overview, p. 11 
26 ibid, p. 9 
27 Harry Harding (1981)，Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976, Ch. 1 The 
politics of bureaucracy in Contemporary China, pp. 1-31. 
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Passions, Politics & Politicians: Beijing between Taipei and Washington^^dbsQXVQS 
that on the policy making in China was rested on 'Leaders' individual interest in 
politics and power was a critical factor that work to shape foreign behaviors, the 
leaders then advance their concern into national interest. As Joseph Nye mentioned 
'national interest can change over time: defining national interests in concrete 
situations involves understanding constraints and cost...but Chinese leaders have to 
contend with the constraints imposed by other countries and by the trade offs among 
their own making...in the real world, countries need to re-define their interests... 
Given that most analysts explain the behavior in foreign decision making in 
terms of one basic conceptual model entitled the Rational model as Allison's model I 
in Essence of Decision 严 they assumed the decision made would be a purposive act of 
a unified national government instead of diversified concerns within the 
administration. Allison admitted the explanatory power of this classic model is 
inadequate. He then introduced Model II，Organizational Process Model, and Model 
III，Bureaucratic Politics Model, as a comprehensive account for the Cuba Missile 
Crisis. The third model attempts to identify the perception, motivation and power of 
the principle players, and to focus on internal politics of a government which was on 
intimate terms with power model's concerns. 
28 Guoguang Wu (2002) Passions, Politics & Politicians: Beijing between Taipei & Washington， 
Conference Paper in international colloquium "U.S.-Asia Relations Today: A New 'New World 
Order'?" in Paris, December 2-4 2002 
29 Julia Hurtzig & Eberhard Sandschneider (2000)，'National Interest and Multilateral Cooperation: The 
PRC & its policies towards APEC and ARF’ in Jom Dosch & Manfred Mols (eds.), International 
relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation, pp. 215-242. 
30 Allison, Graham T (1971), Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, 
Brown. 
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In fact, the main criticism of rational choice model rests on its assumptions; this 
model in a way over-simplified the complexity of the real world, which especially in 
the diplomatic arena, preference keeps changing even during the decision making 
process as choice itself is complicated and full of uncertainty. Moreover, one never 
knows whether they have considered all the relevant criteria for making a choice or 
not; if there are mis-specified or unspecified conditions due to the limited information 
received, then the explanatory power of the rational model will be affected. This 
model also assumes that there are direct relations between the problem and the 
solution. However, whether one policy is an actual response to the problem that 
initiates the decisional process is doubtful. 
Rationality model assumes top leaders evaluate policy choices in terms of their 
perception of national interest; preference was set according to the relevance of 
national interest, rather than the perception of self-interest. (In fact this model at the 
same time fails to explain the formation of perception and preference setting indeed 
involved the external political environment's shaping through the socialization or 
institutionalized process.) Put simply, policies are reasoned responses to perceived 
policy problems under this model, (assuming that the pursuit of the struggle over 
power personals or irrelevant) As for the 'individual power model' personal politics 
is an emphasis in the struggle for power among top leaders or factions into which they 
coalesce.31 Personal politics at the top was an important part of Chinese policy 
making, especially when it come to foreign policy. This view is shared by Patrick 
Tyler in A Great Wall?^ Tyler mentioned that 'China viewed the relationship very 
much through the lens of its own domestic struggle, Jiang Zemin as the core of a 
31 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg (1988) Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and 
Process, Ch. 1 Structure and Process: An Overview, p 3 
32 Patrick Tyler (1999) A Great Wall, Clinton: The Butchers of Beijing, pp. 381-417 
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collective leadership was trying to consolidate his position as the first among equals'. 
Individual or factional power model highlighted the struggle for power among 
contending leaders, and this factor superceded all other considerations, stimulus for 
policy changes to the perpetual jockeying for position among the leaders. 'For them, 
foreign policy is a natural extension of domestic politics, and domestic politics often 
is the eternal struggle to achieve balance addressed in Lampton's Same bad 
Different dreams. As Suettinger，s observation in Beyond Tiananmen]-, 'foreign 
policies are not the product of pristine calculations of national interests by trained 
experts with all the facts at their disposal' which was a counter-argument of rational 
model, he mentioned that ‘.. .rather policies are the result of a profoundly political 
process in which differing or competing domestic interests, bureaucracies and 
individuals affect the outcome', that was closer to the power model. 
It's certain that we are not saying this kind of power model is irrational, rather 
these two models' focus are different; the aggregate response of leaders reflected the 
relative power of the participants in power model, as well as their belief, 
understanding and political interests of the political circumstances, and then evaluated 
in terms of personal consequences of the decision upon the individual policy maker or 
faction.35 It stressed that the choice are weighed up in terms of individual or factional 
interests, instead of the national interest solely. The main difference was laid on 'what 
is the consideration in the calculation of cost-benefit?' The rational model will say it 
is simply according to the consideration of national interest but power model will 
reply it by using the thought of individual interest to retain the seat. The former 
“David M. Lampton (2001) Same bed, different dreams: managing U.S.-China relations, 1989-2000. 
34 Robert L Suettinger (2003) Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989-2000. 
Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg (1988) Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and 
Process, Ch. 1 Structure and Process: An Overview, p 15. 
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approach purely assumed that people are altruistic, it even did not give an explanation 
as to how their perception of national interest come from, it would be certain that if 
the same choice set was given to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example, the decision of whether invading Iraq 
should be done under the will of the US only or should be under the authorization of 
the United Nations, Rumsfeld would definitely choose the former, and Powell will 
surely pick the latter. Albeit both of them were making decision under the 
consideration of national interest, the outcome would be different; however, both of 
their conclusions can be explain by the rational choice approach. Thus, the result of 
rational model would be a self-justification according to the given outcome. The 
complex process of calculation hence should be regarded as the personal concern. 
In recent times, the top leadership had a tendency to personalize China's foreign 
relation, particularly the contacts with US^^. Obviously, policy is affected by the 
outcome of interpersonal competition for power and position at that level.^^What did 
leaders concern the most? It is the acquisition of political legitimacy, as a primary 
element of leader's consideration of interest, Jiang Zemin would like to use the 
political resources gained in the US ties to strengthen his own personal legitimacy 
with the internal rivals, and the venue of summitry would be a nice one. Thus, the 
power theory became one of the dominant explanations of leaders' motivation to 
summitry. Absence of an institutionalized succession mechanism tends to lead to 
gerontocracy and periodic succession crises; it also yields extended periods of 
predictability in foreign policy. Hence, driven by the dynamics of the elite politics, 
Szue-Chin Philip Hsu (2003) 'China's Domestic Politics and US-Taiwan-China Relations: An 
Assessment in the Aftermath of the CCP's National Congress’，American Foreign Policy Interests, 
25: p. 45. 
“Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg. (1998) Policy making in China: leaders, structures, and 
processes. 
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Jiang in early-nineties and Hu Jintao in recent years were encouraged by the strength 
of their position to pursue a stronger role in participating in key spheres of the 
bilateral relationship. Jiang was especially good at taking advantage of 'personal ties 
with those foreign leaders for the purposes of enhancing their positions in the 
domestic power competition'^^. Jiang's confidence as well as his authority increased 
visibly in each summit meeting, his benefit from the improving US-China connections 
tells us the hints of domestic and international linkages. 
2.3 Linking the internal and external politics一 
two-level game instead of realism 
Putnam as the founder of 'Two-level game'^^suggested that 'state negotiators 
(the leaders) essentially bargain simultaneously at two tables: domestic table and 
international one', playing two-level game was to manage the domestic pressure and 
the external pressure skillfully through making a strategic foreign policy. Many of the 
articles in the new literatures are essentially case studies plus the argument that a 
particular foreign policy choice or an international outcome can be explained only by 
invoking some fact of a state's domestic politics'^^, it assured the importance of 
internal politics in considering international policies. ‘How were the leaders perceived 
in handling foreign affairs affected their standing in the domestic political struggle, 
and external perceptions of their domestic standing at the same time affected their 
38 Carol Lee Hamrin (1994) 'Elite Politics and the development of China's Foreign Relations', in 
Thomas W Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, pp. 
70-114. 
39 Robert Putnam (1988), 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level game', 
International organization 42 (2): 427-460. 
40 James D. Fearon (1998), Domestic Politics, foreign policy and theories of international relations, 
Annua! Reviews Political Science, 1998. 1:289-313. 
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potency with foreign interlocutors''*'as David Lampton suggested, and 'the foreign 
policy and external behavior of the Chinese state is the product of a complex mix of 
contextual, historical and political ...,42, therefore to open the 'black box, of decision 
making required us to understand the objective background and subjective framework 
in which elites make resolution. 
Jiang's tactics in handling Taiwan issue was designed to position him well in the 
struggle to become China's preeminent leader after Deng Xiaoping's death as Swine 
suggested43. (Will be further discussed in the case study in Chapter 4) Through the 
game, leaders can use the specter of domestic opposition as a lever with foreign 
negotiators to extract concessions, as the case of RMB devaluation in 1997-1998, 
after the Asia financial turmoil, the threat of devaluation of RMB all over the world. 
However, China's leaders sought to refuse to give in to domestic pressures on 
devaluation, then gaining credit abroad, at the same time, they used the resulting 
prestige gained abroad to enhance their domestic positions, this show was 
demonstrated by Moore and Yang's piece**. Apart from the positive impact, foreign 
pressure can be used by domestic actors to discredit their opponents on a nationalistic 
ground. 
In arguing that domestic politics matters in the explanation of states' foreign 
policies, it is going against the neo or structural realism. Since the realist and neo-
41 
David M. Lampton (2001), i s China's policy-making changing?', The Making of Chinese Foreign 
and Security Policy in the Era of reform, 1978-2000, Ch. 1，pp. 1-39. 
42 David Shambaugh, 'Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses', 
International Security, vol. 21，no. 2 (Fall 1996)，pp. 180-209. 
Michael Swaine (1995), China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy, pp. 7-8. 
44 Moore and Yang (2001) 'Empowered and Restrained: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of 
Economic Interdependence' in David Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in 
the Era of reform, 1978-2000, pp. 191-229. 
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realist paradigms are found on the assumption of an underlying constancy in the 
nature of world affairs"^^. And in their explanations, states as the 'billiard ball' are the 
central actor on the world stage. They are focused on as rational actors that calculate 
their interests in terms of their relative power"^ .^ This predefined course however was 
impossible in Sino-American relations, if the dynamic of domestic and foreign policy 
has not been taken into account. Regarding states as unitary actors is ignoring 
domestic politics and power struggle inward and is misleading for understanding 
international relations, also the state-centric rationalist could not provide an answer to 
where the assumed state preferences come from. Thus, it opened up a black box of the 
estate and scholars started to introduce domestic politics into the picture*?. The 
domestic politics and international relations are inextricably interrelated"^^. A 
country's international position exerts a vital impact on its internal politics and 
economics. Conversely, its domestic situation shapes its behavior in foreign relations. 
Explaining state actions in foreign policy as a result of internal factors only was 
fading, too. It should be interacted with each other, Waltz's third image in Man, the 
State and Wa/^ and Peter Gourevitch's second image reversed^^ later on amended the 
theory and were concerned with the three level of analysis: international level, 
domestic level and individual level explanations. Putnam described the game as ‘At 
the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing 
James N Rosenau (1994), China in a Bifurcated World: Competing Theoretical Perspectives, 
Thomas W Robinson and David Shambaugh (1994) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, pp. 
536-537. 
46 Classical realism can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau (1978)，Politics Among Nation (5"" ed.) 
Thomas Risse-kapper (1995) Bringing transnational relations back in: non-state actors, domestic 
structures and international institutions. 
Helen V. Milner (1997) Interests, institutions and information: domestic politics and international 
relations, Ch. 1’ pp. 1-32. 
49 Kenneth N. Waltz (1954) Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Peter Gourevich (1978)，The second image reversed: The International Sources of Domestic 
Polities', International Organization, Vol. 32, No.4 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 881-912. 
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coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek 
to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the 
adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be 
ignored by central decision makers^ 
Therefore, this thesis argued that the traditional international relations approach 
is less convincing in explaining the complex situation which involve both internal and 
external politics, thus the comparative study approach is borrowed instead. Domestic 
politics in international relations theory re-emerged in the late eighties by Putnam^^, 
Russett53 and Doyle,54 which recognized the new element~i.e. domestic conflicts 
about what the 'national interest' requires. And the main idea behind such game is 
fundamental一political leaders, who are constantly playing in the domestic and 
international arenas simultaneously, though they will face different pressures and 
constrains, sometimes they are contradictory, too. This situation is particularly 
interesting in China's context, leaders need to face constraints from intuitions and 
prevailing discourse of national interest, otherwise the legitimacy of leaders will be 
challenged by other powers inside the party. If leaders want to consolidate his power, 
they need to gain legitimacy from the audiences from both side, the base of their 
legitimacy and the internal struggles are the focal point of Chapter 3 Theoretical 
Framework. 
2.5 Value of Summitry 
51 Robert Putnam (1998) 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level game', p. 434. 
52 ibid 
Bruce Russett (1993) Grasping the democratic Peace. 
Michael Doyle (1986) 'Liberalism and World polities', American Political Science Review, Vol. 80: 
pp. 1151-1170. 
24 
Throughout these thirty years, not just the international structure changed from 
bipolar to mulit-polar (or imi-polar?). The new diplomacy summitry has become an 
established part of political interactions, too. Mainly, with the technological 
development, summitry became less inconvenient and led to a greater willingness for 
presidents to meet in person. One of the major characteristics of new diplomacy is the 
mass media now can show the home audiences the meeting between heads of 
government with the advancements in communication technology; it can be beneficial 
in its own right. The atmospherics of summitry is often fanned by the press coverage 
and the statements of politicians, who are keen to exploit such opportunities for 
domestic political gain. It was a common tactics in the late eighties and so on, like the 
Gorbachev's case, given the importance of propaganda and television images in 
forming political impression, the high-profile summits enabled him to showcase his 
public relationship^^. Gorbachev skillfully used the mass media to amplify the noise 
and achievement of the summit, and work his charm and speak of the growing 
movement between the Soviet Union and US people to improve relations and of the 
need to sustain a more substantial dialogue. Since summits cannot be unveiled in a 
low-key fashion in this informative era, and summit meetings which lead to 
heightened public expectations on that, this was particularly true for superpower 
summits during the cold war, and so as nowadays China and US summits, when the 
press coverage of these events gave the impression that the prospects of war or peace 
could be materially influenced by these talks, and the extremely bad relations will be 
restored by these dialogues, too. Given that the public has great prospect that 
Anthony R. DeLuca (1998), Politics, Diplomacy and the Media: Gorbachev 's Legacy in the West, 
pp. 96-105. 
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achievement can be made in summits, it becomes a mounting pressure to presidents to 
increase high-level meetings. 
Besides, there is another contributing factor for the development of summitry, 
the growth of regional diplomacy, e.g. European Union, ASEAN + 3 and APEC... etc. 
Such groupings have contributed greatly to the increase of summit meetings at which 
participation by heads of governments is politically necessary and it is an obligation 
to join these organizations. The public expectations on the leaders' performance in 
these forums will be lesser than that on the state visits because attending these forums 
did not necessary entail that there will be any significant breakthrough, after all. 
Starting from the 1993 APEC meeting in Seattle, Clinton initiated to add an 
informal leaders meeting subordinated to the formal meeting of APEC, Jiang Zemin 
participated in the leaders' meeting in person in these ten years without missing any 
one of the meetings, this ground gave him many opportunities to meet with US 
Presidents Clinton and Bush, and also other countries' heads of government such as 
President Putin of Russia and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 
Together with the regional diplomacy, world trade and commercial diplomacy 
did contribute to the growth of summitry. Given a growing interdependence of the 
world, it led to an expansion of commercial driven diplomacy. Governments become 
increasingly involved in the promotion and management of bilateral trade on an 
intergovernmental basis. It seems most likely that this trend in summitry will be 
continuing. On the other hand, the Multi-National Corporate (MNCs) or Trans-
national Corporate (TNCs) can affect the attitudes and even the decision of 
26 
government during the negotiations since 'the business of a state is businessesFor 
instance, the debate of whether US should link the human rights record with the 
consideration of authorizing Most Favorable Nation (MFN) status to China in 90s, big 
businesses in USA did demonstrate extensive influences on the subject. In addition, 
two sides at least will announce that they have made some agreements on trade or 
investments issues so as to assure that the summit did attain something, for releasing 
the pressure from within. 
A Photo-taking arena? 
Despite the fact that, presidents in both sides would be at risk if failing to meet 
the domestic expectations, they did treasure these opportunities. Since summits have 
been most valued by politicians for their symbolic importance^^, meetings at summit 
level are also of value in symbolizing a change in the relationship between US and 
China resulting from the agreement of a new policy, e.g. the engagement rather than 
containment towards China. Moreover, the propaganda value of a state or official visit 
can be for the benefit of one of two audiences. With the help of domestic propaganda 
machinery，President Jiang Zemin earned the reputation as the state representative and 
the honorable guest of the US in the eyes of Chinese through various occasion, e.g. 
the APEC leaders meetings, the state visit and the United Nation millennium summit 
meetings...etc. These symbolic remunerations did gold-plate Jiang's face. 
Furthermore, an official visit may serve the purpose of providing a foreign 
leader with opportunities to appeal to the government and citizens of another country 
and, more than that, persuade them to view her home country in a more positive 
56 David H. Dunn (1996)，Diplomacy at the Highest Level, Part IV: conclusion. 
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fashion. It was extremely important for China as their leaders were once called the 
'butchers' after 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, its human rights record has been criticized, 
the public opinion of US towards China was never been good in the late 80s to early 
90s57, over 54% US people have unfavorable attitudes towards China, only after the 
summit of US-China in 1993，the general public started to show a warmer stance on 
China. In November Seattle meeting of APEC, it was Jiang and Clinton's first face-
to-face meeting and the first highest level contacts after June 4th incident, after that the 
public opinion in US turned, over 53% US people have a favorable feeling towards 
China. Also, in 1997 Jiang's official state visit meant a lot to the US audiences 
because he paid a visited to Williamsburg (birthplace of religious freedom), 
Independence Hall (birthplace of self-determination), Wall Street (enshrinement of 
economic freedom) and Harvard University (enshrinement of academic freedom),^^ 
the path he went provided Jiang an image that he was willing to acknowledge those 
values that are fundamentally important to Americans. Hence, the symbolic function 
of summits for the promotion of national image is one of its major contributions. 
However, other than figurative purpose of photo ops, are there any other substantive 
functions of summit? 
Symbolism or substance^^? 
And to what extent are summits mainly symbolic and to what extent are they 
substantive? Are they just an opportunity for a photo-call, or are they more often the 
57 See the US public opinion towards China in appendix ii, data from Pew Research Center of People 
and the Press. 
58 Harry Harding, 'The Clinton-Jiang Summits: An American Perspective' in Peter Koehn & Joseph 
Y.S. Cheung, (eds) (1999) The Outlook for US-China relations following the 1997-1998 Summits: 
Chinese and American Perspectives on Security, Trade and Cultural Exchange. 
59 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, 'Symbolism or substance? China talks up the Texas summit' in CNN World 
October 22, 2002. 
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venue and opportunity for substantial dialogue?^°The past summits indeed told us that 
apart from emblematic uses, summit meetings are also useful for a number of 
important substantive diplomatic tasks. They in fact play an educative role^'. At least 
the meetings constitute an opportunity for the US and China to explain their policy 
positions to their foreign counterparts that other diplomatic occasion will have lesser 
function on it. It is particularly important for countries with different cultures to have 
a further understanding on each others by continuing dialogues. In addition, face-to-
face meetings in nature leave little rooms for ambiguity and misunderstanding. ‘The 
clash of civilizations^^' only applied when two states did not communicate with each 
other, after the talks between two heads of state, breakthroughs are more likely to be 
attained. Presidents as the heads of government normally are the final decision makers 
of foreign policy, or at least their abilities to commit their countries to a given 
agreement are of greater extents than any other person^^; they can produce results 
which could not be accomplished at a lower level. Most dramatic among those who 
move across the pages of Sino-American diplomatic history are the heads of both 
countries, e.g. 1972 US President Richard Nixon's historical visit that rapprochement 
of China and later on established the normalization relationship between two sides. 
Talks between presidents also allowed them to discuss issues and to be briefed 
on subjects to which they would otherwise devote little time; they can leam how well 
their opponents have thought through their positions on certain issues. For US, human 
rights issues have always been high on the agenda during the negotiation with China, 
this subject matter had never been focused in China till the US linked it with the MFN 
60 David H. Dunn (1996), Diplomacy at the Highest Level, Introduction, p. xiii. 
61 ibid, pp.40. 
62 Here just borrow the concept from Samuel P Huntington (1996)'s The clash of civilizations and the 
remaking of world order. 
63 Ernst B. Mass & Allen S. Whiting (1956) Dynamics of International Relations, pp. 1440-1442 
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status and the condition for state visit. After these linkages, Jiang signed the 
International Convention of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Summit in 
Washington with Clinton at October 1997; in March of 1998 China signed the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights before Clinton's visit to Beijing. 
Releasing a number of dissidents has also become one of the assigned programs for 
further summits, like 'expelled' Harry Wu in 1995 August^ " ,^ allowed Wei Jingsheng 
had to have medical treatment in other states after 1997 Jiang's summit with Clinton^^ 
released Wang Dan before US Vice-President A1 Gore's visited to China...all were 
the efforts of summit—US highlighted this issue as a criteria for summit. 
On the other hand, the unification of China is one of the keys on agendas; US, 
though concerned about Taiwan issue, will care about it only when it has the strategic 
value in containing China. During the summits of Jiang and Clinton, Jiang Zemin 
highlighted this issue, finally Clinton made the following statement about Taiwan 
during a roundtable discussion in Shanghai on June 30 in response to a question 
during his state visit in 1998. 
'/had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don 't 
support independence for Taiwan, or two China 's or one Taiwan-one China. And we 
don 't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which 
statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy”' 
64 Robert S, 'US and China agree to resume talks after a rocky two months of feuding', The Wall Street 
Journal 2-8-1995 
65 Editorial in South China Morning Post, November 17，1997. 
66 Shirley A Kan, 'China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key statements from 
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei', CRS Report RL30341, March 12 2001. 
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So, summits actually offer the opportunity to construct and pronounce an 
agreed position of solidarity on given issues that will not draw attention unless the 
emphasis is given in summit by the counterparts, that is the human rights issue for 
China and the cross straits unification issue for the US. Dialogue is a proper 
instrument for them to take the first step in recognizing their own commonality^^and 
focusing on their common interests. During the state visits of Jiang and Clinton in 
1997 and 1998 respectively, a new conceptual framework appeared for the two 
countries' to conduct their relationship when they agreed to work towards a 
'constructive strategic partnership'. Their Joint statement^^ listed their common 
interests in maintaining peace and stability, promoting economic growth, preventing 
proliferation, advancing regional cooperation, and addressing various emerging 
transnational issues” 
Without this summitry, it was hard to imagine how their relationship will have 
a great leap forward. Moreover, their talks have energetically facilitated bilateral 
relations and agreements in reality. In the 1997-1998 Summits, a surprisingly large 
number of specific agreements were made. The Joint Statement of 1997，s summit 
revealed that there were nine baskets^^ included 24 specific agreements reached 
during the summit, ranging from regular exchanges of state visits, establishment of a 
direct presidential communications link, reinstatement of the 1985 bilateral agreement 
on peaceful unclear cooperation, schedules for official and non-governmental 
67 A. Kamal Aboulmagd...et al (2001) Crossing the Divide: dialogue among civilizations, pp. 37-41 
68 Soint US-China Statement signed on 29 October 1997 
69 http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/uschst97.htm in research library of Nuclear Threat Initiative 
(NTI) 
70 They are high-level dialogue and consultations, Energy & Environment Cooperation, Economic 
relations & Trade, Peaceful Nuclear cooperation, Nonproliferation, Human Right, Cooperation in 
field of Law, Military-to-Military relations and science & technology, educational & Cultural 
exchanges, www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/uschst97.htm 
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dialogue on human rights pledges to strengthen cooperation in combating 
international organized crimes, to increase exchanges on legal matters, to strengthen 
maritime safety and hold military to military exchange. In the second summit in 1998 
when Clinton visited to China, the heads reached 47 specific agreements they can be 
divided into 8 categories^', non-proliferation and security, human rights, economic 
and commercial, energy and environment, science and technology, cooperation in the 
field of law, law enforcement and people to people exchanges. Joint Statements were 
made in five others aspects,^^ as well. All these are the substantive accomplishments 
of summits beyond symbolic gesture. And however, the following chapters will show 
that Summitry's value is more than that. 
2.6 Summitry in APEC 
The preceding analysis points out that summit diplomacy serves a number of 
purposes in the Sino-American relation, and is a crucial component in official 
interactions.73 It has not been regularized and institutionalized, though. One of the 
feasible methods would be to schedule another round of summit and continue to build 
the relations of the two sides, as well as the personal relations of two leaders through 
bilateral meetings,^�such as APEC. Informal summit of APEC was initiated in 1993, it 
has been the greatest annual event on both sides of the Pacific and has gained great 
7' Fact Sheet: Achievements of US-China summit from The White House office of the Press Secretary 
Beijing: http://www.usembassv-china.org.cn/english/press/hot/Prcfactl.html 
72 1. Development of an enforcement mechanism for Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
2. Further expansion of military to military exchanges 
3. Human rights issue: Chinese promised they would submit the Covenant on economic, social and 
cultural rights to NPC for ratification and would sign the covenant on civil and political rights 
4. Announced a series of technical assistance programs aimed at helping China design and 
implement its economic reforms 
5. Agreed to expand their cultural and societal relationship (high-school exchange program) 
73 Yang Jiemian, 'Summit Diplomacy and Strategic Partnership: Aspirations, expectations and 
realization.', p. 63. in Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheung, (eds) (1999) The Outlook for US-China 
relations following the 1997-1998 Summits: Chinese and American Perspectives on Security ,Trade 
and Cultural Exchange. HK: The Chinese University Press. 
74 Harry Harding, 'The Clinton-Jiang Summits: An American Perspective' 
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political significance in the forum”. Regular dialogues contribute to a secure and 
stable world. Meanwhile China can use APEC for bilateral contacts and coalition 
building since no other forum except the United Nations (UN) offers similar 
possibilities of informal meetings—for the first official contacts between the US and 
China after Tiananmen events.^^ It was hoped that the summit can promote mutual 
understanding and bridge the gaps between the two countries. Summits provide 
chances for leaders to get to know each other through personal contacts. And hence, 
if the countries run into conflicts，the personal friendship and understanding might 
help dissolve or ameliorate the crisis. 
Refer to the two-level game, Jiang's participation in APEC is an exercise of 
monopoly over an irreplaceable position for dialogue as well as substantive dealing 
with the US, a major power. This monopoly power is in turn related to domestic 
politics. These chances inevitably produced enormous domestic political assets for 
him. Their domestic political strength as well as survival would hinge on his access to 
and thus control over the channels to conduct bilateral dialogues and dealings, as well 
as their ability to resolve bilateral disputes. APEC becomes an occasion for Jiang to 
expand his political connections with other nations, and his image as a modern 
president—thanks to his ability to manipulate the media, the full arsenal of public 
relations and mass psychology weaponry. Indeed, he worked overtime to guarantee 
his over-saturated media exposure. He was not a good problem-solver and seldom got 
Wu Linjun, ‘The PRC and APEC: A Planned Excursion for conciliation', Issues & Studies, Vol. 33 
no. 11 (November 1997), pp. 95-111. 
76 Julia Hurtzig & Eberhard Sandschneider (2000), 'National Interest and Multilateral Cooperation: The 
PRC & its policies towards APEC and ARF’ in Jorn Dosch & Manfred Mols (eds.)’ International 
relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation, New York: St. 
Martin's Press, pp. 215-242. 
77 Interview with Mr Richard W Stites，the Head of Public Affairs at US Consulate in US Embassy on 
March 15 2004. 
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things done.^^Nevertheless he continued to secure himself as the real 'core' after the 
90s as he managed to demonstrate to the public and fellow leaders that he was 
personally 'doing something', and an important actor in the world system. In effect, 
he gradually got rid of the legitimacy crises in his tenure through a stirring of 
summitry shows. 
78 Willy Wo-Lap Lam (1999)，The era of Jiang Zemin. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology & Theoretical Framework 
Summitry for Settling the Legitimacy Dilemma by Two-level Game 
‘In a way, the APEC summit served as a face-saving excuse for breaking the 
deadlock in relations and ending a dangerous period of possible national interest 
conflicts between the two countries. This notion can be demonstrated in the 
following chapters of the 3 case studies. 
Table 3.1 The Crises & Summitries in Sino-American Relations in 1993-2002 
Year Crisi.s Summits 
1989- June： Tiananmen Crisis ^^ ^^ ^ No high-level contacts 
1993 ^ ^ |NOV ClintonAJiang^APEC 5eattle| 
1994 Nov ClintonAJiang-^APEC Borgor 
1995 May: US granted Visa to Lee Teng-hu^^^,^ |Oct ClintonAJiang-^UN anniversaryl 
China ended all kind of high-level contacts 
1996 March: The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis • |NOV ClintonAJiang^APEC Manilcj 
1997 Oct Jiangs US 
Nov ClintonAJiang^APEC Vancouver 
1998 June Clinton->China 
1999 May： NATO bombed on Chinese E m b a s ^ ^ |Sep ClintonAJiang^APEC A u c k i ^ 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia. --""""" 
⑶00 Sep Clinton<&Jiang->UN millennium 
Nov ClintonAJiang^ APEC BandarSeri 
2001 April： EP-3 plane collided with |Oct Bush A Jiang^ APEC Shanghai 
fighter ^ ^ 
Feb Bush—China 
Oct Jiang— US 
Oct Bush (& Jiang^ APEC Los Cabos 
79 Wu Linjun, ‘The PRC and APEC: A Planned Excursion for conciliation', Issues & Studies，Vol. 33 
no. 11 (November 1997)，pp. 95-111.. 
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3.1 Focusing the subject 
The following part of the thesis will on the period from 1993 to 2002. As 
Table 3.1 listed, in Jiang's era, there were fourteen meetings between the heads of 
Chinese and American. These fourteen summitries could be divided into three types, 
1. State visit"•“Jiang and Clinton's reciprocal visits in 1997-1998，Bush visited 
Beijing on his way to Asia countries and Jiang visited Bush's ranch in 2002. 
2. UN meetings—UN anniversary in 1995 and UN millennium in 2000 
3. APEC leaders meetings—In 1993，1994，1996，1997，1999，2000, 2002 and 2002 
The focus will be further narrowed down to the most contributing stage, the APEC 
leaders' meeting. For this platform was a unique institution which can work in the 
dynamics of both domestic politics and Sino-American relations. This chapter will 
conceptualize the pattern of summits in APEC under different domestic milieu. 
Before constructing the model, the sources chosen will be discussed, and in the 
second part, the modeling of regularity in Sino-American relations as well as their 
summits pattern will be shown. 
In Table 3.1, the crises are defined as the conflicts between China and the US 
involving official reaction of both governments like condemnation, embargo, and 
termination of all kinds of diplomatic contacts etc. In particular, all these crises 
violated the key agenda on Chinese foreign policy, they are security, development and 
unification.^® Viewing the table, the Chinese Embassy Bombing is a security crisis, 
and the Taiwan Crisis, a unification panic. Although human rights dispute occurred 
frequently, it will not be investigated here as it never causes turmoil in foreign policy 
H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong (2001)，"The Foreign Policy outlook of China's Three 
generation' elite" in David Lampton (2001)，The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the 
Era of reform, 1978-2000. Ch. 5，pp. 123-150. 
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except that ever since the Tiananmen incident, the US condemned China in the UN 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) nearly every year. None of these resolutions, 
however passed in the century. 
The five main crises in Jiang's era in Table 3.1 are: 
i. The Tiananmen Democratic Movement in 1989~the only human rights dispute that 
caused sanction and suspension of high level exchange from US; 
ii. American granting visa to Lee Teng Hui in 1995—this decision contravened the 
unification principle of China. China recalled its ambassador in the US; 
iii. The third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996—this crisis, again, was a unification issue, 
China nearly had military confrontation with Taiwan; 
iv. NATO Bombing on Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999—since embassy is 
regarded as a country's territory, the incident was an invasion according to 
China's perception. The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced the postponement 
of diplomatic activities right after the crisis; 
V. EP-3 plane collision incident in 2001—as another crisis related to sovereignty, a 
fighting plane landed on Chinese territory without prior permission. China was 
adamant and detained the crew until US apologized. 
Of the five years when these crises took place, emphasis would be put on the years 
that could depict changes of policy after the vibrant interaction in China-US relation 
under domestic consideration and international concerns. Table 3.2 for categorizes the 
domestic context in which the crises unfolded. 
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Table 3.2 Domestic Context VS Crises 
Case Year Domestic context Sino-American crises 
1989 Jiang appointed by Deng as the June 4"' Tiananmen incident 
General Secretary of the Party 
1 9 9 5 Jiang announced his Eight Point US granted visa to Lee Teng-hui 
Speech on reunification of Taiwan 
with the Mainland 
v^ 1996 The health condition of Deng was Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
worsening—Jiang has to consolidate 
his power before Deng's dead 
(Struggling) 
1 9 9 9 Heavy criticism on the PRC NATO bombing Chinese Embassy in 
government for being too ready to Belgrade 
appease the US 
(Struggling) 
- / 2001 Leader's succession—From Jiang EP-3 collision 
Zemin to Hu Jintao, however, Jiang 
still wanted to retain his influence. 
(Struggling) 
Among these five crises, the Tiananmen crisis seemed out of Jiang's control 
since he was just the mayor of Shanghai at that time being far from the core power, he 
was the beneficiary of the event, so the crisis is singled out for case study. In 1995， 
Jiang was still under the shelter of Deng who appoint him. No one could remove him 
even under Sino-American crises except Deng. He could thus use this advantage to 
issue the 'Jiang Eight Points'. However, starting from 1996, domestic context 
changed. While Deng's health condition was deteriorating, Jiang realized that he has 
to seek safer shelter. Cases in year of 1996，1999 and 2001 help shed light on how 
Jiang handled foreign-policy after crises occurred and domestic situation was tough, 
and how Jiang handled it without offending different parties. Internal struggle from 
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within has limited the varieties of leaders' response, how Jiang could still have 
dialogue and meetings with his US counterpart under conflicts may be unraveled by 
the three cases chosen. 
3.2 Research method and data 
Before going into the case studies, the methodology and information 
collection process will be laid out. As mentioned, this research will be based on the 
three case studies as the method of analysis. The longitudinal data from 1993 to 2002 
will be evaluated since the time frame in the thesis was set in these ten years. The ten 
years' review will depend on secondary information, collected mainly from books, 
articles and journals. Since most of the documentary regarding high politics issue is 
not disclosed to the public, this thesis can and will mainly use secondary sources as 
the tools of analyze. Those data come from five main sources, 
1. Personal documents, e.g. memoirs of veteran diplomats like Qian Qichen, Robert 
Suettinger, Warren Christopher, etc; 
2. Official documents, e.g. APEC official documents, CRS report from ministry 
department, US Department of State, documents from Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of PRC and People's Daily, etc; 
3. Academic journals, books, periodicals from the leading professionals in Sino-
American relations like Lampton, Harding, Shambaugh, Oksenberg and Tyler, etc; 
4. Newspapers: searching through news related to Sino-American relations day-to-
day from 1993 to 2002 in New York Times. 
5. An in-depth interview with the Head of Public Affairs in the US Consulate, Mr. 
Richard W Stites, who worked in US Embassy in China from 1999 to 2001. 
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Security reliable and sufficient data sources are the most difficult part in doing 
research concerning China, especially when the topics are considered as politically 
sensitive. It is hard to arrange for interviews and get access to some data. But still, 
there are some attainable materials available for researchers. For instance, the New 
York Time as the "record of the history" reporting major political, economic, social 
and military news in China and the US. In addition, the memoirs, books and journals 
by various experts reveal many stories highly relevant to this research, so that it is 
possible to check the inter-subjectivity through comparing the two sources. Besides, 
the viewpoints in this paper come from my interviews with the US Embassy 
Consulate, and official documents. Thus, a triangulation checking can be done and 
proved the truthfulness of the thesis' arguemnts. 
A large-scale documentary content analysis has been done after collecting 
materials, mainly from the newspaper, about the chronology of Sino-American 
relations. How domestic contexts linked up with foreign policy decision as well as the 
international concerns will be found out in turn. In the end, attempts will be made to 
fit the research findings in the later academic debate. 
3.3 Nature of Sino-American relations 
Harding's comment on the Sino-American association was right~it was 
fragile.8i No doubt, it was played with obstacles, as mentioned in the previous chapter; 
Their divergence existed in aspects like human rights^^, trade^^, s e c u r i t y a s well as 
81 Harry Harding (1992)，A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972. 
82 James D. Seymour (1998), 'Human Right in Chinese Foreign Relation', Samuel S. Kim, China and 
the World: Chinese Foreign Policy faces the New Millennium (4& ed), pp. 217-238. 
83 Nicholas R. Lady (1994), China in the World Economy, pp. 73-103. 
Thomas J. Christensen (2001)，'Posing problem without catching up: China's rise and challenges for 
US Security Policy', International Security 25’ 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. 
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the Taiwan problem^^. Any single mistakes could expand to serious conflicts, as in the 
case of the June 4【卜 incident created a semi-Cold War between China and the West. 
The President of China did not have dialogue with his US counterpart for several 
years until 1993. Similar case could happen again easily in light of the EP-3 crisis， 
Yugoslavia Embassy bombing, Third Taiwan Strait crisis, etc. If they were not handle 
appropriately therefore, bilateral relations surely get worse. Therefore, a platform for 
amending relationship is required, i.e. the Summitry—especially with the pre-
scheduled meeting in APEC. However, this stage did not work without cost. 
Interesting enough, although the two countries have crisis, they would still go 
to the summit and have dialogues, they were definitely under the domestic pressure 
and constraints. Refer to the decision making hierarchy, Presidents of both sides made 
the ultimate decisions on various important issues and thus had the responsibility to 
act on behalf of citizens' interests, or creating an appearance of so . The dignity of a 
country was embodied in the chief executives, so, no matter how tough hard the 
situation was, one cannot engage in a summitry without concerning about the pride of 
his/ her country in mind. Whenever there are crises, leaders find themselves in a 
dilemma~to go or not to go. Attending the summit can promote a leader as an 
honorable man who representing the state and thus gaining support at home. Yet 
being too eager to be present at summit would put himself at the risk of condemnation 
for being too willing to accommodate foreign power. This quandary can be illustrated 
by the legitimacy triangle in Figure 3.1. 
85 Martin L. Lasater (1984), The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations, pp. 153-177. 
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Figure 3.1一Legitimacy triangle 
C m m m m m ^ Summitry 
z \ 
/ Legitimacy ‘ \ ^ ^ / Internal needs \ 
Assumption that the US-China were interconnected and 'interdependence^^' in 
various areas; their ties can be roughly divided into three main aspects, economics, 
security and international affairs. A rather China-centered approach would be 
developed in this thesis. 
1. Economic ties: 
Started from the century, the US has been the largest export customer for 
China. Meanwhile, China is the fourth biggest export country for the US. China's 
foreign trade has skyrocketed over the past 20 years, which rose from approximately 
$20 billion in the late 1970s to $475 billion in 2000. Correspondingly, US's trade 
deficit with China increased from $11.5 billion in 90s to $85 billion in 2000.87 
86 Robert O. Keohane & Jospeh S. Nye (1989) Power and interdependence. 
们 Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington D.C. 
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Figure 3.2 US-China trade from 1993-2002 
US-China Trade 
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Source: Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington D.C. 
Both sides had numerous trade, as well as conflicts. The US granted the MFN status 
to China on condition in Clinton's first term, it was linked with human rights till 
1994.88 This issue is debated in the Congress every year. China relied heavily on 
OQ 
American support in entering WTO ~ a struggle which stretched over 15 years. They 
have traded in various aspects, some are conducted by as the private business network. 
In 1997, for instance, a contract for the sale of 50 Boeing jetliners which worth $3 
billion to China was signed before the summit^. 
2. Security ties 
During the Cold War period, China was of strategic geo-political value for the 
US to counterbalance the USSR, and vice versa. In the Post-Cold War era, the 
88 Tyson, Ann Scott, 'Human Rights in the Back Seat during Summit', Christian Science Monitor July 
31 1997，Vol. 89 Issue 236，P.6. 
89 
Robert S & Kathy Chen,'Sino-US Relations reach sensitive Juncture: New Premier's reform plan, 
pushed by Washington, may rekindle tensions', The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 1998. 
° John M. Broder, 'Summit in Washington: The overview; US and China reach trade pacts but clash 
on rights, New York Times, October 30, 1997. 
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security need for each other was no longer their top priority. US still hope to get 
China into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and joined the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)^^though. Also, nuclear threat from North 
Korea made the ties between them more intimate, so as the controversial arms sales 
from China to Palestine. Above all was in 2001，the 9-11 attacks reconfirmed the 
security primacy between them; the US needs China to join their anti-terrorism 
collision. Security concern thus becomes the most important issue for the US in 
handling foreign policy. If the main focus in 2001 APEC hosted by Chinain Shanghai. 
(Further details will be discussed in Chapter 6) 
3. International Affairs ties 
China as one of the five permanent members in the UN Security Council 
enjoys veto power towards all resolutions. The US needed China to support their 
claims for missions in Kosovo (although Russia and China objected in the end, the US 
bypassing the UN and operated in Yugoslavia in the name of N A T O ) ? and in Iraq 
ended up in pursuance of the UN resolution 1441, although the Security Council once 
again withheld its approval and the US declared war in the name of "Coalition of the 
Willing".93 Besides declaration of war, the US would like to avoid vigorous reaction 
from China when it withdrew from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which China needs 
the US to bring it into the international society by getting the host right of the 2008 
Olympic games and the membership into the WTO. 
91 Harry Harding (1999)，'The Clinton-Jiang Summits: An American Perspective', Peter Koehn and 
Joseph Cheung (1999) eds, The outlook of US-China relations following the 1997-1998 summit: 
Chinese and American Perspectives on Security, Trade and Cultural Exchange. 
92 Philip S Golub (1999，June) An international community, Le Monde diplomatique, 
http://mondediDlo.com/1999/0606golue 
93 'Chinese Media: Breaking New Ground' China Daily August 22，2003 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Aug/73002.htm 
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These ties were equally important for both administrations since economic 
growth, security and image on the international stage are the sources of legitimacy for 
the governments and leaders. According to Huntington,94 the governing capacity 
comes from procedural legitimacy and performance legitimacy. In another words, a 
regime may either strengthen their political capacity by opening up participation 
channels for citizens—in this way even though decisions made may result in 
substantial outcomes which may be only the second best to the public, the public will 
contend with their participation, or by ongoing satisfactory performance in tackling 
important social questions, e.g. security, welfare or economic development, so as to 
increase the trust and confidence of public towards the government. So, when the 
economy of one country is good, the legitimacy of government will face less 
challenge. This explains why Chinese government without serious challenge in the 
absence of democratization, China's economic growth hit upon 9.3% from 
1990^^through the entire decade and is still growing. This ensured social stability in 
the past decade in spite of the limited progress in political reform. If at the same time, 
the administration manages to display its ability to protect its citizens over various 
security issues, its political capacity will be built up further. Again, if the government 
can show its capacity to mobilize the international society to support its decision, it 
will certainly gain credit in the eyes of the public. Put simply, ties with the US are of 
substantial benefits to Chinese leaders by winning them credits from the public. 
However, these linkages only represent two angles of the triangle, relations between 
government's legitimacy and the significance of two countries connections in 
94 Huntington, Samuel P(1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
95 Data from China Statistical Yearbook, CELC Data Co. Ltd 
Recent annual rate of economic growth (Real GDP): 
1992 14.2% 1994 12.6% 1996 9.6% 1998 7.8% 2000 8.0% 
1993 13.5% 1995 10.5% 1997 8.8% 1999 7.1% 2001 7.3% 
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satisfying their respective internal needs without explaining the necessity of having 
summitry between leaders, especially under the pressure of representing national 
dignity and glory, it seems contradictory to the traditional Chinese 'face-oriented' 
style. 
3.4 Summitry under two-level game 
In the following part, the contraction of two level game and the Chinese 
foreign policy in Jiang's era will be shown; attempts will be made to make sense of 
what appears contradictory, by extending of Putnam's two-level game: 'Domestic 
politics and international relations are often somehow e n t a n g l e d F i r s t , it is 
assumed that the leaders' individual political interest is a critical factor at work to 
shape Chinese foreign behavior (as discussed in Chapter 2). Although interest groups 
and the general public did not involve in the decision-making process as China is not 
a pluralistic or democratic society, it is important to highlight that leaders are not 
totally free from constrains. The legitimacy of leaders will be challenged by other 
powers inside the party if they did not handle the domestic atmosphere well. It is the 
rule of the day in Chinese politics, as it lacks institutionalized procedures to select top 
leaders, breeding power struggles among the circle senior officials, after divided into 
hardliners and softliners.^^ This leading characteristic in Chinese domestic politics, 
invariably casts shadows on China's diplomacy. As in Zhu Rongji's case, in his trip to 
US in April 1999，he brought with him a breath-taking proposal containing radical 
concessions in Beijing's WTO deal with Washington, but Clinton still refused to sign 
96 Robert D. Putnam (1988) 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games' in 
International Organization. Vol. 42, Issue 3 Summer 1988. p. 427. 
97 Wu Guoguang (1997), 'Conducting dialogue under Strategic Conflict: Sino-American Relations in 
Flux'. 
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an immediate accord then.^^ Zhu went home empty handed. Worse the proposal was 
used by Zhu's opponents to attack him, especially the core-hardliner, the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA). They charged him of betraying national interest although 
Clinton offered sent Zhu assurance that a deal would be reached before the end of that 
year. Zhu, who was the champion of China's economic miracles by implementing 
reform and macro-economic controls in late 90s, lost his power shortly after his 
failure in Washington.^^ 
Power struggle is ubiquitous and fierce at the apex of Chinese politics. 
Leaders have to be cautious with their attitude towards foreign countries. The 
appearance of surrendering to the West was equivalent to committing political suicide. 
If a leader wants to consolidate his power, he needs to gain legitimacy from both 
domestic and foreign audience. Performance that counts sustainable economic 
development, e.g. continual increase in GDP, improvement in the living standard, 
promotion of a good image to the world. Another approach is to manipulate 
nationalism as the gambling chips, e.g. acting tough to the potential culture or 
territory invaders. In sum, since Beijing would not allow the general public to 
participate in high-politics, and institutionalized democracy can only be found at 
village level, leaders have to consolidate their legitimacy by ensuring sustainable 
economic performance, safeguarding national security and international image, or 
boosting nationalism that helps the public identifies with their leaders. 
98 Warren I. Cohen (2000 4"' ed.), America 's response to China: A history of Sino-American relations. 
Introduction. 
99 David E. Sanger, 'The Trade Deal: the drama; at the last hour, down to the last trick, and it worked' 
in New York Times, 16''' November 1999. 
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Given such domestic political reality, foreign policy is not merely calculation 
of national interest for leaders. Rather, they seek to formulate foreign policy in terms 
of how best it can fortify his standing. P u t n a m h a s clearly pointed that out for the 
domestic side: how Chinese leaders are perceived to handle foreign affairs will affect 
their standing in the domestic political struggle. As for the international side: external 
perceptions of their domestic standing affect their potency with foreign interlocutors. 
Kim in China and the World似 also observes that there are interactions between 
domestic and external variables; and discrepancy exists between state legitimation and 
recapturing a rightful place because there are two types of audience watching leaders' 
accomplishment in foreign policy, home audience and international aud ience .⑴2 
Therefore, two kinds of speech-making will be seen, self-reliance rhetoric for home 
audience and global interdependence rhetoric for the international audience. How the 
leaders make use of this discrepancy will be illustrated in the case studies. Indeed, 
handling foreign policy requires two-level thoughts. The problem is that the two 
thoughts could easily come into a dilemma. If the leader is obsessed by domestic 
affairs, for example, Taiwan issues, which relate to state unification,the nationalistic 
domestic audience will favor a tough attitude against Taiwan and other intervening 
foreign power. They tend to support missile demonstration along the strait and even 
the use of force. But if China acts this way，the 'China Threats' rumors would be 
reinforced among the international society, China would become an unfriendly power 
in Asia-Pacific and even the world. This would cause negative consequences in 
external negotiations for sure. The grants and loans from international institutes, the 
10° Robert D. Putnam (1988) 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games' in 
International Organization. Vol. 42, Issue 3 Summer 1988. pp. 427-433. 
i� i Samuel S. Kim (1998) 4'卜 edition, China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New 
Millennium. 
102 Samuel S. Kim (1994) 'China's International Organizational Behavior' in Robinson and Shambaugh 
(eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, pp. 435-452. 
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IMF and World Bank, for this instance, would be affected; there also would be a 
danger of embargo imposed by the West if China across the line. Hence, just pleasing 
internal audience by sturdy behavior towards Taiwan and the US is not feasible. In 
contrast, if the leader just heed the international audience, it although true that he 
might gain reputation in the international arena, the Party's hardliners and the 
nationalists would criticize the leader traitor selling out sovereignty and national 
dignity. Consequently, he will face the danger of losing his power like Zhu did under 
the pressure of PLA. 
On the contrary, leaders could greatly advance their interests if they could 
manipulate the two edges, external and internal, equally well. Leaders may gain 
facorable deals by using domestic opposition as a lever to extract concessions from 
foreign negotiators. Alternatively, leaders can use foreign pressures and diplomatic 
achievements to discredit their domestic opponents. And thus increasing their own 
capacities. Jiang Zemin, though was far less charismatic or unchallenged than Deng 
and Mao, particularly during the early 90s, has played this two-level game well by 
handling the lever skillfully. The following chapters will discuss his sophistication in 
using foreign policy to strengthen his power within the Politburo. With technological 
advancement, information about the leaders' appearance overseas will be easily 
accessed by the public, Chinese leaders have an advantage of the domestic party-line 
machines, including People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), which help propagandize leaders 
as a national representative gaining respect in international arena, so that people are 
proud of their leaders' performance abroad. This is why Jiang Zemin never missed 
any single chance to meet Clinton in APEC. From the beginning of APEC Leaders 
Meeting in 1993 till Jiang retired, he was never absenct from the regional group;'s 
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meeting. As the summits are always reported positively, the leader usually gained 
credits by participating international-wide events. For instance, 
'Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States and his 
participation in the 10th annual Economic Leaders' Meeting of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation(APEC) forum in Mexico have achieved great success'^^^ 
reported in People 's Daily, 
And 
‘ ...the Shanghai meeting of leaders of the member economies of the (APEC) 
forum a total success that will have an important and far-reaching impact on the 
future of the Pacific rim …_，highlighted in Shanghai APEC 2001，s official website. 
In fact, how the performance of Chinese leaders in handling foreign affairs is 
being perceived undoubtedly determined their fate in domestic political struggle. 
Similarly, external perceptions of their domestic reputation also affect their standing 
vis-a-vis foreign interlocutors. Having said that domestic opposition could be a 
bargaining chip in negotiations with foreign leaders, China would not be so unyielding 
in the China's insistence Embassy Bombing crisis in 1999 if this firmness was not 
supported by the public. The large-scale demonstrations against the US's invasion 
initiated by the patriots'®^，allowed the government to urge US to apologize and 
compensate without hesitation. The public would admire the government's effort to 
Editorial, People's Daily, October 30 2002 
China Says APEC Shanghai Summit Is A Success' in China Secretariat for APEC 2001, 21/10/2001 
105 'World: China makes Kosovo peace demands', BCC News (May 10’ 1999) 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/339846.stm 
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claim damages. Besides, some domestic actors made use of the foreign pressure to 
discredit their domestic opponents on international g r o u n d T h i s illustrated the close 
linkage and interplay between domestic policy and foreign policy. For a weak leader, 
whose personal authority is widely queried, the only option seems to be mobilizing 
the nation's international resources to strengthen his personal legitimacy against his 
domestic rivals. ^ ^^  In this respect the symbolic values of a summit do help leaders in 
meaningful way; summits enhance the image of leaders and strengthen their position. 
Jiang Zemin's visit to George W. Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas in 2002, was 
another excellent demonstration of this tactic, in which Jiang used the emblematic 
meaning of this summit to get realistic achievement. Bush's ranch had received 
friends of the US only, e.g. Russia President Putin, British Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
The barbecue summit between Bush and Jiang symbolized that the latter was 
receiving the highest level of reception'^^frorn the US; the sign of friendship behind 
mad the summit mean a lot more than a mere official welcome with 21-gun salutes. 
Jiang's apparently successful 'Great Power Diplomacy' conferred him a firm grip of 
power in the Party, so much so that, today although he had already passed the position 
of General Secretary to Hu Jintao, he retained substantial influence as Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission (CMC). 
If the nature of summitry is a highly publicized occasion, and the participating 
leader will benefit from international exposure, then the action of Jiang is not a 
reckless gambling. Instead, it was perfectly rational. Jiang came into power in a hurry 
after June-4 '^^  incident, so his stature was so a bit ambigous. His personal leadership 
106 David M. Lampton (2001), ‘Is China's policy-making changing?' in his The Making of Chinese 
Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of reform, 1978-200., Ch. 1，pp. 1-39. 
i�7 Guoguang Wu (2002) Passions, Politics and Politicians: Beijing between Taipei and Washington 
Erik Eckholm, 'Bush to treat China's Departing Leader to a Barbecue Summit' in New York Times, 
Oct 20 2002. 
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qualities are hardly known, and his poltical career had been relatively s h o r t . He was 
the mayor of Shanghai only, and he has not articulated a grand vision of China's 
future. More importantly, he did not process any of the two essential sources of 
personal authority Mao and Deng had, glorious revolutionary record and strong ties 
and loyalties. Worse his personal authority is weak'^®. In sum, Jiang's weak in 
position was his main motivation to find a platform to enhance his political capacity. 
An international stage like APEC一was a nice choice. 
4.5 Pattern in APEC Summits 
A review of the sum-up to the APEC meetings in 1993，1996，1999 and 2001 might 
add to the preceding observation. 
本 1993 APEC Seattle: 
US President Bill Clinton proposed to have summit among the leaders of 
APEC's member-nations in Asia-Pacific. This provided a chance for US-China 
presidents to meet each other, which was the first breakthrough after 
Tiananmen Incident in 1989. 
本 1996 APEC Manila 
3rd Taiwan Strait crisis occurred in Spring. This was the first military 
confrontation between the two countries after the 1972 rapprochement by 
Nixon. Nevertheless, Jiang and Clinton met at the APEC's leader meeting in 
November. 
109 Ellis Joffe, 'Ruling China after Deng', in Orville Schell & David Shambaugh ed.(1999), The China 
Reader: The reform era, pp 136-150. 
Patrick E. Tyler, 'Special to the New York Times', New York Times, November 18, 1993. 
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举 1999 APEC Auckland 
In April, Zhu Rongji failed to secure America's signature, supporting China's 
admission to the WTO, during his US trip, worse till NATO bomb the 
Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia the next month. In September, however, 
Jiang still attended APEC meeting and met with Clinton, 
本 2001 APEC China 
On April 2001，the EP-3 Incident in which an American fighter collided 
with a Chinese one, there were collided between Chinese plane and an 
American crew, despite large-scale demonstrations were held in both countries. 
Bush visited to China in October for the APEC meeting. This was also the first 
visit of the US president after the 911 attacks. 
A pattern could be traced as followings: 
Crisis-^Deadlock^Summit (APEC)-> Recover, 
Based on this pattern, that i.e. a hypothesis that summit is a tool to revive deadlock 
could be reasonable formed, as shown in the model in Figure 3.3 
Figure 3.3—Use of summitry 
Soft- l iner/ business/ 
^ engagement P \ 
^ rJ — 1 / 
Leaders n 
V y “ , Summitry 
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Leaders invariably face struggle from domestic factions once there are crises 
in Sino-America relations. The challenge comes form two camps. Soft-liners, whose 
main concern is economic performance, believed the potential gain of keeping 
friendly relations with US is high. They tend to support Jiang to open dialogue with 
Washington, whereas the hard-liners cared more about national dignity, if attending 
international forum could help China to glorify ifself，they would support Jiang to 
show up in the summitry—as in China's active participation in the UN General 
Assembly in 70s and 80s, although they knew the assembly did not have any real 
e f f ec t s ,� t hey treasured the chance to promote themselves. On one hand, both sides' 
interests can be satisfied by joining the summits, either for continuing economic ties 
or upholding national glory. On the other hand, Jiang's political capital could be 
strength by behaving well in summitry. Among all international forums, APEC 
informal leaders meeting is selected as this thesis's research subject as it has been 
giving Sino-American a face-saving excuse for breaking the deadlock relations, 
providing them with a platform where they could sit down to talk after crisis without 
facing internal criticism due to the following characteristics of the forum. 
First, APEC meeting is pre-scheduled a year before, which means that the 
crisis most likely happened after the leaders promised to attend as the trigger event 
usually happened suddenly. Consequently showing-up in the meeting even after crisis 
was in some way a must for a responsible power. Second, since it did not run on 
From Samuel Kim (1994) ’s piece 'China's international organizational behavior', he mentioned 
that UN General Assembly in 70s was the theater for China to promote her national role, world-view 
and foreign policy line for domestic and international audiences. 
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specified obligation and did not have legal binding on its members,^^^ attendance will 
not give an impression of concession to any ideology, for no declaration of stand is 
required. Third, it includes the leaders from all over Asia-Pacific. On the one hand it 
has the US, China's biggest trade partner, on the other, it incorporates China's Asian 
neighbors. Hence, the forum becomes an instrument of Beijing to play down the 
perceived image of 'China T h r e a t , . � As a result, Jiang can participate in APEC even 
when the Sino-America relations was chilly, with the excuse to promote good 
neighbor policy. This is captured by the speech in 1993 APEC, 'China unswervingly 
pursues an independent foreign policy ofpeace and has been making unremitting 
efforts toward the maintenance of regional and world peace and stability... We always 
strive to develop friendly relations and cooperation with our neighbors and all other 
countries of the world on the basis Five Principles of Peace Coexistence^ ‘ 
This face-saving defense gave Jiang larger room for demonstrating his ability 
in the international arena through APEC and thus expanding his political chips and 
connections with other leaders. These symbolic remunerations in turn helped him 
push his ideas in domestic and foreign policy. 
3.6 Modeling in 3 ‘I，s—International, internal and Individual 
This model aims to explain the reason for the significant increase in summitries. It 
borrow the three-level analysis of David Lampton in Same Bad Different Dream' 
the global level, domestic level and individual political level, as well as Waltz's 
112 Micheal Wesley (2001)，APEC's Mid-Life Crisis? The rise and fall of early voluntary sectoral 
liberalization, Pacific Affair, Summer. 
113 Wu Linjin, 'The PRC and APEC: A Planned Excursion for conciliation', Issues & Studies, Vol. 33 
no. 11 (November 1997), pp. 95-111. 
"4 Ibid and website 
David Lampton (2001) Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations 1989-2000, 
Introduction, p.5 
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inspiring in his third image on human behavior, internal structure of state and 
international anarchy. The framework would be summarized with the three T s 
(Figure 3.4), that is International level，Internal politics level and Individual level. 
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Figure 3.4 Three T s model 
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As one of the angle in Figure 3.1，s legitimacy triangle, this angle represents 
the fact that leaders face legitimate crisis and therefore they have to consolidate 
internal power for his personal purpose. This falls under the first ‘1，，the Individual 
level 
After Deng's dead, gone are the days when only one man does the thinking in 
China. The successor，Jiang no longer enjoyed the absolute power in decision-making, 
He has to share power with Premier Li Peng, National People's Congress Chairman 
Qiao Shi and other senior Politburo members. Jiang as the new leader after June 
event did not get much real power because his seniority was questioned within the 
Politburo. He was neither a national hero in June nor a butcher in June 4 � t h e PRC 
after such a big storm, needed to concentrate on economic development in order to 
restore its absolute authority. Jiang realized all this. He opened the door to the US in 
order to boost economic growth through trading. For a long period of time, his choice 
was troubled by tricky domestic politics. Before 1997, Li Peng was the head of the 
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Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG or waishixiaozu), Unlike Jiang 
and Zhu, Li cannot use international conference to gain political capital. Since he has 
a sharp image as the butcher in the Tiananmen Massacre, he was an unwelcome 
person in any diplomatic occasions with the West. So, Li's strategy left was to act as a 
hard-liner and a defender of nationalism. Whenever there are crises between the US 
and China, he would oppose any concession to the US in order to uphold national 
dignity. This is why US-China reciprocal visit happened not until 1997. 
Jiang and Zhu were trained to be a diplomat. They cleverly used the full-
coverage of mass media as their propaganda tools to garner their political capital. 
They are more pro-US, and therefore, they would like to keep a close and constructive 
relationship with Clinton. Unfortunately, Jiang was not yet the real core of the third 
generation leadership before 1997; he cannot freely adjust his policy towards 
Washington according to his own will. That is why Jiang looked so provocative 
during the 3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996. At the same time Deng's health was 
deteriorating, it was extremely important for Jiang to get enough support from the 
Military before Deng died. The only way out for him was 'to flex its muscles against 
Taiwan'. When Jiang was in-charge of the FALSG at last，1997 and 1998 were the 
two honeymoon years between Washington and Beijing. Even though crisis happened 
again afterward, Jiang had more flexibility to manipulate the discourse of internal and 
external needs. 
Similarly on the US side, when Clinton just took over the presidency from the 
Republican in 1992, he has eager to differentiate himself from Senior Bush. Unlike 
Bush, Clinton did not have a comprehensive vision on foreign policy. Moerover, the 
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failure of Bush served to teach Clinton the consequences of neglecting internal needs. 
These are the reasons why Clinton chose to concentrate on domestic politics in his 
first presidential term to consolidate his political capacity. The President, who 
condemned Bush of "coddling" dictators in Beijing in his campaign, ironically acted 
more pro-China than Bush in his second term. The Clinton Administration was under 
attack for its policy of "strategic partnership" which was considered to be too 
accommodating Beijing. So, in the 2000 presidential election George W Bush used 
the ABC (Anything but Clinton) revolution as the theme of his campaign. It can be 
inferred from these election results that going down to China is harmful to personal 
standing and legitimacy in the eyes of the public in American politics. 
The second angle was named 'Internal needs', the second T . As the 
totalitarian state the ruling party wield can full control over different aspects within 
the country for the population of over 13 billion people. What is its source of 
legitimation? How can it restrict people's freedom in order to retain its authority? The 
key lies in the miraculous economic growth in the past decade. Where the prestige 
and legitimacy of PRC government continued to decline, and political reform was 
intangible, economic reform was the only way out. Hence, it became the mainstay in 
the domestic politics,'^^and it was the vital legitimacy source for both the government 
and leaders. The figures in last section showed us how the miracle worked, however, 
it was not enough. In short, satisfying the internal needs served the purpose of curbing 
the legitimation crisis. 
丨丨6 ibid 
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The prerequisite for the US to take care of internal demand is even more 
obvious and urgent due to regular and direct election, which will remove politicians 
who fail to heed domestic demands. The economy after Gulf War was not good. 
Voters expected low unemployment rate and better economy growth. The needs of 
respect from the West were important for a state with humiliating past. Admission to 
the WTO and getting the host right of the Olympus games meant a lot to the Chinese. 
Before events will grant legitimacy to the government and leaders. 
The top angle which explains the third I，'International level'. At this level is 
summitry, an effective leverage in Sino-American relationship. Economic figures are 
strong evidence of their dependence on each other; security concern at the beginning 
of the new millennium urged them to think about the necessity of a friendly 
relationship. They also need each others to shore up their own foreign policy direction. 
All these concerns were in part related to the internal needs, which if handled 
inappropriately will displease the citizens; and in part related to the legitimacy of the 
leader. Summit stands to settle those economic, security and images concerns 
simultaneously, and both the citizens and foreign counterparts from internal could be 
satisfied. Therefore, Jiang Zemin cherished APEC meeting very much, since in the 
course of summitry, he can enhance cooperation between Washington and Beijing, 
which in various ways fulfill internal expectations and hence have positive impacts on 
him and the country. 
The three T s are more than just a hierarchical framework. Rather it 
incorporates with the inter-related approach of the legitimacy triangle; summitry, 
internal needs and legitimacy are in triangular shape and interact with each ‘1，and 
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each others as Figure 3.5 suggested. It will not work if any single angle is missing. 
This triangular model can be used for testing the real situation in the following cases. 
Figure 3.5 Three T incorporate with leqitimacy triangle 
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Chapter 4 
A Year of Presidential Elections: 
The Case of 1996 
4.1 Manila APEC 
1996 was a year of election. Two of the democracies in the 'China, Taiwan 
and US Triangle' held their presidential elections. The first direct election for Taiwan 
President and the US Presidential election were scheduled in March and November 
respectively. China as the only authoritative state inevitably clashed with the other 
two. Irritated by Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US in June, 1995 and the presidential 
election in 1996 Spring, Beijing was particularly desperate to avoid the pro-
independence movement in Taiwan, by, for example, holding missile tests off Taiwan 
Strait. The US reacted by sending two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the area to 
demonstrate its support for Taiwan. The two countriesran into the brink of the first 
direct military confrontation in March. Dramatically, however, Clinton and Jiang 
reached an agreement on reciprocal visits in the coming two years at the end of the 
year~the first state visits between two sides since Tiananmen Movement. Such a 
'Roller coaster，situation happened frequently in the Sino-American relation. At 
a closer look into the chronology, especially throughout the past decade, plainly 
visible podium stands out—Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) after 
relieves the tension between them. 
The Third Strait Crisis in March as well as various conflicts over trade, 
nuclear nonproliferation and human rights issues not with standing , Xinhua news 
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agency 117 quoted Jiang that ‘the atmosphere in bilateral ties has clearly improved...‘ 
on 24 November at Manila APEC in Philippines. After the meeting, White House 
Spokesman Mike McCurry announced ‘The two presidents have accepted each 
other's invitations for state visits' in 1997 and 1998. This chapter, will examine how 
APEC forums provided a ‘perfect excuse to chat^^^' for leaders when they were under 
a congested domestic constraints and how Jiang Zemin played his diplomatic card in 
order to strengthen his power at home. 
4. 2 Jiang^s Taiwan Policy— 
How did the ‘Eight Points，work under internal politics? 
Compare with other members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), 
Jiang Zemin's attitude towards Taiwan was in fact mild. Li Peng, the second-top 
PBSC member who headed the State Council organs responsible for Taiwan policy at 
operation level, including Generals Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, who were in charge 
for Taiwan policy. Qian Qichen (The Foreign M i n i s t e r ) , " 9 and a number of senior 
military officers, all preferred a tough stance towards Taiwan. Jiang's 'Eight Points' 
proposal announced in January 1995 was a highly conciliatory document on Taiwan 
issue and it also demonstrated his effort in initiating dialogue with Taiwan—The 
Mainland-Taiwan Woo-Wang talk. Unfortunately his endeavors in removing obstacle 
between US-China relations, got rather poor responses from both Taiwan and the US. 
In June, theUS granted Lee Teng-hui, the then President of Taiwan, a visa to join the 
alumni re-union at Cornell University. This broke the promise made by Secretary of 
117 Simon Beck, 'Presidents launch new era of ties' South China Morning Post, November 25，1996, pg. 
1. 
118 A Joke going around Manila at APEC 1996, by Alejandro Reyes & Antonio Lopez, 'A meeting of 
Minds: A Sino-US summit caps the fourth gathering of Asia Pacific leaders', AsiaWeek, 1996. 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/1206/natl.html 
"9 Michael D. Swaine (1998) The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. 
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State Warren Christopher to Foreign Minister of China Qian Qichen that the US 
would not permit Lee's visit in New York, a guarantee made at the meeting on 
1 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in April. China was even more angry 
because the US denied the pledge, while Christopher admitted that he surrendered to 
the great pressure from the Congress一in May, the House of Representative voted 390 
to 0 and Senate, 97 to 1 reversing Clinton's stance.^In effect, Congress called on 
Clinton to issue Lee a visa for private visit. The Clinton administration hoped China 
could understand its situation since it was impossible for it to deny the demand from a 
democratically elected legislature in front of the public. 
Taiwan did not receive Jiang's Eight Points proposal well either. It replied by 
setting a pre-condition on dialogue—'Beijing should drop its threat to use force 
before starting negotiation. This was a slap in the face for Jiang, who already seemed 
to capitulate to Taiwan merely making the propposal. Therefore, Jiang Zemin borne 
the political criticism at home; National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Qiao Shi 
and Politburo member Li Peng, apparently wielded the club of "soft on Taiwan" 
against J i a n g s i n c e they viewed Taiwan's response as a direct affront to China's 
sovereignty. 123 Jiang was in danger of losing power under this circumstance, so after 
Lee's visit, Jiang launched a list of tougher reactions in order to show his ability and 
determination to defend national interest and dignity, first by augmenting military 
exercises near the Taiwan Strait to include missile tests. The first batch of missiles 
was fired during the week of July 21-28 in 1995. On June 18, Beijing recalled its 
12° Qian Qichen (2003), Ten stories of a diplomat Qian Qichen (Waijiao Shi Ji), Ch. 9’ p. 305 
121 Robert Sutter and Kerry Dumbaugh, 'China-U.S. Relations' issue brief. IB94002, Congressional 
Research Service, July 15, 1995. 
122 Michael D. Swaine, 'Chinese Decision-making toward Taiwan, 1979-2000' in The Making of 
Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M Lampton. 
123 Robert S, 'Clinton agrees to meet China's Jiang in New York session later this month' The Wall 
Street Journal October 2, 1995 
64 
ambassador, Li Daoyu, in Washington and did not approve Washington's new 
ambassador until September,^^"^actions to push the US to adhere to the 'One-China' 
policy. All this was necessary given that the rise of hardliner faction in China who 
favored a tougher stance towards the Formosa. As Deng's health condition was 
deteriorated, Jiang's struggle with Party faction to secure his position became the 
scenario of Chinese politics at the same time. 
Indeed, all gestures were crucial for Jiang to show both the Chinese public and 
the people involved in high politics that he was a tough leader. Since Jiang , Qian and 
the Foreign Ministry had been perceived by the PLA brass as being 'soft on 
hegemony', they were forced to make self-criticisms to the Central Military 
Commission (CMC).^^^ No Chinese politician can afford to appear soft on the 
'imperialist'; the failure ‘carrot’ policy left Jiang with the 'stick'. However, it would 
be disastrous to bilateral connection if Jiang, or even Jiang, took a confrontational 
approach to Taiwan and the US. Fortunately, Jiang consolidated his position in the 
PRC leadership since the party approved a proposal for the Five Year Plan on 28 
September, and at the Fifth Plenum, it formalized Jiang's purge of his former rival, 
Chen Xitong. The Beijing mayor was expelled from the Politburo and Central 
Committee. 126 Jiang succeeded in bringing securing the loyalty of the CMC members 
to him 127，which was of utmost importance in important China politics because real 
power always comes out of the rifle. The Military unanimous approval of his retention 
124 David M Lampton (2001) Same bed, different dreams: managing U.S.-China relations, 1989-2000, 
Part One: The Flow of events I Turning Points，p. 52. 
125 David Shambaugh (1996) 'Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses', 
International Security, vol. 21，no. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 190’ by the Interview with knowledgeable military 
sources in Beijing, July 16, 1995. 
126 'Communique of the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China,' Xinhua News Agency, no. 0928131, September 28 1995 
127 Willy Wo lap Lam, 'Triumph Tempered by Failure to Hasten Retirement of Generals Loyal to 
Patriarch, South China Morning Post, September 29, 1995，p. 10. 
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of command evidently became one of his bargaining chips before the Party Congress 
The Fifth Plenum of the 15^ Central Committee concluded on September 28 with a 
t Q 
significant boost for Jiang's practical influence and prestige . All these driving 
forces provided him with leeway for approaching the US again. On October 24 when 
Jiang had a mini-summit meeting with Clinton in New York City during the 
anniversary celebration of the United Nations, they interacted smoothly despite earlier 
wrangles over Taiwan issue. After the meeting, China accepted the US ambassador 
and dispatched its ambassador to the US. Jiang's preserve at the summit 
considerably strengthened his position back at home. He could then engage in a more 
moderate line towards the US. This two-level game was his usual tactics in dealing 
with the internal rival and foreign counterparts. He would presumably benefit from 
the improvement of US-China relations, which is in turn propitious trade and for other 
international affairs. Maintaining a close relation with the US granted Jiang double 
credit, and overwhelming popularity due to the persistent improvement of economy 
and international status. 
Recall the legitimacy triangle mentioned in the previous chapter (Figure. 4.1) 
128 Robert L Suettinger (2003； Beyond Tiananmen, Ch. 6 Crisis over Taiwan 1995-96, pp. 241. 
129 CRS Issue Brief: China Policy: Crisis over Taiwan, 1995—A post-Modem 
66 
Figure 4.1 Legitimacy Triangle in 1996 
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The administrations consider not only the audience at home, but also those 
outside. To secure his position as the first among the equals in the PBSC, Jiang 
needed to gain amuse, the public and the international society with sensible foreign 
policy and remarkable domestic performance. The long-standing economic miracle 
(see Table 4.1) to a certain extent was relied on the US. The US was the biggest 
importer of China's good. Its importance to China in trade spills over to Taiwan 
policy, so much so that Jiang would make concession on the Strait issue to preserve 
connections with the US. 
At the same time, he could not lose face in front of his citizen. Thus, tough 
acts enough in the eyes of public were needed. Therefore, a suitable platform for both 
presidents to save face was essential. The summitry between Washington and Beijing 
scheduled in later 1996，was one example. 
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Table 4.1 China's average annual real gPP Growth Rates： 1989-2001^^° 
Year Average annual (& growth 












2001 7^3% ^ 
Approaching the end of 1995，although the two governments' engagement 
seemed back on track, it was far from full recovery; it was easily to be disrupted by 
domestic forces. When the Chinese leadership reviewed the situation, they, 
particularly the senior PLA offices who had been advocating stronger action, decided 
to 'teach Lee Teng-hui a lesson'.^^^Jiang permitted them to send troops into cross-
strait area to prepare for the PLA's next military exercise in mid-November. They 
conducted a large-scale military exercise off Dongshan Island, and missile tests 
continued in the following months. 
1995 ended with brittle bilateral ties between Washington and Beijing leaders 
at both sides hesitated to move forward, with Clinton still lacked the 'political will' to 
engage further with China by welcoming Jiang with an honorable twenty-one gun 
salute, and Jiang still lacked the political clips to make concession on a par with the 
‘Eight Point' proposal to Taiwan again. Given Chinese nationalism and the PLA ‘s 
130 Official Chinese government data reported by the World Book, World Development Report. 
� Suettinger (2003； Beyond Tiananmen, p. 245. 
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domestic political clout are still the two crucial considerations in China's macro-
political structure’ 132 1996 was naturally an exciting year with respect to the cross-
straits and cross-countries connections. With embedded trade, human rights, 
intellectual property right, nuclear nonproliferation and security problems, the US and 
China found it difficult to fully embrace each other. 
Behind the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
Stepping to 1996，old problems in US-China relations for years and years 
surfaced again. Divergence in human rights definition, discrepancy in trade balance, 
different concepts of sovereignty etc, put them in conflict. Same as before, human 
rights condemnation on China was initiated by the US government and public in 
United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) despite China had "expelled" 
Harry Wu, a human rights activist. Moreover, the US accused China of supplying 
special ring magnets nuclear materials to Pakistan which violated the restriction on 
nuclear weapon technology proliferation. Bilateral trade was affected by human rights 
and nuclear weapon issues, as the US warned to sanction China if the latter refused to 
promise to curb nuclear weapon proliferation, and add human rights as a condition in 
the annual renewal of the MFN status of China. 
They have much quarrel over trade, an aspect they are most interdependent 
on each other. In the US, there are laws against copyright infringement and CD piracy, 
and China was certainly informed. However, piracy violation problem was rampant in 
China; many illegal CD manufacturers were located in central and southern China, 
and more surprisingly, some of them appeared to have connections with the family of 
132 Szu-Chin Philip Hsu, 'China's Domestic Politics and US-Taiwan China Relations: An Assessment 
in the Aftermath of the CCP's 16''' National Congress', American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 25, pp. 
43-51，2003. www.ncafp.org/legacv/proiects/2003hsu.pdf 
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high- level military personnels' family. US warned to chastise China if the 
circumstance did not improve significantly in due course. 
In the tensions between US-China, Taiwan was often a trigger of a bomb. To 
make it clear that 'Taiwan is part of China' and it was just a 'breakaway province 
China has to prevent any self-determination movement by Lee Teng-hui or anybody 
else in the island, China did so by conducting a series of missile tests and military 
exercises off the strait, which turned out it helping Lee won the presidential election 
by a landslide.134 In the March 23 election, Lee won 54% of the votes. ^ ^^  The 
exercises targeted at the watery zones a few miles off Kaohsiung and Keelung. The 
US, in response, deployed two battle groups, ‘USS Independence' and 'USS Nimitz' 
to the area, one located off the east coast of Taiwan and the other the west of the 
Philippines. This apprehension nearly turned into a direct military confrontation 
between the US and China, instituting the third Taiwan Strait crisis. Many worried 
that military exercises would render dialogues impossible. Popular press in the Asia-
Pacific all suggested that conflicts were l i k e l y U n l i k e former cases, however, both 
sides continue to communicate behind the screen, so that they definitely understand 
the approximate bottom line of each other. 
On 5th March, Xinhua announced that the PLA would conduct a "ground-to-
1 "xn 
ground missile launching training" in the Taiwan Strait. A live-ammunition 
133 Robert Greenberger, 'Clinton agrees to meet China's Jiang in New York session later this month' 
The Wall Street Journal, New York, October 2’ 1995. 
134 'Timeline: US-China relations' BBC news, October 29, 2002 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/world/1258054.stm (accessed at April 19, 2004) 
135 Warren Christopher (1998), 'Standing Firm with China', In the stream of history: shaping foreign 
policy for a new era, Ch. 29’ p. 427. 
136 David Lampton (2001) Same bed, different dreams, p.53. 
137 ‘Ground-to-Ground Missile Test Coordinates Announced' Xinhua News Agency, March 5，1996, in 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/D2553/G, March 5，1996. 
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exercise with naval and air force participation was scheduled between 12 to 20 March 
on the Fujian coast approximately sixty miles southwest of Kaohsiung, and a 
amphibious assault on a Taiwan-like terrain on Fujing's Pingtan Island was planned 
from 18 to 25 M a r c h , t h e time when Taiwan Presidential Election was held. But on 
March 8’ Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister and Director of the State Council's Foreign 
Affairs Office Liu Huaqiu visited Washington for a private meeting with American 
National Security Adviser, Anthony L a k e ， ! 39 before he dined with Christopher. 
Christopher made a strict but calmly delivered critique on China's approach to the 
Taiwan issue, in particular he described the missile test launch as "reckless and 
provocative" and he warned that the US would militarily involve if the exercise got 
out of hand. Liu spured American concerns and insisted that Taiwan was a matter of 
Chinese sovereignty and it was only a 'normal, routine' exercise. Later, Lake also 
warned Liu explicitly that there would be grave consequences if China did not settle 
the Taiwan strait crisis peacefully. Again, Liu responded by accusing to Lee's fault 
for promoting independence of Taiwan, claming that US's help on Lee hurt the 
feelings of Chinese people, and reassuring that the military exercise constituted 
actually no threat to the US^ "^ ®. Despite the two administrations were holding different 
views, at least managed to convey to each other their messages. 
Subsequent to the meeting, Secretary of Defense, Perry military briefed 
Clinton that they would deploy two carrier battle groups, Independence and Nimitz, in 
response to Chinese exercises and missile tests and Clinton concurred. Meanwhile, 
Jiang told PLA delegates that China's would not renounce the use of force although 
138 Suettinger (2003； Beyond Tiananmen, p.252 
139 Suettinger (2003； Beyond Tiananmen, p.250. 
140 Suettinger (2003； Beyond Tiananmen, p.254 
71 
the preference was on peaceful reunification.！斗丨 While US openly supported Taiwan 
by offering military assistance, China did not make a slightest concession, for this 
amounted to committing political suicide by Jiang. 
In private, officials in Washington tried to ensure that Beijing had no 
misunderstanding on the intent and limitations of the naval deployments concerned -
it was just a 'precaution' and they two countries were not on the brink of war. Both 
sides explained their concerns privately to each other^ "^ .^ Although the actions and 
rhetoric were of both sides were the stem, the US still affirmed the 'One-China' 
policy, In the end, China just loudly criticized the US for 'interfering' its 'internal 
affair' without further actions. 
But then, what was the point for missile tests? In the language of international 
relations, these tests off the Taiwan Strait was a threat signal for Taiwanese and 
hoping that they would stop Lee's independence endeavor，though they rarely 
intimidate them from voting for Lee. Meanwhile, China would like to make it clear 
with the US its attitude towards unification, unyielding and firm, though a peaceful 
resolution. US was still being sought the two American carriers was also a signal for 
Zhongnanhai. In diplomacy, no response over the Taiwan issue means a fundamental 
change in policy, meaning that 'we cared about Taiwan very much,⑷,Sending ship 
was indeed an appropriate response. Such responses were targeted not only for 
foreign leaders, but also for domestic supporters and adversaries. 
� China Central Television, 11 March 1996，BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 11’ 1996. 
142 Warren Christopher (1998), 'Standing Firm with China', p. 427. 
� Interview with Mr. Richard W Stities, Head of Public Affairs in US Consulate on March 15’ 2004 
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The anticipated military confrontation between the two countries did not 
materialize b e c a m e S e c r e t a r y of Defense Perry, a former artillery offer, frankly 
remarked "I understand very well, and the PLA understands very well, the symbolism 
of 'bracketing' a target. And as a technologist, I understand the very real possibility 
that a missile guidance system can malfunction" The crisis seemed to fade after the 
election. China stepped back from the edge and found ways to resume Sino-American 
relations. 
They began with a strategic dialogue. But the tone was still cold; especially 
when it came to the Taiwan issue, Liu said, for instance, 'the cross strait talks could 
not be resumed until Taiwan had accepted the "One China Principle'". In the 
following months, however, high-ranking officials started to get together. The turns 
were partly because the hard-liner approach did not achieve their key purpose一 
eroding public support for Lee Teng-hui, Beijing's actions actually drove Taiwan 
voters back to Lee at an unprecedented high rate. This approach also prompted an 
unexpectedly vigorous response by the US, that Washington would not hesitate to 
provide its military support for Taiwan. This is the evident agreement made in April, 
1966, between Tokyo and Washington to strengthened their a l l i a n c e T h e PRC 
leadership realized this problem had no choice but revising its militant approach to 
Taiwan. So, after the exchanges of signals, both sides prepared to get back to normal. 
Repeating the same old tunes 
For everything to be back on track, Beijing and Washington needed to "cease 
fire". As usually the US penalized Beijing's 'misbehavior' by imposing sanction on 
144 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry (1999) Preventive defense: a new security strategy for 
America, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 95-97. 
145 Michael D. Swaine, 'Chinese Decision-making toward Taiwan, 1979-2000’，p. 327. 
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trade. As in the summer of 1996, CIA reported that China sold 5000 ring magnets to 
Pakistani46, which was worth nearly $70000. The material is used for producing 
highly enriched uranium, which is the mainstay of nuclear weapons program. The US 
threatened to impose economic sanctions on China if those sales continued. i47 in May, 
China was labeled as the most egregious violator of the agreement on copyright of 
American products, since China failed to curb the piracy of America products. 
Together with the unsatisfactory human rights record, Sanction was inevitable. The 
question was just whether to impose tariff or quota. China prepared two solutions, 
yielding or standing firm. The former meant cracking down piracy with greater 
concentrated effort'48 the latter one was draining a retaliation plan primed in case 
Washington took action. 
Yet again, neither sides abandoned their relations. At the Hague meeting on 
April 14, Christopher met Qian for over 4 hours. It was their first meeting after the 
Strait Crisis, and was aimed at resuming dialogue, especially over items of common 
interests, e.g. policy related to Russia and North Korea, and other contentious items of 
ranging from human rights to exports of ring magnet. A month later, China accepted 
the US proposal of further steps to strengthen their nuclear export controls, after a 
marathon negotiation with the acting US trade representative, Charlene Barshefsky. In 
July, Lake visited Beijing^"^^and met with Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qien Qichen and Liu 
Huaqiu. They discussed the possibility of mutual visits. They came good news from 
146 Wu Guoguang (1997), 'Conducting dialogue under Strategic Conflict: Sino-American Relations in 
Flux' in China Review 1997, HK: Chinese University Press, pp.57-85 
147 Warren Christopher, 'Standing Firm with China', p.428. 
148 Chinese Daily, June 14，1996 
149 David M. Lampton (1997) 'China and Clinton's America: Have they learned anything?' in Rebecca 
McGinnis (ed.) Contemporary China: Approaching the 21" century: 26''' Annual Sino-American 
Conference June 1997 University of Maryland. 
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the House of Representative,, which supported a renewal of China's MFN status 
with a vote of 286 to 141. All this basis moving forward. 
In August, Qian Qichen met Christopher again. It was already their 
meetings 150，and they had a 90-minute conversation. The meeting made possible by 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Brunei^^^ In this forum, Clinton 
through Christopher passed a secret letter to Jiang by way of Qian. This letter was to 
1 C ' J 
reaffirm the long-standing US policy on Taiwan, that is the '3 Noes' policy. The 
content of the letter is resembled Clinton's statement made on June 30 1998,Shanghai, 
'We don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan, one 
China, not a member of any organization for which statehood is r e q u i r e m e n t . I n 
consequences, China officials adjusted their stance toward the US, allowed for some 
improvement in US-PRC relations, This, again, helped Jiang consolidate his position 
in the PRC leadership. The administration called for a ‘more regular dialogue' and 
'periodic cabinet level consultation'. A series of cabinet level visits were held 
afterward, including Qian's Jakarta meeting with Christopher in late July, which 
ultimately led to state-visit, Zhou Youliang (PLA General)'s visited US in mid-
September, the another meeting between Qian and Christopher on 25 September, Xu 
Kuangdi (Shanghai Mayor) went to the US, Christopher visited China in November 
and a heartening speech at Fudan university, ‘ fVe will no dubt at times have divergent 
views. But history has given our two countries a remarkable opportunity~the 
Seth Mydans, 'US-China Talks continue; Tone is warmer despite Difference', New York Times, July 
25，1996. 
151 Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1996. 
Shirley A. Kan, 'China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' policy-key statements from 
Washington, Beijing & Taipei’ Order Code RL 30341, Congress Research Service, Report for 
Congress, March 21,2001. 
‘Sino-US Relations Traverse Rough and Rugged Road', People's Daily, January 19, 2001 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/OP-e/6706.htm 
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opportunity to build a new era of cooperation for a new century. All of them 
paved the way for a meeting between the two heads at the Manila APEC on 24 
November for the two heads. 
4.3 A full embracement after APEC 
After Clinton was re-elected as President on 6 November, he adopted a 
positive policy on China. As 1996 was a presidential election year, the domestic 
political environment was particularly sensitive to a range of issues concerning 
Chinai55. Clinton was reluctant to compromise over bilateral relations, or he would 
face fierce challenge from his political opponents — as he did to George Bush in 1992, 
In this light, any policy adjustment towards China could be made only after Clinton 
has strengthened his internal position. 
Manila APEC provided the place for the fourth meeting between the two 
leaders for four years. Jiang devoted his effort in foreign relations from day one he 
took office, he secured his power in the absence of a solid backup and, the 
international stage exceptionally important showroom for him to win support, both 
internally and externally. Even Taipei Times admitted 'Sino-US relations have been 
improved when Jiang came to power'.^^^ After the stormy first half of the year, APEC 
facilitated their reapprochment. Jiang and Clinton exchanged views on wide range of 
subjects including bilateral relations, regional and international issues during the 
APEC meeting in Manila, the Philippines. Astonishingly, after the 85 minutes 
Alejandro Reyes and Antonio Lopez, 'A meeting of minds: An Sino-US summit caps the fourth 
gathering of Asia Pacific leaders', AsiaWeek, December 6 1996. 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/12Q6/natl.html 
155 Warren Christopher, 'Standing Firm with China', p. 429. 
156 Editorial, 'Keeping an eye on Jiang', Taipei Times, October 29, 2002 
http://www.taipeitimes.eom/News/edit/archives/2Q02/10/29/177524 (accessed at 18 April 2004) 
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meeting, the two leaders announced that they agreed to exchange visits in the next 
two years. Clinton said, as he stood by Jiang at the Press Conference, ‘ We 're doing 
the right thing to have this meeting (the official mutual visit of Clinton and Jiang in 
1997 and 1998)15?. Jiang was thus the first Chinese leader having the honor to 
receiving twenty-one gun salute and state banquet welcome in the US since the 1989 
Tiananmen incident. Table 4.2 illustrates how Jiang got a 'win-win' situation for 
himself and the state by handling well in the 3 Is- level: 
157 Wolf Blitzer, 'Clinton, Jiang agree to future meetings' CNN, World, November 24，1996. 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9611 /24/aDec.china 
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Table 4.2 3 T s level in 1996 
Individual level Jiang Zemin: glorified by being the f irst leader receiving 
full honor from US (which was also a breakthrough in US-
China relations) 
Internal level Settled PBSC struggle and Taiwan Strait Crisis, avoided 
sanction from the US and secured the AAFN status 
International level China did not lose face as the US pledged to uphold the 
'one-China' policy publicly & privately 
State visit has important values, especially for Jiang. Looking back on the past, 
only Deng Xiaoping, who was only the Vice-President though he was the defacto 
leader, had paid a state visit to Washington to meet Jimmy Cater in 1979, and Li 
Xiannian, a more figurehead, paid a state visit by the invitation from Ronald Reagan. 
Jiang would like to be the third one, and above more, the first head of China with 
both in official title and real power, to receive this honor. In 1997，Jiang got what he 
wanted and needed m o s t ~ spend time in public and private with his US counterpart, 
Clinton. He returned to China with more real authority than any title can confer in 
Chinese political system^^^. He was gratitude for American help, which tremendously 
made him look good to his home audience during the visit^^^. The visit depicted him 
as the man who could "handle the Americans". And this was the peak of his political 
life. 
158 Editorial, 'Up the summit' The Wall Street Journal, New York, October 31, 1997 
159 Lilley, James R. 'US-China Summit: Engaging a Giant', Christian Science Monitor, June 22，1998， 
Vol. 90 Issue 144. 
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Chapter 5 
After Honeymoon years: 
The Case of 1999 
5.1 Auckland APEC 
The reciprocal state visits symbolized Sino-American's honeymoon period一 
1997 President of People Republic of China Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to 
Washington and United State's President Bill Clinton visited Beijing in 1998. 
Unfortunately, it did not last long. Their relationship became fmgile_ again in 1999. 
Several crises prompted both sides to address the fundamental problem in their 
relations, which, despite reciprocal honorable receive could still be felt. This y e a r ~ 
1999 began with the surface of mountainous underlying conflicts. China was of 
suspected of espionage; it constant violation of human rights and the backward 
movement of political reform were also attacked. The PRC leadership was angry at 
the rejection of an awesome proposal of entering the WTO in April. Worse, and 
to Jiang's surprise, the US-led NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in 
Yugoslavia a month later that was as serious as an invasion of the China's 
boundary.161 After that, commentaries focused on whether a Tiananmen-like 
deadlock would reappear. However,, at the end of the year, the marathon 
negotiation on WTO admission surprisingly reached a favorable agreement. In 
fact, the miserable trip of Zhu Rongji had made the Chinese leadership lowered their 
expectation on entering the trade organization; it is thus exceptionally surprising that 
China could acquire full membership even after the serious disputes with the US. This 
160 Harry Harding (1992； A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972, pp. 1-12. 
161 According to international convention Embassy is defined as one country's boundary, therefore 
China read NATO missile hit on China's Embassy in Belgrade as an attack on her own boundary. 
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would not happen without a platform for re-opening dialogues一APEC Auckland. As 
James Sasser, former US ambassador to China said ‘the forth coming summit between 
President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin in New Zealand (APCE) will be a new 
1 ^ 
starting point for the improvement of bilateral ties' On September 11，Jiang 
Zemin met with Clinton during the APEC summit in Auckland, New Zealand, 
having a summit which ‘actively guide ongoing Sino-US negotiations^ on China's 
accession to the WTO commented by a spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry in 
People 's Daily on September 12. 
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky announced that the two sides 
would resume their WTO discussions in late September. This is what both presidents 
would like to see after nearly five months of tense relations^^^since the turbulent 
April and May. The obstacle for Jiang was how he could carry on the negotiation 
when Beijing was first, shamefully rejected by Washington its WTO proposal in April; 
and second, humiliated by the bombing on its embassy in Yugoslavia? Even though 
he knew that the further development of China needed the assistance of the US, it 
required the administration to smooth the public's sentiments. In any case, 1999 is a 
good demonstration how the leaders master the of two-level game. 
Conflicts after the honeymoon: Old bottle with new wine 
Parallel with Jiang's difficulties, at the beginning of 1999, Clinton faced an 
impeachment motion by the House of Representatives and hearing at the Senate on 
charges that he had given "perjuries, false and misleading testimony" to a grand jury 
162 Ma Shikun and Zhang Yong, People's Daily, September 9 1999. 
163 Bruce Odessey, 'Chinese Expected to Resume WTO Discussions in Washington', USIA, September 
22 1999. http://www.fas.org/news/china/1999/990922-prc-usia.htm 
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in the Paula Jones case and his affairs with Monica Lewinsky. ^ "^^ This was a serious 
flow to his authority, though not fatal, he did not lose his sit in the end. The president 
was hopelessly in disgrace as the time despite the fact that in 1998, the US made an 
unusual decision of not sponsor a condemnation against China at United Nations 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC). Many people viewed that China has become 
more open, as the country signed International Covenants on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Right, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 
October 27 1997, and March 12 1998，respectively, released political dissidents like 
Wei Jinagsheng in November 1997. These gestures gave Washington an impression 
that continual efforts to open the market will eventually have positive effects on 
China's political development. Unfortunately, the US was mistake, those events were 
symbolic at best, which meant to welcome Jiang's honorable guest—Clinton, so as to 
ensure the state visit went smooth. Actually, Beijing government not yet ready for 
preparing changes in the political system. Soon after Clinton's state visit, Jiang 
� resumed the regimes crackdown on political dissidents. Beijing began to close down 
the China Democracy Party (CDP) that had sprung up in several parts of the country 
during the year. The prominent CDP leaders Xu Wenli, Qin Yongmin and Wang 
Youcai were arrested, charged with subversion against the Central People's 
Government, and sentenced in December to thirteen, twelve and eleven years, 
imprisonment respectively. ^ ^^  This examples why in 1999, the US reinstated its 
condemn action on China in the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and it 
pushed a resolution criticizing. 
i64Robert L Suettinger (2003) Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989-2000, Ch. 
9 Back to the Cold, 1999-2000，p. 358. 
165 Robert L Suettinger (2003) Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989-2000. 
Ch. 8 Scandals and summits, 1997-1998’，p. 357 
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The atmosphere between the two countries hoarsened further after the human 
rights dispute. China did not approve the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)'s humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia; China even declared its tendency 
of vetoing the proposal in United Nation's Security Council. Beijing was vigilant over 
this issue because it was annoyed by US's unilateral manner in promoting democracy 
and assisting subjugated people resonated in China. Above all, Chinese leaders feared 
that the west will interfere in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang issues in the name of 
humanitarian intervention. ^ ^^  In the speech at in the School of International Relations 
in Peking University on 26出 May, 2000^^^ the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
clearly declared China's stand of "sovereignty over human rights", that state 
sovereignty, the pillar of the UN, should not be override by human rights. The two 
countries' contradictory perceptions of human rights and sovereignty brought tensions 
to the negotiation table over China's admission to the WTO. 
Allegations of Chinese espionage aggravated the situation. In the Congress, 
Republican senators had been censuring always censure Clinton for his pro-China 
policy. Criticism got al the more vigorous after Mr. Wen-ho Lee, a Taiwan-bom 
American scientist was accused of stealing American nuclear technology for China, 
Clinton was attacked for appeasing China at the expense of national security. Indeed, 
the Cox Report~an investigation of a 1995 Chinese underground nuclear test, 
suggested strongly the weapon tested was virtually on a par with America's most 
sophisticated miniature nuclear warhead, A mysterious CIA report from a 
Chinese source quoting purported PRC documents on its nuclear weapon program 
166 Tucker, The Clinton Years pp. 65-66 
旧 Qian Qichen (2003)，Ten stories of a diplomat Qian Qichen (Waijiao Shi Ji), appendix 2，pp.380-
381 
168 Robert L Suettinger (2003) 'Back to the Cold, 1999-2000' Ch. 9, pp. 360-361 
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indicated that the information of the design of W-88 had evidently been stolen from 
one of the Department of Energy (DOE)'s national nuclear laboratories, probably the 
one at Los Alamos, New Mexico.^^^ However, the Clinton administration had turned a 
blind eye to warnings from the DOE and intelligence community about the lab's 
vulnerabilities and had dismissed a 1997 DOE briefing on the apparent W88 theft 
because it conflicted with the direction to improve relations with China prior to the 
Jiang's state visit to the US. As a result, allegations of Chinese financing Clinton's 
presidential campaign re-emerged. The Cox committee also accumulated evidence 
that the commercial concerns had overruled security consciousness in the 
administration on sanctioning China for proliferation and American companies for 
breaches of security regulations. Last but not least, rumors that China had been 
providing Pakistan with technical support and nuclear materials had been on for 
y e a r s . 170 All this reinforced the idea of "China threat" among the American public, 
and White House resumed its hostility to Beijing. 
Although the FBI ended up admitting that it did not have enough evidence to 
bring espionage charges against Wen Ho Lee, the officials discovered that he had 
evidently erased from his office computer improperly obtained classified files 
containing nuclear test data. On March 9，he was fired by the Secretary of Energy 
Bill Richardson for "failure to properly notify Energy Department and lab officials 
about contacts with people from a sensitive country...failing to properly safeguard 
classified material and apparently attempting to deceive lab officials about security 
I69 ibid 
17° Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, 'The Clinton Years: The Problem of Coherence', Ramon H. Myers, 
Michel C. Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh (2001), Making China policy: lessons from the Bush and 
Clinton administrations, pp. 45-78 
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matters，’i7i This unproved spy case became another obstruction for Zhu Rongji's 
April trip, and it was certain that Zhu's road to US was rough. In those high-level 
meetings similar to Presidents meetings, chance for significant breakthrough was slim 
as the officials involved were under the public's supervision, and the pressure 
triggered from failure in their political professions by one single mistake. (See Figure 
5.1) 
Figure 5.1 Legitimacy Triangle in 1999 
April's trip to the US： risk + opportunity 
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Economic growth as the 
source of legitimacy 
The above triangle at the same time depicts the concerns of the leadership, 
Zhu faced a dilemma~to visit or not to visit. The meeting, if successfully would 
bring China its long-awaited membership to the WTO, which is almost a guarantee 
for even stronger economic growth. But in the backdrop of tricky domestic and 
171 James Risen, "US fires scientist suspected of giving China bomb data," New York Times, March 9, 
1999’ p.Al 
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international situation, Zhu was practically risking his own political career if he 
insisted on visiting the US. 
5.2 Three Crises 
Huge mis takeunder mismatched timing 
Zhu Rongji, Chinese Prime Minister who is famous for his pragmatic style, 
came to Washington amid heightened tensions due to the war of Kosovo, charges of 
human rights abuses, and espionage, and allegation of Chinese tampering in American 
presidential election. Besides, NATO warplanes, included an Italian one, started an 
intensified bombing campaign in Belgrade the day Jiang was visiting Italy. Its use of 
air force got on the nerves of the PLA. Worse still the Congress admitted the US to 
establish "theater missile defense" '^^(TMD) in East Asia with Taiwan. This is 
obviously counterbalance the mounting threat of missile attacks by the PRC. PLA was 
furious. The events made Jiang convene a Politburo meeting to discuss the growing 
opposition to the April visit. In this regard, in the November before Zhu left for the 
US, National Security Council sent Jiang a letter with Clinton's signature, suggesting 
that both sides should try to put together a viable WTO by early 1999. They supposed 
the potential gain should overweighet the loss, and so Zhu's trip went on as 
planned. 
Zhu arrived to Washington on April with some breathtaking proposals, 
among which American firms could hold up to 51% shares of Chinese 
telecommunications companies and insurance firms, two strategic industries in China. 
The great concession, should the PRC government's determination completing one of 
172 H.R. 366，sec 1533, 'Report on requirements for response to increased missile threat in Asia Pacific 
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the most astounding economic reform programs in history—joining WTO, which 
could help boost economic growth further and in turn sustain the Communist Party's 
absolute political control. Given the unpromising public opinion in both sides, even 
though China has made genuine concession in its joining package, Clinton still 
frustrated hopes of signing an immediate accord Clinton's advisers' views were 
indeed diverse. Barshefsky, the National security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, and 
Secretary of State Madeleine K Albright favored the deal; Sperling, the chief of staff, 
John Podesta, and other political aides who focused on domestic issues were against it 
offers. In the end, Clinton only announced there were "major progress" instead of 
concluding a deal. Embarrassingly, white House made a big mistake by publishing a 
14 page list of Zhu's "concessions", turned out to be a powerful weapon for Zhu's 
opponents since many industrial and political leaders in China were ignorant about 
these proposals. Zhu the champion of China's economic miracles who brought 
economic reform and macro-economic controls in late 90s, was quickly lost his power 
after this disappointing m e e t i n g � 7 4 . 
In fact, Clinton's rejection in April was a serious mistake, the Bilateral WTO 
talk dated back to July 1986，a deal could normally be reached within three years if 
the talk was not bogged down by the Tiananmen Square Incident 13 years later, 
following the intensified negotiations in February and March, words circulated in both 
American and Chinese business circles that the long expected deal was within reach. 
However, the constant tension between two sides, coupled with domestic political 
concerns, made an end game turned into a weeklong game of chicken. Clinton was 
too weak to fulfill China's dream. He was played by the Lewinsky scandal suffered 
口4 David E. Sanger, 'The Trade Deal: the drama; at the last hour, down to the last trick, and it worked' 
in New York Times, November 16 1999. 
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from public rage over leakage of unclear secrets to China and allegations of receiving 
secret contribution of Chinese government to the presidential campaign. He could 
only express on April 10，his administration's commitment to support China's 
accession to the WTO at the end of the year. When the US business community 
realized soon afterwards that the deal was so favorable, it castigated the 
administration for this shortsightedness. Clinton called Zhu on April 13 and asked 
him to restart the talk again. But Zhu replied that he could not do so until he got back 
to Beijing. As soon as Zhu returned, he was under attack. His political enemies were 
using the list of trade concessions to bury his economic reform program. Samuel 
Berger admitted that it was "one of the biggest foreign policy mistakes of the second 
term”i75，although he remained optimistic that the ground lost in April could be 
recover soon. 
Here is where deeper issue involved. That Jiang and Zhu decided to go on the 
trip definitely had a certain extent of confidence in the proposal, especially when they 
did get a signal, though proved to be wrong that the US was ready to sign it^^ .^ The 
moral is the importance of private communication before photo-opts events. Any 
official trip will attract public attention, people would place expectation on it. If there 
were no personal talks beforehand, the representative's involved would be at great 
political risks if they return home empty-handed. 
Missiles on the Embassy 
When Zhu left, Clinton was criticized for wasting the favorable package. So 
he had to express a willingness to reach a deal quickly. But something happened 
175 ibid 
176 Interview with Mr Richard W Stites, the Head of Public Affairs at US Consulate at March 15 2004. 
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suddenly and 'accidentally', a US aircraft operating under NATO auspices bombed 
the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia on May 7 (5:45 am of May 8 Beijing time), 
killing three Chinese reporters, causing numerous other causalities and leaving the 
embassy building devastated, This action infuriated Beijing. In response to the 
bombing, Beijing soon called off all high level military contacts between the US and 
China since "Beijing and ordinary Chinese viewed the bombing as an affront to 
national dignity, so it sparked violent anti-American demonstrations and prompted 
China to adopt a stern line in all contacts with US”!??. Chinese Government issued a 
statement expressing its utmost indignation and severest condemnation of such brutal 
1 TO 
act, and lodging its strongest protest at the same day morning . Therefore, the talks 
between China and US regarding WTO membership, human rights and security issues 
were all s u s p e n d e d 口 9 ， J i a n g refused to answer the phone call from Clinton throught 
the hotline after the bombing, and despite Clinton had sent a letter on May to Jiang 
to express his apologies and sincere condolence to the tragic situation and casualities 
in the Chinese Embassy in the accident, demonstrations were hold by the patriots 
president at various levels. China called for a UN Security Council meeting to 
condemn NATO for the bombing. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao 
deplored, the bombing was "a gross violation of the universally recognized 
international law'\ and according to the official New China News Agency, was ‘a 
barbarous act'^^^ 
177 Seth Fasion, 'US to pay China for embassy bombing' in New York Times July 30 1999. 
178 '1. Bilateral Political Relations in Retrospect' from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's 
Republic of China in http://fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4923.htmal (accessed on November 18 2002) 
179 Seth Faison, "China and US meet on trade and chilled relations thaw a bit" in New York Times, July 
28 1999. 
咖 Elisabeth Rosenthal, 'US agrees to pay China $28 million for bombing' in New York Times, 
December 16，1999. 
88 
The US side tried to explain that the bombing resulted from a string of errors 
involving outdated maps and incomplete computer databases of NATO. ^^ ^ China 
certainly would not accept this explanation. The incident made it difficult for Chinese 
leaders to make concession in any aspects under intense nationalism. At this critical 
time, US House of Representatives issued the "Cox Report", accusing China of 
stealing US unclear technology. Beijing was thus more defensive and unwilling to 
accept US's apologies. Their relationships were frozen. 
‘Special State-to-State relationship， 
Adding to 'territory i n v a d e d b o m b i n g , on July 9, Taiwan President Lee 
Teng-hui suggested Taiwan and China were separate states by saying that “The 1991 
constitutional amendments have placed cross strait relations in the position of being a 
state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than 
an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or 
1 QO 
between a central government and a local government “ He even claimed that “the 
Beijing authorities，characterization of Taiwan as a renegade province is historically 
and legally untrue''. This is literally another bombing targeted Beijing, powerful 
enough to damage cross-strait as well as Sino-American relations. Beijing soon 
reprimanded Lee's "separatist malice" through the spokesmen for the CPC Central 
Committee's Taiwan Work Office and the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office on 
ibid 
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12^ July 1999184. Two days later, Renmin Rihao criticized Lee's long-standing 
intention to split China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
That the cross-straits crisis broke out when Sino-US relation was tense 
tempted China to question whether Taiwan actually got tacit support from US. China 
was then left with no choice but to make tough gesture to please its citizens, to 
threaten Taiwan and to test US's bottom line. 
At personal level, it was essential for Jiang to differentiate himself from 
pleasing Clinton blindly after Zhu's trip and embassy bombing. At internal level, the 
administration viewed the large-scale demonstration as evidence of rising patriotism, 
it would be strong support for them to stand firm against Washington. At international 
level, though US and China were interdependent, PRC government would are not 
accommodating US under the public outrage expressed in the Anti-American protests. 
The US had to do something about the situation. James Foley, deputy 
spokesman for the State Department remarked at a news briefing in response to Lee's 
speech, ''Our policy is unchanged. Our 'one China'policy is long-standing and 
certainly well reassurance pacified China as Clinton's 'three Noes' in 
last summer'^^did, later on they went further to say that "The US recognized Beijing's 
184 ‘Spokesman on Lee Teng-Hui's Separatist Malice' in People's Daily Online, July 12 1999. 
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as the only lawful government of China, and considers Taiwan geographically part of 
China, but not currently subject to mainland political rule.，，!87 
Along with the Taiwan problem, Chinese political dissidents became an 
obstacle between US and China again. On July 22, the PRC government outlawed 
i n n 
Falun Gong , a spiritual movement in China said to combine Buddhist and Taoist 
mediation practices with a series of exercises. In November, People ’s Daily claimed 
that Falun Gong presented a great danger to the nation. From then on the government 
defined the religious sect as cult, though no clear definition was given to 'cult', and 
arrest its leaders and followers. Through the broadcast network of Falun Gong 
practitioners, American news agencies began to give wide coverage to report PRC 
officials suppressed the sect's practitioners, and thus intensified the trouble between 
the two countries. 
5.3 ‘2As，meetings—platform for saving face 
It cannot be denied that the positive response from US towards Taiwan 
worked for the PRC. At least, it made the first high-level encounter after the bombing 
possible during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Singapore on July 25. Chinese 
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with US Secretary of State Madeline Albright^^^ 
in the forum. Their meeting was a barometer of whether Washington's efforts to mend 
the relationship with Beijing were effective. After two rounds of talk in July a 
compensation of US$4.5 million was settled for Chinese casualties and property 
losses. Tang announced a meeting between and Jiang will be possibly held in New 
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Zealand at September's APEC meeting. The meeting was possible because in late 
August, Clinton wrote Jiang a letter, and hand delivered by Senator Diane Feinstein, a 
California Democrat, to request him to start the talk at APEC meeting. Since it had 
been a few months after the bombing and the suspension of contacts between China 
and the US, and Clinton made repeated apologies and several telephone calls, Beijing 
began to relent and resumed meetings with the US. In their September meeting, Both 
Clinton and Jiang seemed determined to restore normal relations. 
The truth is in August, their relationship fluctuated again due to cross strait 
turbulences. Beijing warned the Washington that it may be compelled to take military 
action against Taiwan for its recent moves toward independence. Washington in turn 
cautioning Beijing that the US would retaliate any military action targeted Taiwan. In 
the beginning of August, the US announced it was going ahead with the sale of $500 
million of military equipment to Taiwan. ^ ^^  That said, their relationship plummeted to 
its lowest depth in years. As in 1996，Taiwan was once again the "trouble maker" in 
Beijing-Washington relationship. 
It was said that during the meeting, Jiang was really friendly and 
accommodating to the US, he would nod, and say something noncommittal meeting 
that nothing meaningful would happen. He learnt to suppress the public's expectation, 
a useful tactic, in order to safeguard his power. Though in public, Jiang seemed not so 
eager to talk, the summit between Clinton and him was indeed the highlight of the 
APEC. They held talks on the sidelines of a meeting of APEC forum, this sideline 
19° Elizabeth Becker, 'China set to end suspension of military relationship with US' in New York Times, 
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ended up the mainline for both leaders who had not met for more than a year, since 
Clinton's visit to Beijing in July the previous year. Clinton hoped to reach an 
agreement before November for China to join the 134-member international trade 
organization that sets world trade rules ^ ^^and he would like to mend the relationship 
with China after the Embassy bombing in May. He sought to do so by reaffirming in 
the meeting that the "One China" policy remained unchanged^^^. The American 
subsequently characterized the one-hour meeting as “productive, harmonious and 
non-polemical跳'Chinese spokesman Zhou Bangzao also said it was "a very 
important meeting at a very important time and was constructive and positive". 
Clinton reiterated on US's "One-China Policy" by saying that 'US policy had not 
changed and would not changed^^^'. At least, their relations back on track, both 
leaders then had agreed to resume the WTO talks.. 
Clinton's statement in the meeting was crucial for Jiang to handle internal 
pressure; it provided the justification for Jiang to move forward their relations. 
Though Beijing knew anti-American sentiments were still high among the public, It 
would still like to resume the talks, and would not let short-term interest deteriorate 
in long term interest^^^ThQy both counted on a good bilateral relation because, to 
some extent, their power rested on the rising living standards, which in turn depended 
on growing trade. With the assurance from the US, Jiang could finally set the tone for 
recovering US-China relationship. 
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5.4 Re-open dialogue in WTO deals 
The personal contacts between leaders did help in these deadlocks. Clinton 
kept pushing the Chinese government in person rather than public due to the lesson he 
leamt from Zhu's April visit. The warming of relations was initiated by Clinton, 
beginning with the phone calls to Jiang; he sought to repair what administration 
officials then conceded as a policy blunder to reject the offer by Zhu Rongji.^^^ They 
also realized that publishing Chinese terms triggered opposition by opponents of Zhu 
inside China and in the end, making the deal more difficult to achieve. Zhu intended 
to use commitments to the WTO to make it hard for domestic opponents to overturn 
reforms, and he believed that China's admission to WTO would have dramatic 
political impact. But before he could get it done, he lost his power due to the unwise 
decision of Clinton Administration. It was likely that China will offer less generous 
proposal than that in April. This would indeed be the price of not sealing a wise deal 
in spring, although, it was equally difficult back then to sell the arrangement to the 
Congress. In this light, the administration assembled a 150-person working group to 
ensure the Congress would approve giving China the PNTR status in autumn. On 16山 
October, Clinton called Jiang and suggested a visit by Ms Barshfsky to Jiang, so that 
the US trade representative could follow up the WTO deal, Clinton also said he would 
soon send a bottom line offer to Jiang. This time, Jiang's response was not very 
revealing. The situation reversed, in April where, China was the supplicant, it was 
now the turn for the US to show greater eagerness for the deal. 
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On 23^'^October, Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers was sent to China and 
talked with Zhu Rongji on WTO. He was the first Cabinet level official to visit China 
since NATO warplane the Chinese Embassy in Y u g o s l a v i a . ！ 卯 On November 5, 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that China and US agreed to resume 
military relations suspended by Beijing after the bombing. And China agreed to 
remove this obstruction in its relation with the US a week before during the visit of 
Thomas Pickering, the deputy undersecretary of state, to Beijing. 
High-level contacts were activated again. On November 8, Clinton called 
Jiang again. This time Jiang responded more positively, showing much more interest 
albeit noncommittal. At last, the agreement was finalized on November, during 
Barshefsky and Gene Sperling, a top Clinton aide's, visit to China. Before the visit, 
Ms Barshefsky was unusually tight-lipped about the talks; she did not want to appear 
too eager apparently to strike an agreement, which is the biggest taboo on the 
bargaining table—being too keen would be a dangerous negotiating s t a n c e I n fact, 
China still wanted a deal despite the disappointment in April, but it was clear an exact 
same deal was unattainable given the changes in political circumstances. Where Zhu 
has already sacrificed in internal power struggle, and Clinton happened to show his 
desperation, Jiang was in a position to devise a plan more favorable to him. 
The situation became increasingly adverse for Clinton, as mentioned Clinton's 
position and situation was gloomy; he was reduced to a lame duck after the scandal. 
Various cases proved his limitation in implementing policy with weakened authority. 
In October, Clinton wanted to have the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ratified. The treaty 
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was signed by Clinton in 1996, and was sent it to the Senate in September 1997. But 
the ratification was still unsuccessful till 1999 October; commentators foresaw that ‘to 
allow ratification only on a new President's w a t c h ' I n fact, Clinton would like to 
operate the treaty in a bid to burnish his legacy in his final 15 months in office. 
However, "foreign policy becomes much more difficult because of the political 
context" said the diplomat Winston Lord, who served in both Republican and 
Democratic administrations. "President and the Party wants to get re-elected, that 
means the White House, the press, and the national political committees view 
everything through the political prism? As Clinton was entangled in domestic politics, 
being unable to press the Congress for ratification much earlier, he feared that ‘a 
confrontation with the Senate's Republicans over the Democratic domestic agenda', 
and insistence on the Treaty ratification would affect the WTO deal which was more 
significant. 
Though the WTO deal was no panacea, it should be one of the most important 
accords in Sino-American relations after the three main communiques^®^ since the 
resumption of diplomatic relations two decades ago. It would also provide Clinton 
and Jiang with a long-sought foreign policy accomplishment, Clinton can claim to 
help integrate the world's most populous country into the global economy, putting it 
under the rule of international law and stimulating China's faltering economic reforms, 
while Jiang can claim he strived for national glory as China finally became member of 
the World's biggest international trade organization, he fulfilled the dream of the PRC 
which stretched for thirteen years, and above all, he established a tougher image than 
Jane Perlez, The World: Presidential Wish Lists; seeking Glory far from home' in New York Times, 
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Zhu did in April. The WTO deal credit was supposed to be given to Zhu, but after his 
failure in spring, Jiang reaped the fruits. The second time he became a beneficiary 
after the 1989 Tiananmen incident. He was lucky because by then, White House has 
already learnt that they could not publicly discuss Clinton's conversation with Jiang, 
the officials would even deny any of such conversation. Clinton has insisted on a veil 
of secrecy around the delicate talks.202 Clinton's carefulness helped Jiang save face 
for the negotiation. At last, this historical milestone，signing of the Sino-US WTO 
agreement, was completed by Barshefsky and Shi Guangsheng on November 15. 
Diplomat dead but diplomacy alive 
On 29^ November, a diplomat who served over a quarter-century died. He 
was Hsing-Hsing, the National Zoo's giant panda.2�4 j^g ^as a gift, together with the 
female denmate, Ling Ling, to the US from Mao Zedong in commemoration of 
President Richard M. Nixon's ice-breaking trip to China in 1972. The animal 
symbolized a deepening but still testy relationship between the world's most populous 
nation and the wealthiest one. Without Hsing-Hsing's sweet-natured delight to 
millions, China still has it own attractiveness in the eyes of the US, enormous 
economic interests. Their reciprocal contacts symbolized diplomatic accomplishment, 
thus helping the government appealing to the public, turned against the breakdown 
from internal and left face to the leaders, which was crucial especially when they were 
trapped from legitimation crisis. 
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On now, leaders leamt the rules of game—always hide the concession in front 
of the public and blow the achievements up even if the deal was not really a very 
favorable. For instance, the US and China negotiators reached agreement on 
compensation, in December 16 afternoon, for damages in the NATO bombing of the 
PRC Embassy. It was in fact not a one-sided compensation from the US to China. On 
the one hand, the US government has agreed to pay China $28 million in 
compensation for the damaging of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. On the other 
hand, China agreed to pay the US $2.87 million for damage to the American Embassy 
and other diplomatic buildings in China during the anti-American demonstrations 
triggered by the bombing.^^^Beijing emphasized that they punished the invader by 
charging them a huge compensation without mentioning the fact that China also 
needed to pay the US. Similarly, Washington maintained that it was a fair deal in 
which both side claimed for compensation. The stormy year was over, the new 
millennium was inaugurated with the permanent normal trade relation (PNTR) taking 
effect on 1 of January. 
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Figure 5.2 Three ' I 's model in 1999 
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Chapter 6 
Dealing with a New Emperor: 
The Case of 2001 
6.1 Shanghai APEC 
On January 4 2001，George W. Bush was elected as the 43''' President of US. 
Sino-American relations then opened a new chapter as this new emperor was 
enthroned. If Clinton's attitude towards the PRC was mild, Bush was certainly harsh. 
In his adolescence he experienced that being soft to China, would mean losing in 
presidential election. Therefore, he redefined the relationship with China from 
Clinton's 'strategic partnership^ to his “strategic competitive rival,!抓 after assuming 
office. Despite he promised a tougher approach to China, in October's APEC 
Shanghai, Bush reiterated that ‘China is a great power. And America wants a 
constructive relationship with China严，He even admitted that China was a 
friend of America, albeit the rocky start of 2001 with EP-3 plane collision on 
Fool's Day and many other old problems involved. From 'partnership' to ‘rival,, 
and then suddenly transformed from 'competitors' to ‘friends,, it was a fundamental 
change in attitudes. The relations can hardly be repaired without a face-saving 
platform一APEC. The meeting in Shanghai this year was critical point for Jiang who 
was expected to retire that year, but still hoped to retain his power in the PRC 
leadership. Hence, He needed to handle this fresh new player carefully. In this chapter, 
it will be demonstrated how Jiang's two-level show worked to Bush, replaced Clinton 
as his counterpart. 
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Junior Bush indeed learned from his father's sad experience. He would act 
tough on China to avoid repeating the fate of Senior Bush, who was criticized by Bill 
Clinton in 1992 Presidential Election for his soft attitude to China, eventually failed to 
the re-elected. (After the June 4 incident, when the US banned high-level visit to and 
put sanction on China, Bush send Scowcroft and Eagleburger on a secret trip to 
Beijing in order to repair the crashes between the US and China^® ,^ Bush's opponents 
harshly criticized this) Bush adopted the ‘ABC，policy, Anything but Clinton. The 
first move was to redefine China as 'strategic competitive rival’— upon assuming 
office, Bush called a dozen of country leaders except the Chinese leader, and he even 
arranged visit for Prime Minister of Japan and President of South Korea to US before 
Qien Qichen's in March. All these gestures indicated that the Bush Administration 
would like to lower China's diplomatic status in the language of diplomacy. The 
Beijing administration started to worry about the future of Sino-America relations, 
inlight of Bush's apparent reversal of the 'engagement' policy. Fortunately, APEC 
again served as a platform to bridge the gap between the two countries. 
New Doctrine: A Potential enemy or ally? 
A few months later, Bush soon found that it was impossible to play China 
down, as it was already a part or, more precisely, an important part of the world 
system.210 Many business figures including the Republican ones appealed to 
Washington for a healthier development of Sino-US relations. The two presidents 
then started to communicate by correspondence, leading to some consensus on the 
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development of their relations on bilateral, and by March 18，Qian Qichen's visit to 
US, a new framework of stronger ties with each other was established. During the 
visit Qian met with US President Bush, Vice-President Richard Cheney, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and they agreed to develop a rather constructive 
connection from a long-term perspective. Bush was more articulated about the 
bilateral relations; everything seemed going on the right track in March though US 
put forward a proposal expressing concerns about 'human rights' in China at a session 
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 26th March, 
which was the lO^ h time since 1990 even though China announced it would ratify the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights it signed on October 
27, 1997 in February. China defeated the condemnation, as usual, on April 18. In May, 
the US was ousted from the UN Commission on Human Right -with China playing a 
big role in it，US slowly woke up to the 'China Threat' discourse. Compare with the 
previous two crises, this was rather mild. At least, domestic situation was not adverse 
as there were no outcries or scandals. Bilateral connections could thus move forward 
steadily. 
6.2 Conflicts again 
A Joke on Fool's Day 
But then on April Fool's Day, a China F8 fighter collided with a US EP-3 
electronic reconnaissance plane in South China Sea, the two planes rammed and then 
caused a crash, Chinese pilot，Wang Wei died from the incident. The American plane 
together with its 24-crew members, had entered into Chinese airspace without 
permission and landed on Hainan Island. From China's perspective, the US owed 
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China an official apology for sending out 'spy' plane, and resulting in the pilot's 
death,2ii China perceived this incident as one of many in its long history of 
humiliation by the West. A formal apology, not just a casual 'sorry', was therefore 
required. However, from America's perspective, Bush cannot concede since the 24 
American crew members were still detained on the Chinese island. The White House 
only authorized a letter expressing sincere 'regret' for the death of pilot, and the US 
was "very sorry" for entering China's airspace and making an unauthorized landing. 
Nevertheless, China demanded an official apology from the world's sole superpower, 
a hegemony which had bombed her embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during a military 
action. The apology thus became a strong domestic motivation in China that was at 
least as important as those relating to cross-strait and bilateral relations. The apology 
from US was ended up jockeying over language. Expressing regret without admitting 
guilty, according to the will of domestic and international spectators, required some 
tactics. As modem China now is filled with nationalism as the void left by the demise 
of Marxism-Leninism. In interpersonal level, if one person wrongs another, an 
apology is required to move the relationship forward. However, things would be more 
complicated for stats since an apology was to satisfy the nation's wounded sense of 
pride, President would be more concerned with their status and reputation than with 
the need for an honest relationship. This is particular true in China, in order to save 
face, where nationalism has filled after the two planes collided, the two Presidents 
barked void left by the demise of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts at 
each other and exchanged rhetoric. We could see it from Bush's reflexes，Jiang's rule 
and their return of a rivalry. Deep down, however, both of them knew that it was 
^"http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/lib pov apologv.html related links "Sorry the hardest work" by 
BBC News Online Kate Goldberg (April 11 2001), "Sorry is nice, but not what China wants" 
CNN.com (April 10 2001) CNN.com also has an in-depth special entitled 'US-China Collision: 
diplomatic solution.' 
103 
better to put this behind and prevented it from developing into a significant disruptive 
• 2 1 2 • • 
issue. Public opinion on both sides were started to mobilize, which could become a 
source of troubles as well as the bargaining chips. The US public criticisms 
surrounding China giving Bush under political pressure to adopte a hard-line policy 
towards China. Similarly Jiang was pressured to act tough. Even though informal 
negotiations on the EP-3 settlement from April 23 to 25 were held by Assistant 
Foreign Minister Mr. Zhou Wenzhong and US Ambassador Pruecher, the resolution 
was not reached because both leaders were under strong internal crosswinds. 
Art of apology—negotiation involved 
The 11-day long tension after the EP-3 Incident^ ^ ^ fully demonstrated that 
'sorry' is sometimes the hardest word to say. Initially, US Pacific Command 
spokesman, Colonel John Bratton, said the collision appears to have been "an 
accident" only. Bush said he was troubled by failing to get the aircraft and its crew 
returned, 'now it is time for our servicemen and women to return home and it is time 
for the Chinese Government to return our plane' However, Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Zhu Bangzao replied on April 3，that 'based on Chinese law, and 
international practice, we have the right to conduct an investigation'. Meanwhile, the 
Chinese press expressed extreme anger and made a concerted call for a full apology. 
The next day, Jiang called Washington demanding a publicly apology for the collision. 
He said the US 'should bear all responsibilities for the collision', the Xinhua News 
Agency reported. However, Powell called the incident 'tragic accident' only. ‘We 
regret the loss of life of that Chinese pilot, but now we need to mover on.' Ari 
212 Robert Marquand, 'Interview Kenneth Lieberthal: US and China can still limit the damage from the 
crisis' Christian Science Monitor. April 5 2001, Vol 93 Issue 91, p.7 
213 'Diary of the dispute' in BBC News world edition, Thursday, May 24, 2001 
http://news.bbc.co.uky2/hi/asia-pacific/1270365.stm 
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Fleischer, White House spokesman went further, ‘...we do not understand any reason 
to apologize.' On April 5, Bush said he 'regrets' that a Chinese pilot was missing and 
that one of their planes has been lost. China's news agency translated his expression 
as 'yihan' a mild regret that did not accept any blame. For high level officials, and 
even Presidents expressing personal sorrow was not difficult, but they rarely 
apologize for their work, no matter it was an error or not. An official apology is a 
potential minefield as it assumes governmental responsibility and liability.^ Think 
about Japan, Chinese have been waiting for over 50 years for Japan to apologize for 
its conduct in World War II. It is thus easy to imagine how hard it would be to get and 
apology, and from the US. 
The following Wednesday, Bush told his advisers he wanted to find a ‘way 
out'. Hence, Powell appeared to make a concession by the word 'sorry' when 
referring to the loss of the Chinese fighter pilot, Wang Wei, on April 8. He broadened 
the view towards China as well; while affirming that China was a 'competitor', he 
added 'But that doesn't mean we can't find areas in which we can p a r t n e r . C h i n a 
eventually announced the released of the crew after it received a letter from the US, 
delivered by US Ambassador Joseph Prueher, written 'Both President Bush and 
Secretary of State Powell have expressed their sincere regret over your missing pilot 
and aircraft. Please convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei 
that we are were sorry about their loss and we are very sorry the entering of China's 
airspace and the landing did not have verbal clearance, but very pleased the crew 
landed safely. We appreciate China's efforts to see to the well-being of our crew.' The 
214 Earl Ofari Hutchinson, 'Why Rice can't apologize' in September 11 Inquiry, South China Morning 
Post, A13 Insight, April 13，2004. 
215 Nancy Gibbs and Michael Duffy, 'Saving Face' in TimeAsia 
http://www.time.eom/time/asia/news/magazine/0.9754.105658.00.html 
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tension seemed loosen up with these shady expressions in between sorrow and 
apology. Until now, the two countries were keeping each other a distance. 
Then, why did Jiang insist on demanding an apology? Why would he stake so 
much on one plane? If he gave a nice treatment to the crew, he could earn a wide-
spectrum of goodwill from the West, but he chose a tough and unfriendly response. 
Compared with the Embassy Bombing in 1999，Jiang was more aggressive this time. 
This reflected his weakness in internal power struggle, contrary to two years ago, 
when he blessed by a string of precious state visits. In 2001, he had to resign. Before 
he left, he had to place his followers into key posts, so as to secure his position and 
influence. Therefore he had an urgent task to consolidate his supremacy. (See Figure. 
6.1) 
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Figure. 6.1 Jiang's decision on foreign policy 
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Taiwan and Tibet—‘internal affairs?' 
Apart from the collision between American spy plane and Chinese fighter 
aircraft, a strong protest took place in China on May 22 in which，the public 
condemned that the US had 'grossly interfered，in China's affairs and encouraged 
independence forces.加 
Beijing government was angered by US decision of arms sales to Taiwan in 
April, providing Lee Teng-hui, the former Taiwanese President, with a visa and 
allowing Chen Shui Bian, President of Taiwan to stop over in the US. Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao protested that 'China has always opposed all forms 
of official contact with Taiwan by countries with which we have diplomatic 
relations.' Given Chen met the Mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, held 
discussions with US congressmen and visited the New York Stock Exchange during 
his break in the journey, Beijing perceived all these as an encouragement to Taiwan's 
independence, and thus a case of interfering her internal affairs and harming its 
216 'US backs Dalai Lama' in BBC News world edition, Wednesday, May 23, 2001 
httD://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-Dacific/1346621.stm 
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interest. What was more, Bush decided to sell Taiwan a range of weapons, including 8 
submarines, 12 P-3C sub-hunting patrol aircraft and 4 Kidd-class destroyers on April 
25, and claimed that ‘ We would do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.^ 
Even though China delivered a strong condemnation of the White House's decision, 
Bush maintained it was the "right package for the moment" Hence, China's vigorous 
reaction to Chen's controversial multiple transits and meeting with US Senators and 
politicians, and so as her opposition towards Bush's meeting with the Tibet's exiled 
spiritual leader came in no surprise. China thought that Dalai Lama was not a 
"religious figure but a political exile"^^^ who indulged in activities aimed to split 
Tibet form the motherland, and incessantly sought Tibetan independence. 
Nevertheless, Bush offered strong support to Dalai Lama and had meeting with him at 
the White House. Bush committed to "support Tibet's unique religious, cultural and 
linguistic identity and the protection of the human right of all Tibetans"^^^ China 
naturally got angry and remained tough without reservation. The anger could be 
showed on statements like ‘KILL THE IMPERIALIST AMERICAN PIGS' dotting 
Chinese Internet message boards. The escalating tension on both sides caused 
Rumsfeld to make an announcement in that the United States was suspending military 
contacts with the Chinese military until further notice. Despite the fact that a Pentagon 
spokesman said 'the statement was a mistake' hours later, we could see there were 
many fluctuations in both sides' internal power struggle when facing domestic politics. 
But reality is reality, after a series of negotiations, both sides agreed finally on 
the technical arrangements of the disassembling and transporting of the EP-3 military 
217 ‘Bush defends Taiwan Arms Sales' in BBC News world edition, Wednesday, April 25, 2001 
httD://news.bbc.co.uk /2 /hi /asia-Dacif ic /1295542 .stm 
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surveillance. The lesson they learnt from the incident was that if the administration 
could calm down before blaming on others immediately, refrain the mass media from 
blowing the incident up at the beginning, things would be much different. They 
thoroughly understand the importance of intensive private diplomacy, e.g. through 
telephone calls, letters and informal meeting by Presidents and officials. Moreover, it 
is crucial to settle a crisis before it escalated to be a confrontation. China 
underestimated the consequences of seizing the crew in this incident would made US 
public. The action harked back to the Iran hostage crisis twenties years ago. For this 
reason, what Americans cared most would be when they would leave the plane back 
and when the crew would be released. The US did not understand the influence of 
China's long humiliated history and that of the 1999，s Embassy Bombing Chinese 
stands to stand a deep apology and compensation in any similar cases. The tasks for 
the two sides were what kind of statements was needed to made to resolve the issue. 
The issue, in fact, cannot be negotiated publicly. Otherwise, options would be unduly 
limited by domestic pressure. 
This time, the successful resolution of the spy plane impasse underscores an 
important principle: Diplomacy must be paramount in the contentious US-China 
relations.220 China and the US must work in both private and public diplomacy to 
reduce confrontations. Privately, they needed a better understanding to the strains and 
struggles within the administration; publicly, they needed to handle public opinion 
and other related institute. Again, a platform for settlement is needed. 
22° Editorial: Chinese Boxes, Nation, May 7 2001, Volume 272 Issue 18. 
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6.3 Warming in relations 
Ardent summer 
After months of tension, July and August seemed to be the propitious months 
for China, after Beijing won the right to host the 2008 Olympic Game on July 14, five 
days later, US House of Representatives approved the extension of China's PNTR 
status for one more year. On July 25, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan held 
talks with US Secretary of State Colin Powell on the sidelines of the annual meeting 
of the Eighth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, Vietnam. And after the ARF, 
Powell visited Beijing and met with Jiang, Zhu and Qian in late July. During the visit, 
they reached consensus on four issues, namely, holding the Sino-US Joint 
Economic Committee (JEC) meeting, Sino-China Joint Commission on Commerce 
and Trade (JCCT) meeting and the special meeting of the Military Maritime 
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and resuming dialogue on human rights between 
two governments, he also planned to prepare the way for Bush's trip to Shanghai and 
Beijing in October. Subsequently, some Senators】�'，media and business delegations 
met with Chinese leaders during the summer, like Jiang, for this instance, met with 
visiting Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. They would like to constructively engage 
with Beijing by promoting trade and exchange, though they were still in the dilemma 
of struggle between whether it was best to help China open and develop through a 
liberal policy of engagement or contain China as a potential threat to the US. Cheng 
Li, a China expert at Hamilton College in New York, concluded by saying 'it looks 
like a strategy of congagemnef which is a blend of engagement and containment. 
221 Robert Marquand, 'A Careful Boost for US-China Ties', Christian Science Monitor, August 10 
2001 Vol. 93 Issue 180, p.6. 
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Indeed, in that summer, Chinese leaders were in the midst of fierce struggle over 
Jiang's replacement. Political succession in China has not yet institutionalized. In the 
absence of a formal mechanism, successor is hand-picked by the former leaders. Deng 
Xiaoping appointed Hu Yaobang, Zhao Zhiyang, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. 
However, this kind of succession often lacks adequate legitimate foundation. Thus, 
the top decision-making bodies organs were in a state of turmoil were gushing inside. 
Jiang's adamant approach in the commencement of the year revealed his weakness at 
home. The crisis hit him at the most delicate moment in his career since he took 
power after Tiananmen Square Incident. Jiang would like to retain his power though 
he was supposed resign at a party conference in late 2002, and Hu should rise to the 
apex. Jiang still wanted to sustain his influence, he attempted to achieve this by acting 
tough towards the US. If Jiang really wanted to serve for a longer term, he must play 
the 'diplomatic card' skillfully. His opponents, especially among the hard-liners in the 
PLA, considered Jiang too soft and too willing to submit to American demands. 
Under such great pressure, if Jiang fails to handle the relationship with the US 
properly, he will lose the greatest pillar of his legitimacy, if he did not handle the 
internal anger at US over the EP-3 incident, he could literally be drowned by the 
passionate nationalistic crowd. Though he seemed to be surrounded by enemies the 
summer was proved to be his 'showtime'. Finally, even Jiang Zemin stepped down as 
required, by the constitution, limiting the office of President to two terms^^^and Hu 
Jintao took power, but he retained the position of the Chairman of the CMC, which 
guarantees him as one of the core-decision makers of China. One of his bargaining 
chips to secure a solid status of the first among equals was the military's relatively 
222 Kerry Dumbaugh, 'China-US relations: Current Issues for the 108 '^ Congress' in CRS Report for 
Congress (Order Code RL31815) Updated July 25，2003 
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unanimous approval of his retention of command, provided that his foreign policy 
consideration would take the PLA's hard-line preference into account. 
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Legitimacy consideration did not limit to China. At the beginning of the year, a 
similar situation happened in the US, where Bush got the seat by a marginal victory at 
the presidential election. His legitimacy was weak, given that he received less votes 
than his competitor, A1 Gore. That was why he resorted to the ABC policy to 
differentiate himself from the pro-China democratic administration and hoped to build 
his own cohorts. Thus, he acted equally, or even more, tough to China, as did Jiang to 
the US. 
Death of asylum, birth of hamlet 
After the rocky start of 2001, the September 11 terrorist attacks against the 
United States appeared to affect the policy calculus for both Washington and Beijing. 
These attacks not only caused serious casualties and aggravated the economic 
recession in the US, but also forced the government to readjust its global security 
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strategy and relations with large nations, thus providing a new opportunity to improve 
Sino-US relations. At midnight, Jiang conveyed a message expressing his deep 
sympathy to Bush, the US government and its people, and emphasized the Chinese 
government's opposition against terrorism. Jiang did so at his earliest, almost 
immediately after the tragedy. In the wake of this episode, the US downplayed the 
differences and problems between both sides, and set their cooperation against global 
terrorism as a priority. The US would adopted a more pragmatic, rational and active 
stance in China, their goal were to increase common ground and seek more common 
interests in security and politics, strengthen mutual economic cooperation and 
promote common development and prosperity and resolve differences through 
dialogue.^^^ Since China was a permanent member in the United National's Security 
Council, she could veto or support the resolution in the council including the UN anti-
terrorism measures. On September 20 to 21, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited 
US and both countries held expert negotiations on anti-terrorism and other security 
issues in Washington and Beijing afterward. On October 9 and 10, Jiames A Kelly, 
US Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited China while China-
US human rights dialogues were held in Washington?^"^ There were more and more 
senior level visits and contacts in the Bush Administration after 911-attacks. On 
October 19, Jiang and Bush met for the first time at the APEC Economic Leaders' 
meeting in Shanghai. This time the APEC's meeting intently focused on anti-
terrorism campaign, so that American rather than Chinese officials were in the 
position to set the agenda?^^ Despite the fact that China cannot reach goals that 
223 Sino-US Relations: Develop in Twists and Turns 
http://www.china.org.cn/ennhlish/2001/Dec/24146.htm (accessed at 6/11/2002) 
224 'China and the United States of America' from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4452.html (accessed at 5/5/3003) 
225 Willy Wo-Lap Lam，'APEC: Jiang's last hurrah?' in CAW October 16’ 2001 
http://www.cnn.com/2001 /WORLD/asiapcf/10/16/willY.column/ 
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matched its status as a 'regional superpower' during the meeting, it gained something 
invaluable. 
At the stage in Shanghai APEC summit, Bush said, 
'China is a great power. And America wants a constructive relationship with 
China. We welcome a China that is a full member of world community, that is at 
peace with its neighbors. We welcome and support China's accession into the World 
Trade Organization. We believe it's a very important development that will benefit 
our two peoples and the world.‘ 
And 
'Today's meetings convinced me that we can build on our common interests. 
Two great nations will rarely agree on everything; I understand that. But I assured 
the President that we'll always deal with our differences in a spirit of mutual respect. 
We seek a relationship that is candid, constructive and cooperative 
Note that constructive relationship is a rare term after Bush assumed the 
office, comparing to 'competitor' and 'rival'. After a circle around, Bush realized that 
his father was right, China was a rising power which nobody can afford to ignore. 
During the meeting, Bush even said ‘China is a great country and is not an enemy of 
the United States', adding that he regarded China as a friend of the United States,^^^ 
226 u s China stand against terrorism: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011019-4.html 
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which has not been used in the Sino-America relationship before. It signaled a step 
forward in the diplomacy of the US and China. Without this summitry, it was hard to 
imagine how their relationship can be rescued. The joint statement on anti-terrorism 
，，Q 
attack will not be signed either. Bush and Jiang held a three hours talk on China-US 
relations and Taiwan issue, the first visit of Bush after the 911 incident; he nearly 
cancelled all the state visits except Shanghai APEC, though at that time they were 
waging an air raid upon Afghanistan.^^^ His efforts resulted in Beijing's commitment 
to 'be a partnership for constructing a new world order of peace and stability in the 
age of terrorism ad counter-terrorism^^^' In August 2002, the US further pleased 
China by announcing that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has placed 
on the US list of terrorist groups while initially, the US did not want the anti-terror 
campaign be used to persecute separatists or other minorities with political grievances 
against Beijing. This was clearly a trade off for the PRC's support in the UN Security 
Council for American campaign against I raq� ]� . 
A Green House in Winter 
In the coming winter, high-level official contacts were frequent. Deputy 
Foreign Minister Wang Guangya visited the United States from November 29 to 30， 
and met with the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security John R. Bolton for consultations on Arms Control and non-proliferation. And 
on December 11，China formally joined the World Trade Organization. In mid-
December Avis Bohlen, the United States Assistant Secretary for Arms Control 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/0ct/20809.htm 
228 Chronology of China-US Relations http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26890.htm 
(accessed on 2002/11/6) 
229 Bob Woodward, 'Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role' in Washington Post, Saturday, 
November 18’ 2001; Page AOl http://www.washingtonDost.com/wp-srv/politics/CIA18.html 
230 Willy Wo-Lap Lam，‘APEC: Jiang's last hurrah?' in CAW October 16’ 2001 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/10/16/willv.colui-nii/ 
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visited China, briefed to the Chinese side on the withdrawal of the US from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty. At the end of that year, Bush decided to grant China the 
Permanent Normal Trade Status on December 27 that ended a long practice of an 
annual review in the Congress of China's status. 
From then on, the US and China had more senior level contacts in Jiang's time. 
The 911-incident provided them with a ground for operation, since a common enemy 
was found. In the 70s, the US and China signed the three communiques because of the 
threat of their common enemy, the USSR. The 911 incident, however, was only part 
of the reason, and was contributor really the key. The truth is the cost of losing each 
other is prohibitive, but at the same time, they need to learn 'how to approach each 
other without jumpy the polls?' After the Shanghai APEC, Bush Administration 
apparently recognized the value of summitry. So in the following year, there were lots 
of visits between them, like between February 21 to 22 Bush, visited China as a 
stopping during his visit to Japan and South Korea, and Hu Jintao，who was the PRC 
Vice-President at that moment, paid his first visit to the US in Apr iP�� . Jiang was also 
invited to Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, on October 25, a place representing 
respect and friendship of Bush. Jiang made it high profile in order to impress the 
public, and to win vital domestic political support. All these meetings became a 
vehicle to deepen bilateral ties and symbolize a new framework for cooperation. The 
use of summits revealed in these three chapters will be graphically displayed in Figure 
6.3 
232 Interview with Mr Richard W Stites, the Head of Public Affairs at US Consulate who was a China 
expert. He mentioned that 7 think a lot changes after 911, but I don 't think that was really the key 
point, I think what would seen is a long term shift in the relationship... result of China's emergency in 
the world stage, economically and regionally 
233 Kerry Dumbaugh, 'China-US relations: Current Issues for the 108''' Congress' in CRS Report for 
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Figure 6.3 Use of Summitry in 2001 
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Progress in the relation between China and the first post Cold War Republican 
government was possible through contacts the Shanghai Summit in 2001 has paved 
the way for the sound development of bilateral ties in the new century. Hope it 
ensures a more stable Sino-American relationship in the foreseeable future with 




7.1 Era unlike Mao，s and Deng's 
The eighteen summitry in the thirty-year history of Sino-American relations 
meant much more than just photo-op occasions, substantive achievements are made 
including the breakthrough in diplomacy, signing of numerous agreements like Joint 
Communique of the People 's Republic of China and the United States�，、Joint 
Communique on the establishment of Diplomatic relations and the China-US August 
17 Communique and a large-amount of trade deals, plus the symbolic achievements 
gained from meetings. In fact, summit means more than that. This thesis shows the 
leverage of summits in handling domestic legitimacy crisis or satisfying the internal 
needs, while strengthening leader's standing at home. This explains Jiang Zemin's 
enthusiasm in requesting and attending summits, and thus the amazing number of 
summit in the period of 1993-2002. 
Although Deng's motto was 'keep a low profile, never take the lead', Jiang 
never seemed to stick to it, he was often a high profile starting from early 90s. His 
glamorous presence in those meetings with the US Presidents delivered the real 'core', 
the new helmsman in the third generation. 
As far as China is concerned, leaders of each generation were given a 
characteristic label. When Chinese people said 'Chairman', they referred to Mao 
Zedong; If ‘Comrade,，we meant Deng Xiaopeng, and 'Core' is Jiang's designation. 
It is also known as the 'Shanghai Communique’ 
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However, the name itself did not promise anything, Mao led the communist 
revolution and established the PRC - or New China. Deng was the designer for 
economic reform, turning China from a socialist planned economy to a "socialist 
market economy". But Jiang can only keep things on an even keel with little 
amendments indeed. Political legitimacy of the older generation of leadership comes 
from their revolutionary experiences. It is high time leadership later established a new 
base of political legitimacy. 
Jiang faced strong competition from hardliners like, Li Peng, who gained a 
distinguished service record during the June Incident because of his tough acts. 
Also, many other veterans in the CCP had wider reputation in the Party and longer 
experiences in playing high politics. Jiang's high profile scored him prestige. Over the 
past decade nobody except Jiang in the Politburo succeeded in winning the support of 
American political elites in the eyes of public, not even Zhu Rongji, who was favored 
by the US, due to his failed trip in 1999. No other cadre had the experience and 
breadth of vision to effectively handle the Americans either. Summitry in the new 
century has a new function in addition to the traditional one of conflict resolutions 一 
'Seeking honor abroad to shore up one's legacy back home.'^^^ 
Jiang needs to be honest to himself that, unlike Deng and Mao, he is not an 
idea entrepreneur, Mao Zedong's Thought and Deng Xipang's theory are really 'path-
shaping' ideology which guided the way for the country, but Jiang's "three 
represents" are not, it did not grant him credit and his performances at summits did. 
235 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘Symbolism or substance? China talks up the Texas summit' in CNN World 
October 22，2002. 
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Among the three forms of summits, APEC is the most contributing venue for 
Jiang's show. If the 1993 Seattle APEC meeting broke the sanctions that the US 
imposed upon China following to the Tiananmen movement, and it started the 
contacts between the two countries since the end of Cold War. Then, the 1996 Manila 
APEC was the step leading to the reciprocal state visits in the subsequent two years. 
The admission of WTO was definitely through the efforts made in the Auckland 
APEC. In the 2001 Shanghai summit, Jiang made his last attempts to retain the 
ultimate decision making power, which contributed to a relatively steady and 
predictable China-US relations because it finally reversed the initially unfriendly 
approach of the Bush Administration. Rounds and rounds of APEC meetings have 
transformed to be a regular crisis management platform, gradually institutionalized in 
the bilateral relations, though in a subtle manner. 
7.2 Lessons for Policy makers 
The arguments in this thesis presented aim more than the theoretical value of 
the two-level games approach, they also tries to show how the relationship between 
the two biggest countries was managed through the APEC summitry, a bridge which 
brings the leaders together by them a nice excuse to meet without losing face. A few 
more lessons can be drawn from this study for leaders. 
First, Public Relations (PR) is essential for a leader. As a leader, either you 
are powerful or charismatic enough to shape the thoughts of others, even he is your 
rival; or you need to be high-profile enough to impress the public so much so that 
that you cannot be substituted by others. This image-building task ensured Jiang's 
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position the entire decade despite of his limited ability in comparison to Mao and 
Deng. 
Second, reading the signal from the counterpart is crucial to decision-
making. A leader being the representative of state cannot act explicitly against 
mainstream opinions, even Jiang longed to be favored by the United States'he still 
had to show the US some gestures by withdrawing the embassy consultants in 1995 
for granting Lee a visa; even Clinton preferred engaging with China, he had to send 
two carriers to Taiwan Strait in 1996 in order to show Beijing America's insistence on 
a peaceful resolution. If a leader fails to read the message behind, and misunderstood 
it as the reverse of engagement policy, he will miss the opportunity and respond 
unwisely. 
Third, minor concession is a necessary to get great progress. With respect to 
domestic concerns, it is wise to make trivial compromises on peripheral issues, Jiang 
had released Wei Jinagsheng and signed International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights before or after his state visit paid to the US in 1997. This 
concession, though far from opening up Chinese political system, gave Clinton face, 
in return Clinton was more ready to offer China a better deal in bilateral issues. 
The preceding chapters argued that Jiang Zemin was not a genius with a 
vision to bring China to a new page. However, he knows best how to make use of the 
marketing value of summits, to read the others' mind and to take advantage in crisis. 
All these are crucial in securing his position in the past 10 years. 
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The use of summit has been fully demonstrated in Jiang's time and he has 
already set the framework for the leaders in this century, in the future, even Hu Jintao 
himself might be less sociable than Jiang, he cannot escape from the base set by Jiang. 
The general Public has already familiar with having their representative in the 
international stage, well representing the glorification of the Great China. It explained 
Hu's activeness in visiting different countries since he got the seat. The next step for 
China is to actualize its 'Great Power Diplomacy' in the coming century. We will be 
in honor to become the witness as we born in this period of time. 
7.3 Contributions/ Implications 
The rising dragon attracted the eyes from countries all over the world 
including the sole hegemony, the US. None of them can neglect the value of each 
other given their independence across the board. In this millennium, it is not 
exaggerating to say that it is the world of Sino-America. As a Chinese student in this 
epoch, it will be an honor to witness the dynamic between them, and I am craving for 
a stronger China in the hand of the fourth generation. It is hoped that this research can 
give a reflection on the tactics of handling bilateral conflicts with the assistance of 
summits. 
Yet, most of the academic researches have excellent explanations on 'how 
Sino-American can maintain their relationship in this decade' through the various 
connections in trade, security and international support based on liberalism, realism 
and the English School respectively. But they neglected domestic concern which 
interacts with the foreign policy. Besides, they offered no insights on 'how' to handle 
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their relations in 'what' situations, both are significant questions for making further 
steps in bilateral relations. 
Surprisingly, summitry as an important venue for leaders is scarcely 
explored in the existing literature. I believe this research can contribute to the study of 
politics of summit by exploring the changing context in which US and Chinese 
leaders had their meetings. Furthermore, many people had overlooked this platform, 
APEC Leaders' Meetings as the bridge of Beijing and Washington. Although there 
were over hundreds literatures written about on APEC, or China and APEC 
specifically, not many of them had focused on its political uses, let alone its use in 
smoothing Sino-American relations. Up to now, none of them had investigated the 
APEC leaders' meeting as the subject matter. This paper showed the impacts of these 
disregarded occasions with unexpected outcomes. It also sets the model for analyzing 
Hu Jintao，s performance in Summit since his circumstance is more or less similar to 
Jiang in the early 90s.. 
7.4 Limitations 
Although I have tried my best to exhaust the information on the Sino-
American politics in summit, I must admit that the study was based on secondary data 
only. Another limitation in this study is that since summitry is meeting between top 
leaders, some secret and off-record conversations are not accessible. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that is a platform to handle Sino-US relations, can only be tested in a 
limited way. Fortunately, with the increasing transparency in China and a highly 
demanding disclosure system in the US, together with continual information 
124 
technology advancement, a reasonable amount of the details of their summitry and 
responses are attainable. 
It was true that this paper cannot prove that domestic power struggle is the 
main concern in every leaders' policy making although most information favor this 
kind of argument. Washington Post ]ust posted an article on China's decision on Hong 
Kong policy in 2004 May, it mentioned that 'Jiang...is to strengthen his hold on 
power by promoting a hard line approach toward Hong Kong.. .prolonged struggle for 
power between Jiang's allies and those who support Hu has created a 
dynamic...Policy is being used as a weapon in the power struggle. , The same logic 
is apparently applicable to policy areas other than foreign relations. 
236 Philip P. Pan, 'Jiang puts hard line to the test in China; ex-President limits leaders' options on Hong 
Kong, Taiwan', Washington Post, AOl, May 31, 2004. 
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Appendix 1 
Chronology of Key Issues in Sino-US Relations237 
1972 
Feb 21-28 US President Richard Nixon visited China and met with Chairman 
Mao Zedong at Zhongnanhai, Beijing 
Feb 27 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and US President Richard Nixon signed 
the Shanghai Communique 
1973 
Feb 22 Two countries announced the establishment of Liaison offices 
1975 
Dec 1-5 US President Gerald Ford visited China 
Dec 2 Mao Zedong met with US President Gerald Ford 
1978 
July Talks on normalization of relations commenced. 
Dec 16 After six rounds of talks lasting for half a year, they reached an 
agreement and issued the Joint Communique between China and the 
US on the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
1979 
Jan 1 Chinese and American sides will acknowledge each other and 
establish formal diplomatic relations. 
Jan 29-Feb 5 Vice-Premier Deng Xiangping paid an official visit to the US. He 
met US President Jimmy Carter. They signed a scientific and 
technological cooperation agreement, a cultural agreement and an 
agreement on establishing consular relations and open consulate 
generals in each other's country. 
Feb 28 US closed Taiwan embassies. 
Mar 1 Exchanging ambassadors and opening embassies in the two nations 
Apr 10 US President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act (Law 96-8). 
1982 
Aug 17 China and US issued a Joint Communique on the gradual decrease 
and ultimately termination of US arms sales to Taiwan 
1984 
Jan 10-16 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited US 
April 26-May 1 US President Ronald Reagan visited China 
April 28 Deng Xiangping (Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Central 
Committee of the PRC) met Regan in the Great Hall of the People in 
Beijing. 
237 Data come from various source include website of ministry of Foreign Affair of PRC 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/premade/28067/sino-us2.htm, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4452.hti-nl 
& embassy of PRC in USA http://www.china-embassv.org/eng/c2681 .html. Report of the CSIS US 
China Policy Task Force, CRG Reports IB98018, Human Events, South China Morning Post, Beijing 
Review and New York Times. 
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1985 
July 22-31 Chinese President Li Xiannian visited US (China: time a nominal 
head of state visiting the US) 
1989 
Feb 24 Japanese Emperor Hirohito died on Jan. His funeral scheduled on 
24th Feb, George Bush came to Japan and then went to China 
Feb 24-27 US President George Bush visited China 
May Chairman of the Standing Committee of National People's Congress 
of China, Wen Li visited US 
June 4 Tiananmen incident happened, the West started to impose sanctions 
on China. US announced the suspension of high-level exchanges 
between the two countries 
June 24 Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang as the general secretary of the 
Communist Party. Later on he also got the post of the Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission. 
July Bush sent National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft on a secret 
journey to Beijing (to keep the lines of communication open) 
Oct 30 Deng Xiangpang visited US, and met with the former US president 
Nixon. 
Dec Bush sent National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to visit China 
1990 
Jan 10 Premier Li Peng announced the lifting of martial law in Beijing 
June Fang Lizhi and his family were allowed to leave China and several 
hundred other less known prisoners were freed. 
US President Bush announced the renewal of MFN status for PRC 
July Zhu Rongji as the Shanghai mayor visited US (Since Bush after 
Tianannnieii incident ban on all exchanges at or above the 
ministerial or cabinet level) 
Sept Economic Work Conference 
Nov 30-Dec 1 Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited the US at the 
invitation of James Bake, US Secretary of state. They reached an 
agreement in Cairo, New York about the voting in Security Council 
over Gulf War 
Dec National Planning Conference 
1991 
Mar 22 First Huangfu Ping commentary 
Mar NPC promoted Zhu Rongji to be vice-premier 
May 30 US President Bush announced the renewal of MFN status for PRC 
July 1 Jiang Zemin calls for opposing "peaceful evolution" 
July 10 US House of Representatives passed House Resolution (HR 2212) 
that sets conditional renewal of MFN status for the PRC 
July 23 US Senate passes HR 2212 
Aug 19-21 An Attempted coup d'etat failed in the Soviet Union 
Nov 16 Baker became the first cabinet officer to travel to China after the 
Tiananmen incident 
Dec 31 The USSR dissolved 
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1992 
Jan 18-Feb 21 Deng Xiaoping's "southern tour" 
Jan 31 Premier Li Peng met with Bush during a UN Security Council 
meeting at its headquarters in New York 
Feb 25 US Senate adopted HR 2212 
Mar 2 Bush vetoed HR 2212 
Mar 10-12 Politburo meeting supported Deng Xiaoping 
Mar 11 US House of Representatives passes HR 2212 that override the 
President's veto. 
Mar 18 US Senate rejects HR 2212's presidential veto override, thereby 
extending China's MFN status 
Sep 2 President Bush announces the sale of 150 F-16 AB fighter jets to 
Taiwan 
Sep 28 Conservative theoretician Hu Qiaomu dies at age 81 
Oct 12-18 Fourteeth Party Congress 
Oct 19 First Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee 
Nov US President Election~Bush has been fired, Bill Clinton won 
Nov 16 PRC's Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) 
sent a letter to Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) to start 
the dialogue 
1993 
Mar 5-7 Second Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee 
Mar Jiang Zemin became the President of China and Li Peng as the 
Premier 
Apr 27 US President Clinton and vice-President Gore had a short meeting 
with Dalai Lama 
Apr 27-29 ARATS and SEF held their fist talks and signed their fist agreements 
since 1949. (Mainland-Taiwan Koo-Wang Talks in Singapore) 
May 3-5 Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord flew to Beijing for last 
minutes talk about MFN and seeks for concession from Beijing 
May 28 Clinton issued Executive order 128590, released the required 'Report 
to Congress Concerning Extension of Waiver Authority for P R C 
and established seven human rights related factors as the conditions 
for extension of MFN for China beyond July 3, 1994 . 
Aug 3 Chinese ship, Yin He, stopped by US Navy 
Aug 25 Spokesman from US Secretary of State announced considering 
whether to impose sanctions against China for allegedly selling M-
11 missile technology to Pakistan 
Sep 23 2000 Olympics awarded to Sydeny, Australia, instead of Beijing 
Oct31 -Nov2 Assistant Secretary of Defense visit China for 3 days and met with 
PLA, resume the high-level military contact. 
Nov 11-14 Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee 
Nov 19 Chinese President Jiang Zemin met with US President Bill Clinton 
in Seattle (Black Island) during the informal meeting of APEC 




Jan 6 US announced that starting from Jan 17 the quota on China's export 
on textile and clothing will be cut 25-35% 
Mar 11-14 Secretary Christopher stay in Beijing without special production 
Apr-May Vice Premier Zho Jiahua came to US to attend Richard Nixon's 
funeral and to talk with Clinton 
May 4 Lee Teng-hui requested State Department permission for President 
him to append one night in Hawaii during refueling stopover en route 
to Central America and Africa. 
May 26 US President Clinton announced the extension of MFN status for 
China, along with a decision to delink MFN from human rights issues. 
Sep 25-28 Fourth Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee 
Nov 14 Jiang and Clinton met in Indonesia during the informal meeting of 
APEC leaders 
1995 
Jan 30 Chinese President Jinag Zemin gives his eight-point speech on 
reunification with the Chinese mainland. 
April 10 Chen Yun, advocate of a planned economy, dies at age 90 
April 17 Secretary Christopher met with Vice Premier and Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen, Christopher told him that US did not intend to make 
any change in their fundamental policy of only ‘unofficial’ relations 
with Taiwan. 
April 27 Chen Xitong removed as Beijing Party secretary for corruption 
May The House International Relations Committee sought to amend the 
Taiwan Relations Act to strengthen weapons sales to Taiwan and 
endorsed legislation declaring Tibet toe be an occupied sovereign 
country 
May 22 US State Department announced that a visa would be granted to 
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui for an unofficial, private visit to US. 
May 26 Chinese government decided to delay the politburo's visit to China 
on June, and end all kind of high-level visits 
May 28 Chinese government decided to terminated the discussion in MTCR. 
June week of June) US let Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui visited 
Cornell University 
June 7 Christopher wrote a letter to Qian mentioned that the votes of 390 to 
0 in House and 97 to 1 in Senate, Congress (House Concurrent 
Resolution 53) was so unity to call on Clinton to grant Lee a visa, 
Clinton do so for pre-empted a more official legislation on the 
Taiwan visit. Lee's visit will be only 'rare, unofficial and for a private 
propose' 
June 16 China recalled its ambassador to US, Li Daoyu, to Beijing for 
consultations 
Jun 21-28 China conducts missile test 85 miles north of Taiwan. Two short-
range surface-to-surface missiles with no explosives are fired on July 
22 and two more missiles are launched on July 23. China also deploys 
a number of warplanes along its eastern coast, 170 miles across the 
Taiwan Strait 
Aug 1 US Secretary of State Christopher and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
met 90 minus following the ASEAN conference in Brunei. (Clinton 
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through Christopher passed a secret letter to Jiang through Qian, this 
letter is about re-affirming past US policy towards Taiwan一'3 noes') 
US agree to send US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
Peter Tamoff visit Beijing and met vice-Chinese Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing. 
Aug 24 Orders human rights activist Harry Wu to be expelled from China 
Oct 3 US rules out lifting remaining post-Tiananmen sanctions against 
Beijing 
Oct 24 Jiang met with Clinton in New York during the UN's 50 anniversary 
celebrations 
Nov 19 US Vice-President A1 Core met with Jiang for 40 minutes at the 
APEC Osaka Summit in Japan 
1996 
Mar Taiwan Straits Crisis: PL A began massing troops across the strait 
from Taiwan just before its election and US involved in it by sending 
2 carrier battle groups to the vicinity of the island 
Mar Lui Huaqiu, State council foreign affairs official visit to Washington 
May China Can Say No Published 
May 15 US published a list of $3 billion worth of Chinese goods and threat 
sanction will be imposed if the privacy invasion in China continued. 
July Anthony Lake, American National Security Advisor visit Beijing and 
proposed an exchange of state visits of Clinton and Jiang 
July 22 Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister and Warren Christopher，US Secretary 
of State met in Jakarta, Indonesia ASEAN Regional Forum and agree 
to schedule of high-level meetings 
Oct 7-10 Sixth Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee 
Nov US president election: Clinton won 
Nov 20 Christopher visited China 
Nov 24 Jiang conferred with Clinton in the Philippines during the informal 
meeting of APEC leaders. 
Nov-Dec Xu Kuangdi, Mayor of Shanghai and Defence Minister Chi Haotian 
also visited US 
Dec Chi Haotian, China's defense minister, visit US 
1997 
Feb 19 China's news agency announced Deng Xianping's death 
Mar US vice-President A1 Gore paid an official visit to China 
Apr 28-30 Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen pay a three-day visited to US 
and met Clinton and Albright in preparing the fore-coming summit 
May 19 Clinton announced the decision on extension of MFN status for 
another year 
May 29 Jiang Zemin speaks at Central Party School 
July 1 Hong Kong is returned to China 
July 27 Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright met on the Foreign Ministers Meeting of ARF in Kuala 
Lumpur to prepare for the CI in ton-Jiang summit. 
Sep 12-18 The CPC's Congress held in Beijing 
Sep 19 First Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee 
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Oct 27 China signed the International Convention of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
Oct 26-Nov 3 Jiang visited to US for a week-long and met with Clinton, he 
commit to end sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran and stop 
exporting nuclear-weapon related materials 
Nov 15 Beijing released prominent dissident Wei Jinagsheng and allowed 
him to travel to the US for medical treatment 
Nov 24-25 Jiang met Clinton hardly three weeks after the visit of Jiang to 
Washington in Vancouver APEC meeting 1997 
Dec 31 Beijing emphasized she would not devalue its currency even though 
its high value relative to other Asian currencies 
1998 
Jan US Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited China, Ministry of 
Defense of China and US Department of Defense singed the 
Agreement on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen 
Military Maritime Safety. 
Feb 25-26 Second Plenary Session of Fifteenth Central Committee 
Mar 4 Beijing University celebrates its 100 anniversary 
Mar 12 China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right 
Mar 16 National People's Congress selected Zhu Rongji as Prime Minister 
(replace Li Peng) 
Apr China releases prominent dissident Wang Dan from prison and forces 
him into exile in the US 
May 1 US Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited China and signed the 
Agreement on US-China establishment of Direct Secure Telephone 
Link. 
May 2 Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton had their first talk through the new 
established direct secure telephone link, exchange view of South Asia 
and Sino-American relations. 
June 1-2 US Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs, Samuel 
Burger, visited China. 
June 3 Clinton announced the extension of China's MFN trading status for 
another year 
June 25-July 3 US president Bill Clinton visit China, they issued the Joint Statement 
on the Negotiation of the Protocol to the Biological Weapons 
Convention and the Joint Statement on Banning Anti-Personnel 
Landmines, and also the Joint China-US Statement of the issue of 
South Asia. 
June 30 Clinton made a statement about Taiwan during informal occasion in 
Shanghai that ‘ US did not support Taiwan independence, or two 
China or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan 
should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a 
requirement.' 
July 27 Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with US Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright during the ARF in Manila. 
Sep Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of China, Zhang 
Wannian, visited US 
Oct 14 Second Talks between Taiwan's Koo Chen-fu and China's Wang 
Daohan in Shanghai and agreed on a four point common understand. 
131 
Nov 16 US vise-president A1 Gore met with Jiang during APEC Informal 
Leaders meeting in Malaysia 
Dec 21 Democratic activities Wang Youcai and Xu Wenli sentenced to jail 
1999 
Jan 1 Jiang and Clinton exchanged congratulatory letter on the occasion of 
the 20^ anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relation between 
US and China. 
Mar 2 Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson expressed China's strong 
opposition to US government's decision to sponsor a China-related 
motion on the Conference of the UN human rights commission in 
Geneva. (US condemn China about its Human Rights record) 
Mar 23 United States starts bombing Serbian forces in Kosovo 
Apr 6-14 Premier Zhu Rongji official visited US over China's application to 
join the WTO break down 
Apr 10 Zhu and Clinton issued a joint statement on the issue of China's 
accession to the WTO in Washington which expressed US's 
commitment to firmly support China's accession at the end of 1999. 
Apr 20 Task force established to investigate corruption in Xiamen 
Apr 25 Falun Gong organized physical exercise programes had managed to 
surround Zhongnanhai 
May 8 NATO bombed on Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia 
May 9 Clinton sent a letter to Jiang to expressed his apology and sincere 
condolence for the tragic situation and human losses in Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade yesterday 
May 10 China foreign Ministry Spokesperson announce that the high level 
military contacts between armed forces of US and China will be 
postponed 
May 14 Jiang had a phone talk with Clinton; Clinton expressed his regrets 
over the bombing incident 
May 25 'Cox Report' by US House of Representative accused China steal US 
nuclear technology. 
June 16 US Under Secretary of State, Thomas Pickering visited China and 
presented to the Chinese government that the US government report 
on the bombing incident. 
July 9 Taiwan president Lee Tang Hui suggested that from now on talks 
with China should be held on the basis of equal states, in a "special 
state-to-state relationship". 
July 10 The two Presidents Mr. Clinton and Mr. Jiang spoke in the telephone 
call when teams from the two countries played each other in the 
Women's World Cup Final. 
July US openly criticize of Lee Teng Hui's 'special state to state 
relationship' and reaffirmed the one China policy since Nixon's 
visit. 
July 22 China crackdown on Falun Gong一name it the 'cult' and this group 
was banned. 
July 25 Tang Jiaxuan met with Albright while attending the ARF meeting in 
Singapore 
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July 27 Deputy Commerce Secretary David L Aaron met with Foreign Trade 
Minister Shi Guangsheng and two other senior Chinese officials to 
discuss a number of commercial issues. (Trade Talk) 
July 30 US and China agreed that Washington would pay $4.5 million in 
compensation for the victims of NATO's bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Yugoslavia. 
Sep 11 Jiang and Clinton held an official meeting during the APEC Informal 
Leaders Meeting in Auckland, New Zealand. (Ended the frozen 
relations following the bombing) 
Sep 12 Vice Premier Qian Qichen met with Albright and Berger. 
Sept 19-22 Fourth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee 
Sep 23 Tang Jiaxuan met with Albright during the 54化 session of the UN 
General Assembly in New York 
Oct 1 50^ anniversary of the founding of the PRC celebrated 
Octl 1 -23 Zen Jianhui, member of the Standing Committee and the Chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the NPC visited US to met 
the Congress members of US 
Oct 17 Jiang Zemin had a phone talk with Clinton through the direct secure 
telephone link, exchanging views on China's accession to WTO 
Nov 7 Jiang had phone talk with Clinton on the bilateral negotiation 
between China and US on China's accession to WTO 
Nov 10-15 China's Minister of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation Mr. Shi 
Guangsheng and US Trade Representative Mr. Bashervski, National 
Economic Council Mr. Sperling held talks in Beijing on China's 
accession to WTO. 
Nov 15 US-China signed the Bilateral Agreement on China's accession to 
WTO 
Dec 11 Wen Ho Lee 'spy' case: Wen, a Chinese American scientist accused 
of leaking US nuclear information to China 
Dec 16 US and China negotiators reached agreement on compensation for 
damages in NATO bombing of PRC Embassy 
2000 
Jan 12 US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth visited China as the 
guest of the US Embassy of China. Vice Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi met with Stanley Roth. 
Jan 22-26 Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai’ Deputy Chief of the General 
State the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) visited the US 
and met US Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe and 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
Feb Jiang Zemin raises 'Three representatives' Slogan 
Feb 17-18 Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Deputy Secretary of State 
Talbott held China-SU Consultation of Strategic Security 
Mar 18-22 Richard Hoi brook, US Representati ve to the UN, visited China and 
met Jiang, Qian, Tang.. .respectively 
Mar 28-30 Assistance to the US President for National Security Samuel Berger 
visited China 
Mar Pro-independence politician Chen Shui-bian wins Taiwan's 
presidential election. Beijing threatens to attack the island if it 
attempts to secede 
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May 28 Jiang had a phone talk with Clinton and discussed Sino-American 
relations 
May US House of Representatives votes to normalize trade relations with 
China, and to set up a commission to monitor China's human rights 
record 
Jun 22-23 US Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited China 
Jul 7-8 US Under Secretary of State Holum visited China and met with Vice 
Foreign Minister Wang Guangya on arms control and nonproliferation 
Jul 28 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxiian met with US Secretary of State 
Albright during ARF meeting in Bangkok 
Sep 8 3-days UN millennium summit meting began in New York, Jiang 
Zemin joined and had a official meeting with Clinton during Summit 
Oct 9-10 Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee 
Oct 22-29 Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited US for Vice Foreign 
Ministerial Consultation 
Nov 15 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with US Secretary State Madeline 
Albright in Brunei 
Nov 16 Jiang and Clinton held an official meeting during APEC informal 
leaders meeting in Brunei 
2001 
Jan New US president George W Bush makes it clear he does not regard 
China as a 'strategic partner". China fears his support for a National 
Missile Defence System 
Jan 29 US Trade & Development Agency (TDA) announced reopening its 
grant assistance program in China which had suspended since 1989 
Feb 28 China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights it signed on Oct 1997. 
Mar 18-24 Vice Primer Qian Qichen visited to US 
Apr Bush allows arm sales to Taiwan 
Apr 1 EP-3 incident: A China F8 fighter collided with a US Navy EP-3 
plane over the South China Sea, and it made an emergency landing 
on Hainan island and caused the death of the pilot Wang Wei. 
April 11 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan received a letter from the US 
Government saying “very sorry" for the US military surveillance 
plane ramming into and destroying a Chinese military plane, handed 
by the representative plenipotentiary of the US Government and US 
Ambassador Pruecher. 
April 12 Chinese Government decided to allow the 24 crewmembers of the US 
plane to leave China 
Apr 23-25 Assistant Foreign Minister Mr. Zhou Wenzhong and US Ambassador 
Pruecher held informal negotiations on the settlement of the US EP-3 
event 
May The White House allows Taiwanese President Chen Shui Bian to visit 
the US 
Jun 19-22 Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Zhou Wenzhong made a 
working visit to the US 
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July 5 Chinese President Jiang Zemin talked with US President George W. 
Bush on phone 
July 14 Beijing won the right to host the 2008 Olympic games 
July 16 US President George W. Bush wrote to President Jiang a letter about 
some issues on US-China relations 
July 25 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan held talks with US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell on the sidelines of the annual meeting of the Eighth ARF 
ill Hanoi, Vietnam. 
July 28-29 US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Beijing and met with Jiang, 
Zhu and Qian. 
Sep 12 President Jiang Zemin had a telephone conversation with US President 
Bush a day after 911-terror attack 
Sep 20-21 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited the US 
Oct 9-10 James A. Kelly, US Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs visited China 
Octl 5-21 APEC 2001 held in Shanghai, members leaders came to China (include 
US President George W. Bush, Russia President Putin and ROK 
President Kim Dae-jung.. .etc) 
Oct 19 Jiang held talks with US President George W. Bush in Shanghai 
Oct Bush said US against Taiwan independence. 
Nov 12 President Jiang had phone conversation with President Bush 
exchanged views on the implementation of the spirit of the two 
President's meeting in Shanghai 
Nov29-30 Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Guangya visited the United States，and 
met with the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security John R. Bolton for consultations on Arms 
Control and non-proliferation. 
Dec 11 China formally joined WTO 
Dec 16-17 Avis Bohlen, the United Slates Assistant Secretary for Arms Control 
visited China, briefing to the Chinese side on the withdrawal of the US 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
2002 
Jan 1 China received PNTR (Permanent normal trade relations) from US 
Feb 20-21 US President Bush visited China in his way to Japan and South Korea 
Apr 27-May3 Vice-Premier Hu Jintao began his first official visit to US 
April Angry over US dealings with Taiwan, China refuses a request by the 
USS Curtis Wilbur to make a port call at Hong Kong 
May 1 President Bush welcomes China's presumed future leader Hu Jintao 
to the White House for talks. 
July 12 A new Pentagon report to Congress questions China's commitment 
to a peaceful settlement of its differences with Taiwan. It also 
highlights the threat China poses to neighbouring countries 
July 31 Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell while attending the ARF meeting in Brunei 
Aug3 In a televised speech in Tokyo to the World Association of Taiwanese 
Associations, Chen expended by describing the situation across the 
Taiwan Strait as the 'one side, one country' furthermore suggesting 
that he supported a national referendum in Taiwan on Taiwan's 
future. 
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Aug 25-27 Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State of US came to China to 
attend the China-US vice-foreign ministerial political consultation 
Aug 26 US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage announced US was placing 
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement on its list of terrorist group. 
Sep 6 Jiang received the phone call from Bush. The two sides exchanged 
views on international and regional issues as well as further 
development and enhancement of China-US constructive and 
cooperative relationship. 
Oct 17 US Under Secretary of State Bolton and Assistant Secretary Kelly 
met with Vice Foreign Ministers Li Zhaoxing, Wang Guangya and 
Wangyi respectively during their trip to China 
Oct 22-25 Jiang made a state visited to US, meeting with Bush at his ranch in 
Crawford, Texas 
Oct 26-27 Jiang met Bush again during APEC meeting in Mexico 




Pew Research Center of People and the Press 
rhe Gallup Poll. Latest: Feb. 4-6, 2002. N=1,011 adults nationwide. MoE ？3. 
"Next, I'd like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. Is your overall opinion 
of China very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?" 
Very Mostly Mostly Very No 
Favorable Favorable Unfavorable Unfavorable Opinion 
% % % % % 
2/02 6 38 37 12 7 
2/01 5 40 31 17 7 
11/00 5 31 39 18 7 
3/00 6 29 40 16 9 
1/00 4 29 33 18 16 
5/99 5 33 38 18 6 
3/99 2 32 39 20 7 
2/99 8 31 34 16 11 
7/98 6 38 36 11 9 
j 6/98 5 34 42 9 10 
A f C m m ^ C 5 28 36 14 17 
Seot t Qng met 
with Clint3>f96 6 33 35 16 10 
2/94 4 36 38 15 7 
11/93 10 43 24 15 8 
8/89 5 29 32 22 12 




Books and Articles 
Allison, Graham T. (1971). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
New York: Harper Collins Publisher. 
Aboulmagd, Kamal et al (2001). Crossing the Divide: dialogue among civilizations. 
South Orange, NJ. : School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton 
Hall University. 
Bamett, A. Doak (1985). The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and 
Process. Boulder, Colo: Westview 
Bachman, David (1989). Domestic Source of Chinese Foreign Policy. In Samuel S. 
Kim (ed.)，China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations 
(pp. 31-54). Boulder: Westview Press. 
Becker, Elizabeth (1999，November 5). China set to end suspension of military 
relationship with US. New York Times, p. 15. 
Broder, John M. (1997，October 30). Summit in Washington: The overview; US and 
China reach trade pacts but clash on rights. New York Times. 
Broder, John M (1999, November 29). Hsing-Hsing the panda，A gift from Mao, dies. 
New York Times. 
Beck, Simon (1996, November 25). Presidents launch new era of ties. South China 
Morning Post, 1. 
Carter, Ashton B. & Perry, William J. (1999). Preventive defense: a new security 
strategy for America. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Christensen, Thomas J. (2001). Posing problem without catching up: China's rise and 
challenges for US Security Policy. International Security 25 :5-40. 
Cohen, Warren I. (2000). America 's response to China: A history of Sino-American 
relations (4出 ed). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Christopher, Warren (1998). 'Standing Firm with China'. In the stream of history: 
shaping foreign policy for a new era, Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, Ch. 29. 
DeLuca, Anthony R. (1998). Politics, Diplomacy and the Media: Gorbachev's Legacy 
in the West. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Dunn, David H. (1996). Diplomacy at the Highest Level New York: St Martin's Press 
Inc. 
138 
Dumbaugh, Kerry (1984). Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy. In Harry Harding 
(ed.), China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Dumbaugh, Kerry (2002, Nov 21). China-US Relations. CRS Report. IB98018. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 
Dumbaugh, Kerry (2003, July 25). China-US relations: Current Issues for the 108th 
Congress. CRS Report for Congress fOrder Code RL31815). Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 
Deutsch, Karl W. (1953). Nationalism and social communication: An inquiry into the 
foundations of nationality. Cambridge: The Massachusetts institute of 
technology. 
Doyle, Michael (1986). Liberalism and World politics. American Political Science 
Review 80: 1151-1170 
Eban, Abba (1983). The New Diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modern Age. 
New York: Random House. 
Eckholm, Erik (2002, October 20). Bush to treat China's Departing Leader to a 
Barbecue Summit. New York Times. 
Evans, Peter B.; Jacobson, Harold K. & Putnam，Robert D. (1993). Double-edged 
diplomacy: international bargaining and domestic politics. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
Fearon, James D. (1998). Domestic Politics, foreign policy and theories of 
international relations. Annual Reviews Political Science 1: 289-313. 
Finnemore, Martha (1996). National Interests in International Sociality. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Fasion, Seth (1999，July 30). US to pay China for embassy bombing. New York Times. 
Foot, Rosemary (2000). Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the 
Struggle over Human Rights in China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gibney, Frank B. (1993). Creating a Pacific community: A time to bolster economic 
institutions. Foreign Affairs 72: 20-25. 
Greenberger, Robert (1995, October 2). Clinton agrees to meet China's Jiang in New 
York session later this month. The Wall Street Journal 
Gourevich, Peter (1978，Autumn), ‘The second image reversed: The International 
Sources of Domestic Polities', International Organization, Vol. 32, No.4，pp. 
881-912. 
139 
Heywood, Andrew (2002). Politics Edition). New York: Palgrave 
Hay, Colin (2002). Political Analysis. New York: Palgrave. 
Huang, Gary (1999, April 6). Last Minute Debate gave Zhu go ahead. Hong Kong 
Standard. 
Hamrin, Carol Lee (1994). Elite Politics and the development of China's Foreign 
Relations. In Thomas W Robinson & David Shambaugh (ed.), Chinese Foreign 
Policy: Theory and Practice (pp. 70-114). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hass, Ernst B. & Whiting, Allen S. (1956) Dynamics of International Relations. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 
Hutchinson, Earl Ofari (2004, April 13). Why Rice can't apologize in September 11 
Inquiry. South China Morning Post, A13. 
Harding, Harry (1981). Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Harding, Harry (1984). China's Changing Roles in the Contemporary World. In Harry 
Harding (ed.), China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (pp. 177-223). New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Harding, Harry (1992). A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 
1972. Washington DC: Brookings Institution. 
Harding, Harry (1999). The Clinton-Jiang Summits: An American Perspective. In 
Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheung (ed.), The Outlook for US-China relations 
following the 1997-1998 Summits: Chinese and American Perspectives on 
Security, Trade and Cultural Exchange. 
Hurtzig, Julia & Sandschneider，Eberhard (2000). National Interest and Multilateral 
Cooperation: The PRC & its policies towards APEC and ARF. In Jorn Dosch & 
Manfred Mols (ed.), International relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of 
Power, Interest, and Cooperation (pp. 215-242). New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Hsu, Szue-Chin Philip (2003). China's Domestic Politics and US-Taiwan-China 
Relations: An Assessment in the Aftermath of the CCP's National Congress. 
American Foreign Policy Interests 25: 45. 
Huntington, Samuel P (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order. New York : Simon & Schuster. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain (1998). International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy. In 
Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the 
New Millennium (4山 ed) (pp. 55-90). Boulder: Westview Press. 
140 
Joffe, Ellis (1999). Ruling China after Deng. In Orville Schell & David Shambaugh 
(ed.), The China Reader: The reform era (pp. 136-150). New York : Vintage 
Books. 
Koehn, Peter & Cheung，Joseph Y.S. (ed.) (1999). The Outlook for US-China 
relations following the 1997-1998 Summits: Chinese and American Perspectives 
on Security, Trade and Cultural Exchange. HK: The Chinese University Press. 
Keohane, Robert O. & Nye，Jospeh S. (1989). Power and interdependence. New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers. 
Kan, Shirley A (2001, March 12). China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" 
Policy—Key statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. CRS Report 
RL3034L Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress. 
Kim, Samuel K. (1994). China's International Organizational Behavior. In Robinson 
and Shambaugh (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (pp. 435-
452). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Kim, Samuel S. (1979). China, the United Nations and World Order. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Kim, Samuel S. (1998). Chinese Foreign Policy in theory and practice. In Samuel S. 
Kim (ed.), China and the world: Chinese foreign policy faces the new 
millennium (pp.3-33). Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. 
Lampton, David M. (1997). China and Clinton's America: Have they learned 
anything? In Rebecca McGinnis (ed.), Contemporary China: Approaching the 
2”' century: 26"' Annual Sino-American Conference June 1997 University of 
Maryland. Maryland: University Press of Maryland. 
Lampton, David M. (2001). Is China's policy-making changing?. In David M. 
Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
reform, 1978-2000 (pp. 1-39). California: Stanford University Press. 
Lampton, David M (2001). Same bed, different dreams: managing U.S.-China 
relations, 1989-2000. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Lilley, James R. (1998). US-China Summit: Engaging a Giant. Christian Science 
Monitor 90: 11. 
Lasater, Martin L. (1984). The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth (1997). Domestic Politics and Sino-US Relations. In Ezra F. 
Vogel (ed.), Living with China 
141 
Lieberthal, Kenneth & Oksenberg，Michel (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, 
Structures, and Processes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lady, Nicholas R. (1994). China in the World Economy. Washington, DC: Institute 
for International Economics. 
Lam, Willy Wo-Lap (1995). China after Deng Xiaoping: The power struggle in 
Beijing since Tiananmen. HK: PA Professional Consultants Ltd. 
Lam, Willy Wo lap (1995, September 29). Triumph Tempered by Failure to Hasten 
Retirement of Generals Loyal to Patriarch. South China Morning Post, 10. 
Lam, Willy Wo-Lap (1999), The era of Jiang Zemin, Singapore ； New York : Prentice 
Hall. 
Marsh, David & Stoker，G. (1995). Theory and Methods in Political Science. London: 
MacMillan. 
Morgenthau, Hans (1948). Politics among nations; the struggle for power and peace. 
New York : A. A. Knopf. 
Miller, H. Lyman and Liu, Xiaohong (2001), The Foreign Policy Outlook of China's 
"Third generation" elite. In David Lampton (ed.)，The Making of Chinese 
Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of reform, 1978-2000 (pp. 123-150). 
California: Stanford University Press. 
Milner, Helen V. (1997). Interests, institutions and information: domestic politics and 
international relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Mydans, Seth (1996，July 25). US-China Talks continue; Tone is warmer despite 
Difference. New York Times. 
Marquand, Robert (2001). A Careful Boost for US-China Ties. Christian Science 
Monitor 93: 6. 
Marquand, Robert (2001). Interview Kenneth Lieberthal: US and China can still limit 
the damage from the crisis. Christian Science Monitor 93: 7. 
Myers, Robert H.; Oksenberg, Michel C & Shambaugh, David (ed.) (2001). Making 
China Policy: Lessons from the Bush & Clinton Administration. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Little field Publishers Inc. 
Moore, Thomas G. & Yang, Dixia (2001). Empowered and Restrained: Chinese 
Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Independence. In David M. Lampton 
(ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of reform, 
1978-2000. California: Stanford University Press. 
Oksenberg, Michel (1982). A decade of Sino-American relations. Foreign Affair 61: 
175-196. 
142 
Peter, B. Guy, Rhodes, R. A. W. & Wright，Vincent (2000). Staffing the Summit: The 
Administration of the Core Executive: Convergent Trends and National 
Specificities. In B. Guy Peter, R. A. W. Rhodes & Vincent Wright (ed.), 
Administrating the Summit. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Perlez, Jane (1999, July 26). US and China say they are mending post-bombing rift. 
New York Times. 
Perlez, Jane (1999，October 10). The World: Presidential Wish Lists; seeking Glory 
far from home. New York Times. 
Pearson, Margaret M. (1999). China's Integration into the International Trade and 
Investment Regime. In Elizabeth Economy & Micheal Oksenberg (ed.), China 
Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (pp. 161-205). New York: The Foreign 
Relations Council. 
Pei, Minxin (2003). Domestic Changes in China and Implications for American 
Policy. In Christopher Marsh & June Teufel Dreyer (ed.), US- China relations in 
twenty first century (pp. 43-70). New York: W.W. Norton. 
Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two 
Level Games. International Organization 42: 427-460. 
Purdum, Todd S (1996，November 25). Clinton and Chinese President Agree to 
Exchange State visit. New York Times. 
Qian, Qichen (2003). Ten stories of a diplomat (Waijiao Shi Ji). Beijing: Shi jie zhi 
shi chu ban she. 
Russett, Bruce (1993). Grasping the democratic Peace, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rosenthal, Elisabeth (1999，December 16). US agrees to pay China $28 million for 
bombing. New York Times, p. 6. 
Rosenau, James N. (1994). China in a Bifurcated World: Competing Theoretical 
Perspectives. In Thomas W Robinson & David Shambaugh (ed.)，Chinese 
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (pp. 536-537). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Risen, James N. (1999，March 9). US fires scientist suspected of giving China bomb 
data. New York Times, Al . 
Ross, Robert S. (1995). Negotiating Cooperation: the United State and China, 1969-
1989. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Risse-kapper, Thomas (1995). Bringing transnational relations back in: non-state 
actors, domestic structures and international institutions. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
143 
Robinson, Thomas & Shambaugh, David (1994). Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Shih , Chi-yu (1993). China's Quest for Justice In Chi-yu Shih (edO, China's Just 
World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy (pp. 29-60). Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Shambaugh, David (1996). Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating 
Beijing's Responses. International Security 21: 180-209. 
Sanger, David E. (1999，September 12). Clinton and Jiang heal rift and set new trade 
course. New York Times, p. 1. 
Sanger David E (1999，November 9). Cliton sends envoys to try to close a deal on 
opening Chinese Market to the US. New York Times, p. 12. 
Sanger David E. (1999，November 16). The Trade Deal: the drama; at the last hour, 
down to the last trick, and it worked. New York Times, p. 16. 
Seymour, James D. (1998). Human Right in Chinese Foreign Relation In Samuel S. 
Kim (ed) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy faces the New 
Millennium ed) (pp. 217-238). Boulder: Westview Press. 
Swaine, Michael D. (1998). The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security 
Policymaking. Santa Monica: RAND. 
Swaine, Michael D. (1995). China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy. Santa 
Monica. 
Swaine Michael D. (2001). Chinese Decision-making toward Taiwan, 1979-2000. In 
o'avid M Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in 
the Era of Reform. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Schell, Orville & Shambaugh, David (ed.) (1999). The China Reader: The reform era. 
New York: Vintage Books. 
Sutter, Robert and Dumbaugh, Kerry (1995，July 15). China-U.S. Relations. CRS 
Report IB94002. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress. 
Sutter, Robert (1995, August 2). US and China agree to resume talks after a rocky two 
months of feuding. The Wall Street Journal 
Sutter, Robert (1995, October 2). Clinton agrees to meet China's Jiang in New York 
session later this month. The Wall Street Journal 
Sutter, Robert G. (1998). China's Changing Conditions. CRS Report 93114. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 
144 
Sutter, Robert (1998，May 1). Albright builds relations: With China but gets few 
details for June Summit. The Wall Street Journal. 
Sutter, Robert & Chen, Kathy (1998，April 28). Sino-US Relations reach sensitive 
Juncture: New Premier's reform plan, pushed by Washington, may rekindle 
tensions. The Wall Street Journal. 
Suettinger, Robert L (2003). Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 
1989-2000. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Tyson, Ann Scott (1997). Human Rights in the Back Seat during Summit. Christian 
Science Monitor 89: 6. 
Tucker, N Bernkopf (2001). The Clinton Years: The Problem of Coherence. In 
Ramon H. Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg & David Shambaugh (ed.)，Making 
China policy: lessons from the Bush and Clinton administrations (pp.45-78). 
Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Tyler, Patrick E. (1993，November 18). Beijing may seek a US Trade Deal. New York 
Times. 
Tyler, Patrick E. (1999). A Great Wall. New York: A Century Foundation book. 
Whiting, Allen S. (1998). Chinese Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect. In 
Samuel S. Kim (ed). China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the 
New Millennium. ed.) Boulder: Westview Press. 
Wu, Guoguang (1997). Conducting dialogue under Strategic Conflict: Sino-American 
Relations in Flux' in China Review 1997, HK: Chinese University Press, pp.57-
85. 
Wu Guoguang (2000), ‘Conflicts Intensify, Dialogue Continues: Sino-American 
Relations into the New Century. In Lau Chung-ming & Jianfa Shen (ed)., China 
Review 2000 (pp. 27-59). HK: Chinese University Press. 
Wu Guoguang (2002) Passions, Politics & Politicians: Beijing between Taipei & 
Washington, Conference Paper in international colloquium "U.S.-Asia Relations 
Today: A New 'New World Order'?" in Paris, 2-4 December 2002 
Waltz, Kenneth N (1954) Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia University 
Press 
Wu, Linjun (1997). The PRC and APEC: A Planned Excursion for conciliation. Issues 
& Studies 
Wu, Lilian (1999, September 12). Clinton-Jiang Talks to help Taipei, Beijing to enter 
WTO: Scholars. Central News Agency - Taiwan. 
Yang, Jiemian (1999). Summit Diplomacy and Strategic Partnership: Aspirations, 
expectations and realization. In Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheung, (ed.), The 
145 
Outlook for US-China relations following the 1997-1998 Summits: Chinese and 
American Perspectives on Security , Trade and Cultural Exchange (pp. 49-65). 
HK: The Chinese University Press. 
Zuckerman, Laurence (1998, June 30). Clinton in China: Trade. New York Times. 
Zheng, Yong-Nian (1999). Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: 
Modernaization, Identity, and International relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Documents and Periodicals 
Additional Documents on Relations between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan 
(2000). Asian Affairs: An American Review 26: 223-226. 
Communist China's Chump (1996). Human Events 52: 1-2 
Chinese Daily. 14 June 1996. 
China: Jiang Turns on the power for Summit (1997, July 21). Asiaweek. 
Clinton meets Jiang Zemin ahead of APEC conference (1999, September 11). 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur 
China Statistical Yearbook. CELC Data Co. Ltd. 
'China: Clinton hopes for China WTO deal' in China Business Information Network 
(CBNet), September 13，1999. 
'Communique of the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China,' Xinhua News Agency, no. 0928131, September 28 
1995 
‘Ground-to-Ground Missile Test Coordinates Announced' Xinhua News Agency, 
March 5，1996, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/D2553/G, March 5, 
1996. 
Editorial (1997，October 31). Up the summit. The Wall Street Journal, All. 
Editorial (1997，November 17). South China Morning Post. 
Editorial (1999, August 14). A worsening crisis over Taiwan. New York Times, p. 12. 
Editorial (1999，November 3). In Search of a Chinese Trade Deal. New York Times, p 
24. 
Editorial: Chinese Boxes (2001, May 7). The Nation, p. 4. 
146 
Editorial (2002, October 30). People ’s Daily. 
Los Angeles Times. 2 August 1996. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth (2001) ‘US Policy Toward China' in Policy Brief. 
'Roundup: China and US say relations are back on track, Auckland, New Zealand' in 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 11, 1999，Saturday, International News. 
Sino-US Relations Traverse Rough and Rugged Road (2001, January 19). People 's 
Daily. 
US Treasury Chief meets Chinese Premier (1999，October 25). New York Times, p. 10. 
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, (2002, October 22)'Symbolism or substance? China talks up the 
Texas summit', CNN World. 
World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Website 
30 years of Sino-American relations from Ministry of Foreign Affair of People 
Republic of China: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eiig/premade/28067/sino-usl.htni 
APEC's official website: http://www.apecsec.org.sg/ 
Bush defends Taiwan Arms Sales (2001, April 25). BBC News world edition. 
Available at website: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1295542.stm 
Blitzer, Wolf (1996, November 24). Clinton, Jiang agree to future meetings. CNN, 
World, available in website: http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/961 l/24^Dec.china 
Chronology of China-US Relations http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-
us/26890.htm (accessed on 2002/11/6) 
‘China and the United States of America' from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
PRC http://www.fmprc.gov.cii/eng/4452.html (accessed at 5/5/3003) 
Chinese Media Continue Refuting Lee Teng-hui's Separatist (1999，July 14). People 's 
Daily Online, available at website: 
http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/other/archive.html 
China News Services and China News Agency, http://www.chinanews.com 
147 
China Page Archive in U.S. Department of State: 
http://usinfo. state. gov/regional/ea/uschina/archive.htm 
China in brief: 
http:// www.china.org. cn/e-china/forei gnrelation/index. htm 
Diary of the dispute (2001，May 24). BBC News world edition, available in website: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/127Q365.stm 
Editorial (2002, October 29). Keeping an eye on Jiang. Taipei Times, available in 
website: http://www.taipeitimes.coin/News/edit/archives/2002/10/29/177524 
(accessed at 18 April 2004) 
Fact Sheet: Achievements of US-China summit from The White House office of the 
Press Secretary Beijing, at website: 
http://www.usembassy-diina.org.cn/eiiglish/press/hot/Prcfactl.html 
Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington D.C., available at website: 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c57Q0.html 
Gibbs, Nancy & Duffy，Michael. Saving Face. TimeAsia in website: 
http://www.timexom/time/asia/news/magazine/0,9754,lQ5658,Q0.html 
H.R. 366，sec 1533, 'Report on requirements for response to increased missile threat 
in Asia Pacific Region' (http://thomas.loc.goV) 
‘1. Bilateral Political Relations in Retrospect' from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People 's Republic of China in http://fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4923.htmal (accessed on 
November 18 2002) 
Jiang/Bush Hold "Fruitful" Talks, China Daily October 19，2001. 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/0ct/20809.htm 
Jiang Holds Talks with Bush (2001，October 19). China Secretariat for APEC 2001, in 
website: http://211.99.196.218/apec/20011019/924867.htm 
Lam, Willy Wo-Lap (2001，October 16). APEC: Jiang's last hurrah?. C N N . available 
at website: http://www.cnn.eom/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/10/16/willv.column/ 
Odessey, Bruce (1999, September 22). Chinese Expected to Resume WTO 
Discussions in Washington. USIA, in website: 
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1999/990922-prc-usia.htm 
148 
Pew Research Center of People and the Press: 
http://www.pollingreport.com/china.htm 
Philip S Golub (1999, June) An international community, Le Monde diplomatique, 
http://mondediplo.eom/1999/0606golue 
Reyes，Alejandro & Lopez，Antonio (1996). A meeting of Minds: A Sino-US summit 
caps the fourth gathering of Asia Pacific leaders. AsiaWeek, available at website: 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/1206/natl.html 
Research library of Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI): 
http ://www. nti • org/db/china/engdocs/uschst97.htm 
'Spokesman on Lee Teng-Hui's Separatist Malice' in People 's Daily Online, July 12 
1999. (http://endish.peopledaiW.com.cn/other/archive.html) 
Sino-US Relations: Develop in Twists and Turns 
http://www.china.org.cn/ennhlish/2Q01 /Dec/24146.htm (accessed at 6/11/2002) 
Timeline: US-China relations (2002, October 29). BBC news, available at website: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/1258054.stm (accessed at April 19，2004) 
US backs Dalai Lama (2001, May 23). BBC News world edition, available at website: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/l 346621 .stm 
US China stand against terrorism: 
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2Q01/lQ/2Q011Q19-4.html 
US Reaffirms "One China" Policy (1999，July 14). People 's Daily Online, available at 
website: http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/other/archive.html 
Woodward, Bob (2001, November 18)，Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat 
Role. Washington Post, AOl http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/CIAl 8.html 
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President of the United States#Presidential powers 
Interview 




CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
_ l _ l l l 
• •mMMbOb 
